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2 | Preface 
1.1  Preface 
On the afternoon of the day that Gaddafi’s regime in Libya was 
subverted, I defended my proposal for PhD research in comparative 
politics. In that session, I had to argue why the study of the interrelation 
between societal culture and models of democracy matters. I was there 
with the strong conviction that democracy is demanded in different 
cultures, even by those nations that have lived under a long-lasting 
dictatorship. The Arab Uprisings, and before that the Iranian Green 
movement, shocked many political analysts and observers who strongly 
believed that people in the Middle East love their dictators and are happy 
with the authoritarian regimes in their countries. The domino of uprisings 
fractured this solid belief and showed that there is a demand for 
democracy and dignity everywhere.  
But bringing down old dictators is sometimes easier than building up a 
new democracy. The new constitution should be designed (or the old one 
should be adapted) to arrange a set of democratic institutions. 
Institutional choices about regime type, power structure and electoral 
system must be made. These choices will form a county’s model of 
democracy and may have consequences for the transition and 
consolidation of a democratic system. The issue of what institutional 
arrangement or model of democracy should be implemented in a new and 
transitional democracy is a crucial question that can codetermine the 
destiny of the country. This issue is sometimes taken for granted and 
political institutions are recklessly transplanted with no attention to the 
importance of compatibility of democratic model and contextual factors.  
In the defense session of my proposal, I hypothesized that societal 
culture, as an important contextual element, does matter in adoption of a 
model of democracy and that the compatibility of these two codetermines 
the legitimacy and performance of a democratic system. Therefore, 
constitutional engineers and institutional designers in new democracies 
should take into account the cultural orientations of the society, alongside 
other factors, and accordingly decide on opting, adopting and adapting 
political institutions. 
The committee liked and accepted the proposal1 and I have tried to do 
my best to study this hypothesis and examine the relation between 
societal culture and democratic models and the importance of this 
                                                      
1. I would like to pay tribute to the late Professor Willem Witteveen, one of the members 
of the interview committee, who was tragically killed along with his wife and daughter in 
the flight MH17 disaster over Ukraine.  
Chapter 1 | 3  
interrelation in the functionality of democracy. This book is the outcome 
of three years of research on the relation between patterns of culture and 
models of democracy. But what do we mean with these two concepts? 
And what have the literature and other students of culture and democracy 
said so far? What is the untold story that this book aims to tell?  
1.2  Approaches to the Relation between 
Culture and Democracy 
There are different approaches to treating culture within political 
science. The first approach belongs to those, mainly anthropologists, who 
believe in ‘cultural relativity’ and argue that each culture is unique and 
cultural values and social practices cannot be compared and classified. 
They advocate a ‘thick description’ of culture (Geertz, 1973). Radical 
relativists believe that all societal values, attitudes and practices, even if 
they are against the basic human rights indicated in the Universal 
Declaration, should be respected and any remarks or action to criticize or 
change cultural dispositions would be an imperialistic and neo-
colonialistic treatment imposed by Western power and hegemony (see 
Donnelly, 1984). Advocates of this approach are hesitant to accept any 
cultural explanation for variation in social, political or developmental 
success or failure.  
There are two other schools of thought that, for quite different reasons, 
disregard the importance of culture as an explanatory factor. Rational 
choice theorists believe that rational interests prevail over cultural 
orientations of individuals; in other words, rationality overcomes 
nationality. They assume individual preferences as given, which are not 
affected by cultural values. On the other hand, Marxists understand 
culture as a ‘superstructure’ that is utilized by the ruling class to 
legitimate oppression and justify inequality. These two perspectives see 
culture as epiphenomenon and share the same idea about the insignificant 
role of culture in political science.  
The opposite approach is proposed by those social and political 
scientists who believe that (mainly or even only) culture matters and 
counts in human development and political democracy. This school of 
thought has root in classic works by Alexis de Tocqueville (2002 [1838]) 
and Max Weber (2001 [1930]). This approach argues that cultural 
values and attitudes would be facilitators of, or obstacles to, progress. 
They mostly utilize comparative methods, mainly qualitative but 
sometimes quantitative, to examine how cultural factors codetermine 
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economic performance and political democracy. The radical ‘culturalist’ 
perspective often judges cultural values as good versus bad cultures and 
concludes that a cultural change, from a bad one to the good one, is 
crucial for successful economic and political development. It is inferable 
that these scholars believe in the superiority of a set of cultural values. 
Individualism, for instance, is seen as congenial to progress and 
democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963; Thompson et al., 1990; p. 256) 
while collectivism (familism/communitarianism) could be detrimental 
(Banfield, 1958; Harrison, 1985).  The cultural orientation of hierarchy or 
power distance is mostly interpreted as a despotic orientation in this view 
(Pye, 1985).  
The prominent scholars who sympathize with this perspective have 
gathered a collection of their ideas in the book Culture Matters. This 
book is the proceedings of the symposium Cultural Values and Human 
Progress, held by Harvard University in the summer of 1998. The book 
was edited by two famous ‘culturalist’ advocates, Lawrence Harrison and 
Samuel Huntington (2000). Among others, Francis Fukuyama, Ronald 
Inglehart, Lucian Pye, and Seymour Martin Lipset contributed to this 
edition.  
These two opposite views lie on a spectrum between two extreme 
poles that are labeled as ‘cultural relativism’ versus ‘cultural 
universalism’ (the latter is also called ‘cultural imperialism’ by its 
critics).  
There is another group of cultural theorists who believe that ‘culture 
matters’ (Ellis & Thompson, 1997), but stand between relativists and 
universalists. They assert that cultural universalists, who believe in 
superiority and workability of one universal culture, and cultural 
relativists, who believe in the viability of infinity of cultures, are both 
wrong. The advocates of ‘Cultural Theory’, who are inspired by the 
theory of Mary Douglas, claim that “we can make the world in more than 
one way but we cannot make it any way we like. More than one is not 
automatically infinity; there are some numbers in between” (Thompson et 
al. 2006, p. 325). This approach is called ‘constrained relativism’ and 
asserts that there are not more than five viable types of culture, or forms 
of social solidarity, which can explain the diversity of political 
preferences.  
The point of departure of this book is that each discussed approach is 
characterized partly by truth and partly by prejudice. This study, first of 
all, posits that culture is an important factor that cannot be ignored. This 
book supports the idea of constrained relativism, but not in the orthodox 
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interpretation that insists on the viability of limited number of ‘cultural 
types’. It will be presented that there are several cultural 
orientations/dimensions that map the diversity of cultures across 
countries. They are called dimensions or orientations of national culture. 
National culture represents the dominant, average inclination of people in 
a society towards a specific cultural orientation. Needless to say that 
national culture does not mean that all people in a national unit have the 
same position across a bipolar cultural dimension. National culture shows 
the average peak in a bell-shaped normal distribution of people’s values.  
From the outset, it should be emphasized that these cultural 
dimensions should not be misinterpreted so as to justify the violation of 
human rights indicated in the Universal Declaration. This study assumes 
that these bipolar dimensions do not stretch between black (bad) and 
white (good) values but between red and blue ones. The different cultural 
orientations predispose societies towards different preferences. As far as 
political democracy is concerned, we can find workable democratic 
countries having cultural values of either pole. However, it seems that 
models of democracy of countries with different cultures would be 
different; this is where we think cultural differences do matter. This study 
accepts universalism insofar as we talk about the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and ‘democracy as a universal value’ (Sen, 1999), 
however, it rejects universalism and superiority of a pattern of culture or 
a model of democracy.     
1.3  What Manifestation of Culture? 
In different studies of the relation between culture and politics, 
different elements are considered as manifestations of culture: religion 
(Fish, 2002; Huntington, 1996; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Weber, 2001 
[1930]), ethnicity (Jung, 2006; Lane & Ersson, 2005; Lane & Wagschal, 
2012), trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993) and common values or 
attitudes (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Baker, 
2000; Thompson et al., 2006; Wildavsky, 1987).  
The importance of religion originates from the seminal work by Max 
Weber (2001 [1930]) on the relation between Protestantism, capitalism 
and democracy. Later on, other political scientists elaborate on the role of 
religion. Huntington (1996), for instance, asserted that democracy is less 
feasible in Islamic countries. The emergence of democracy in countries 
with different religions over past decades weakened the credibility of 
using religious legacies as an explanatory factor for political democracy. 
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Norris and Inglehart (2002, p. 235) based on an empirical study posit that 
“Huntington is mistaken in assuming that the core clash between the 
West and Islamic worlds concerns democracy. The evidence suggests 
striking similarities in the political values held in these societies.” On the 
other hand, a recent survey-based research of 121 in-country religious 
groups from 56 nations by Minkov and Hofstede (2014b, p. 1) shows that 
“with respect to values, a shared national history is a potent cultural 
factor, whereas a globally shared religion is not”. In other words, “the 
national influence is much stronger than the influence of global 
religions”.   
The most important facet of culture, which absorbs more attention in 
the contemporary study of culture and democracy, is values and attitudes. 
Among political scientists, culture is mainly defined as being composed 
of values, attitudes, norms, beliefs, orientations, assumptions and mental 
products prevalent among people in a society (Huntington, 2000, p. xv; 
Thompson et al., 2006, p. 319). In the literature, ‘values’ and ‘attitudes’ 
are mostly used interchangeably. This is problematic, since while the 
former is more durable, the latter is more variable. In this study, we 
distinguish between cultural values and situational attitudes and will 
focus on the role of cultural values.  
1.4  Political Culture or Societal Culture? 
The concept of cultural values in the literature of political science is 
predominantly described by the notion of ‘political culture’. This concept 
was developed in the seminal book, The Civic Culture, by Almond and 
Verba (1963). They have introduced three types of political culture, 
namely parochial, subject and participant, according to the level and kind 
of political participation. Thereafter, many ‘culturalists’ and 
‘essentialists’ considered political culture as the main factor in explaining 
the existence and persistence of democracy or autocracy in different 
countries (a.o. Harrison & Huntington, 2000).  
The notion of political culture, in my view, is problematic due to the 
ambiguities involved in the definition and operationalization of its 
‘culture’ component. The ‘political’ component indicates that this 
concept is about the political process and system. Almond and Verba 
(1963, p.12) defines political culture as “attitudes toward the political 
system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in 
the system”. The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 
describes political culture as "the set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments 
Chapter 1 | 7  
that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the 
underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political 
system". In both of these definitions, as well as in empirical 
operationalization of political culture, it is mainly attitudes towards 
politics that are considered and measured.   
As mentioned above, the distinction between values and attitudes in 
defining and operationalizing culture is crucial. The notion of ‘value’ 
connotes something durable, while ‘attitude’ implies a sense of 
fluctuation. Culture is also acknowledged as a more durable and slow-
changing phenomenon. Thus, culture seems to better match values than 
attitudes. Attitudes are more situational rather than cultural. Given this, 
the concept of political culture is confusing: is it more about stable 
values, as the notion of culture implies, or is it more about situational 
attitudes, as the notion of politics suggests? 
This ambivalence can be a source of controversy around the concept 
of political culture in the literature (see the chapter titled “Political 
Culture Revisited” in Brynen et al., 2013). When a phenomenon is called 
‘cultural’, it implies that this is non-changing or difficult to change. If it is 
said that political culture is undemocratic, the impression is that no 
democracy will emerge. But when we talk about political attitudes, the 
inference will be different; less supportive attitudes towards democracy 
can be changed and shifted toward democratic attitudes, even over a short 
time, as attitudes change fast. Allow me to illustrate this with an example. 
The World Values Survey asked Egyptians several questions about 
democracy in 2008 and 2012, both in March (WVS, 2014). The earlier 
survey was conducted in the era of Hosni Mubarak and the second one 
was done before the presidential election in which Mohamed Morsi, the 
candidate of the Islamic party known as the Muslim Brotherhood, won. 
The answers to three questions can show the challenge of 
interchangeability of political attitudes and political culture. In a question 
about the ‘importance of democracy’2, in both rounds of surveys 87% of 
Egyptian respondents indicated that it is very important for them to live in 
a country that is governed democratically. In other questions, participants 
were asked about the ‘essential characteristics of democracy’. In 2008 
and 2012 respectively, 92% and 85% indicated that “choosing leaders in 
free elections” is an essential characteristic of democracy. The responses 
                                                      
2- The exact question is ‘how important is it for you to live in a country that is governed 
democratically?’ All questions were answered on a 1 to 10 scale from ‘not at all 
important’ to ‘absolutely important’. I aggregate the percentage of respondents who 
selected the answers 8 to 10.  
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to these two questions and stability of responses imply the existence of 
democratic values among Egyptian people. Another question asks 
whether it is essential that “religious authorities interpret the laws” in a 
democracy. This question is assumed to measure the popularity of 
separation of mosque and state. In answer to this question, 65% in 2008 
and 43% in 2012 support the involvement of religious authorities in 
interpretation of laws as an essential condition of democracy. This 
remarkable variation shows the effect of situational conditions on the 
political attitudes of people. This example can reveal the vulnerability of 
the concept of political culture when one uses political attitudes to 
operationalize this concept.  
I argue that if we distinguish between political attitudes and political 
culture, then the latter would be the facet or consequence of societal 
culture in the political behavior of people. Some features of political 
culture that are addressed in the literature, like ‘deference’ or ‘consensus’ 
(Almond & Verba, 1963) for instance, are features of societal culture 
indeed, manifested in the political realm as an aspect of social life. 
Dimensions of societal culture are important due to their influence on 
different aspects of social interactions. Political behavior and preferences 
can be interpreted and analyzed as one aspect of societal life. Therefore, 
one can interpret the ‘deference’ in political culture as a facet of societal 
culture of ‘power distance’. The ‘consensus’ political culture can be seen 
as a consequence of another societal culture, namely collaborativeness 
(see Chapter 2). Therefore, political culture can be seen as a 
manifestation or footprint of societal culture in the political domain.  
1.5  Democratization and Political Institutions 
This study is mainly concerned with the issue of democratization, 
designing or adapting political institutions in the process of democratic 
establishment and democratic survival  (Schedler, 1998). Although 
Democracy is a contested concept, however, in the present study 
democracy is defined as a political system in which political leaders and 
decision makers are elected in free, fair and frequent elections. This 
electoral process requires civil and political freedom including inclusive 
citizenship and freedom of expression, assembly and information (Dahl, 
2000; Diamond, 1999; Hendriks, 2010). These are sometimes known as 
the minimal criteria of democracy that may shape “electoral democracy” 
and not advanced and liberal democracy. In this book, we are working 
with this minimalist conception of electoral democracy (Diamond, 1999; 
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Przeworski, 1999) as we aim to involve and study more new 
democracies.  
The point of departure of this research is not the question of whether 
or not democracy is compatible with different cultures, but rather the 
question of what institutional arrangement is more compatible with the 
context of a new democracy. Some political theorists are convinced that 
people in some cultures are happy with their dictators and thus do not 
demand democracy; that is why there is no supply of democracy in those 
countries. Muslim countries and the Arab World were cited as the 
supporting example for this assertion. The empirical research of public 
attitudes on demand for democracy (Jamal & Tessler, 2008; Maleki, 
2011) and public uprisings in Arab countries in 2011 discredit these 
theories. The debate should no longer be on the acceptability of 
democracy for different cultures but instead the question should be what 
model of democracy could work better in a specific context.  
Democratization begins with establishing democratic institutions. At 
the very first stage, two major political institutions should be determined: 
first, the type of political structure or regime type, namely presidential or 
parliamentary (or a combination of these two); and second, the electoral 
system, namely majoritarian/plurality or proportional system (or a mixed 
one). The combination of these two major institutions and their sub-
institutions (e.g. term length, electoral threshold, district magnitude) will 
form a variety of institutional settings and models of democracy. In the 
literature of comparative politics, based on the seminal work by Arend 
Lijphart (1999, 2012) on Patterns of Democracy, a dichotomy of 
majoritarian versus consensual models of democracy are widely known 
and utilized. These two models, or institutional arrangements, have been 
operationalized only for thirty-six established democracies, most of 
which are Western.  
In democratization literature, there is a long-lasting debate on the 
superiority of a majoritarian versus a consensual model. Similar debate 
has been ongoing about the outperformance of various regime types (i.e. 
presidential vs. parliamentary) and different electoral systems. However, 
the lack of operationalization of democratic models for many new and 
developing democracies limits the possibility of conducting a 
comprehensive comparative study on the impact of institutional settings 
or the role of cultural factors in democratization. In this book, I try to fill 
this gap by operationalizing democratic models for 80 electoral 
democracies including many new and developing ones.   
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1.6  Which Matters Most? Culture or Political 
Institutions? 
The relation between culture and democratic institutions is 
complicated. Some scholars rightly define culture as ‘informal institution’ 
(Williamson, 2009). It is argued that there is a continuous interaction 
between formal and informal institutions. However, regarding the success 
or failure of democracy and performance of governance, some scholars 
refer to the importance of cultural factors, whereas others emphasize 
institutional arrangement.  
There is a debate between those who believe that culture matters most 
(Etounga-Manguelle, 2000) and those who posit that institutions matter 
most (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Rothstein, 1998). Regarding the 
successful transition to and consolidation of democracy, this study asserts 
that while both culture and constitutional/institutional choices matter, the 
interaction or compatibility of these two does matter most. If only culture 
matters, then in practice we should have seen successful democracies 
only in countries with a set of similar cultural orientations, or if only 
institutions matter, then we should have had successful democracies with 
the same institutional arrangement. The diversity of both societal culture 
and democratic institutions in workable democracies implies that neither 
of the two is solely determinant.  
According to well-known international institutes for monitoring 
democracy (BTI, 2014a; EIU, 2010; Freedom House, 2012; Polity IV, 
2014), Australia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South 
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, the USA and Uruguay among 
many others, have been electoral democracies over the past decade. The 
cultural diversity of these countries is more than obvious. Interestingly, 
among them there are countries with collectivist cultures, namely Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Poland, Slovenia, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and Uruguay. Many of these countries have a 
highly hierarchy-oriented culture, like Brazil, Chile, France, Ghana, 
Greece, India, Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, Turkey and Uruguay. They are 
diverse in other cultural dimensions as well. Moreover, among them there 
are many religious countries with different religions including Roman 
Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Muslim and Eastern religions, and they 
are also on different continents.  
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On the other hand, these countries have different democratic 
institutions. Some are presidential, some are parliamentary, and some are 
mixed. They also have different electoral systems. As it will be presented, 
there is no conclusive evidence to show that among these countries one 
institutional arrangement or model of democracy is, across the board, 
superior to other models. All in all, it seems that the superiority of a set of 
cultural values or specific institutional arrangement in establishing and 
consolidating political democracy is questionable. This comparative study 
tries to contribute to our understanding of the role of culture, institutions 
and their interactions in democratization.  
1.7  Research Questions and Structure of the 
Book 
Given the brief review above, this book aims to contribute to the 
discussion on the relation between culture and democracy from a 
different perspective, emphasizing the interaction or compatibility of the 
two. In each of the following chapters, one main issue/question about this 
interrelation will be addressed. These chapters have been written and 
organized as independent but connected articles.3 Each chapter can be 
read as a full independent piece, but chapters are also logically linked to 
each other and make an interconnected mosaic of culture and democracy. 
The following is a presentation of a central question and main issues 
discussed in each chapter: 
 
Ø What dimensions of societal culture can explain the diversity of 
cultural values among nations/countries?  
Chapter 2 aims to present different cross-cultural theories and 
identify empirical dimensions of culture that are extracted from large 
cross-national value surveys. These are known as national dimensions 
of societal culture that affect different aspects of social life. After a 
review of both conceptual and empirical theories, the chapter suggests 
a clustering of many dimensions of culture based on a systematic 
theoretical and statistical analysis. The proposed clusters will be of use 
                                                      
3- The chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are based on co-authored articles which have been already 
published in ISI-ranked, peer-reviewed journals. As requested by the PhD regulation of 
Tilburg University (Article 17), it should be emphasized here that the role of the PhD 
candidate has been dominant in all of these co-authorship. This is demonstrable from the 
candidate’s first authorship in all articles. Moreover, co-authors acknowledge the 
candidate’s demonstrable and dominant co-authorship.   
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for identifying the proper empirical measures of societal culture at the 
national level.  
 
Ø What are challenges of Cultural Theory, as one of the most dominant 
theories in political science, for cross-national research?  
Chapter 3 demonstrates the challenges with Douglasian Cultural 
Theory and its operationalization for cross-national research. This 
theory is vastly applied to the political-administrative world and 
particularly in some studies on the relation of societal culture and 
models of democracy. Although this theory is mostly used in 
theoretical and qualitative research, in recent years some students of 
comparative politics have put effort into operationalizing two 
dimensions of Cultural Theory, Grid and Group, using cross-national 
surveys. There are some grave challenges surrounding the 
operationalization of these two dimensions. Moreover, Grid and 
Group cannot cover some cultural variances between societies, 
particularly when it attempts to explain the diversity of democratic 
models. Chapter 3 discusses the abovementioned challenges and 
introduces a third dimension, ‘Grade’, to Cultural Theory.  
 
Ø What models of democracy can be recognized among electoral 
democracies across the world? How can two persistent dimensions of 
democracy, contestation and participation, be operationalized for a 
large number of electoral democracies? 
Chapter 4 aims to operationalize models of democracy for a large 
number of countries. It is a crucial step for this research as in the 
literature we lack operationalization of democratic models for new and 
developing democracies. The influential work on Patterns of 
Democracy by Lijphart includes mostly established and Western 
democracies. Any comprehensive research on the relation between 
societal culture and democratic models need to have measurements of 
both concepts for a wide range of countries from all over the world. 
Chapter 4 presents a systematic operationalization of two known, 
persistent dimensions of democracy, contestation and participation, for 
80 electoral democracies between 1990 and 2009. We also empirically 
assess the relation between model, level and performance of 
democracy and demonstrate that the superiority of a model of 
democracy, e.g. majoritarian or consensual, is debatable and 
inconclusive. 
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Ø What is the relation between societal culture and models of 
democracy? 
Chapter 5 addresses the main descriptive assertion of this research 
that culture matters in opting and adopting different models of 
democracy in different countries. Having identified and 
operationalized dimensions of societal culture and democracy, we 
argue and present that cultural orientations of society codetermine the 
inclination of a country to adopt a specific model of democracy or 
institutional setting. We utilize the multiple regression analysis to 
empirically assess the hypotheses regarding the relation between 
dimensions of culture and democracy. The findings corroborate the 
assertion that societal culture matters in explaining the diversity of 
models of democracy.  
 
Ø What is the importance of compatibility between societal culture and 
the contestation dimension of democracy? How can this compatibility 
affect the democratic outcome? 
Chapter 6 evaluates the importance of the interaction between 
dimensions of societal culture and democracy for ‘satisfaction with 
democracy’ as an outcome indicator. We hypothesize that the 
interaction between mastery orientation, as a dimension of societal 
culture, and integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy, as 
the measure of contestation, will affect the level of satisfaction with 
democracy in new and developing democracies. This assertion is 
examined empirically in a cross-national study. The findings 
corroborate the importance of compatibility between societal culture 
and democratic model.     
 
Ø What is the importance of compatibility between societal culture and 
methods of public participation? How does this compatibility matter 
for a successful participatory practice?  
Chapter 7 discusses the importance of involving dimensions of 
societal culture in designing and implementing a successful 
participatory practice in the process of policy making. In this chapter, 
a framework is developed to operationalize the effect of national 
culture on participatory policy analysis. This framework is utilized in 
secondary case studies in four countries with different cultures. The 
findings suggest that the compatibility and adaptation of participatory 
tools and methods to different cultural contexts would matter for a 
successful practice of public participation.    
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Ø What is the effect of societal culture on political institutional 
choices? 
Chapter 8 elaborates the effect of societal culture on the adoption 
of different political institutions in different countries. In Chapter 5 the 
relation between dimensions of culture and democratic models is 
studied and in this chapter, the relation between cultural values and 
democratic institutions, which are components of democratic models, 
will be analyzed. That is, the effect of societal culture on the adoption 
of different political institutions – namely regime type, electoral 
system, electoral threshold, compulsory voting and referendum 
provision – will be examined. Using cross-national data, we 
demonstrate that there are significant associations between dimensions 
of national culture and the adopted political institutions in different 
countries. This leads us to developing a thesis, in the next chapter, 
about the importance of cultural compatibility for institutional design.   
 
Ø What theory can be developed to explain the importance of cultural 
compatibility in designing democratic institutions?  
Chapter 9 is the concluding chapter in which a new thesis about 
the interaction between culture and democracy, based on the empirical 
findings of other chapters, is introduced. The Cultural Compatibility 
Thesis (CCT) is developed and examined for a large number of 
countries. The thesis proposes that cultural orientations of society 
codetermine opting, adopting and adapting political institutions. The 
‘culturally compatible score’ for each political institution is calculated 
by aggregating national scores of relevant cultural orientations. 
Culturally compatible scores reveal what institutional choices would 
be more compatible to the societal culture of the country. The thesis 
suggests that the gap between the culturally compatible institution and 
the existing institution could result in some challenges for the 
credibility or functionality of the political system. The chapter closes 
with discussing the limitations of the study and suggesting some 
further research to validate and improve the findings of this study.  
 
The chapters of the book can be organized under three major parts, 
which are connected as consecutive stages in studying the association 
between culture and democracy. The first stage is about 
operationalization and consists of chapters two to four. The second stage 
focuses on studying relation and interaction, which comprises chapters 
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five through seven. The third stage is around implication and consists of 
the two final chapters. Figure 1.1 demonstrates these stages and the 
chapters involved.  
 
 






Chapter 2  
Identifying and Clustering the 
Dimensions of National Culture * 
                                                      
*  This chapter is based on Maleki, A., & De Jong, M. (2014). A Proposal for Clustering 
the Dimensions of National Culture. Cross-Cultural Research, 48 (2), 107-143.  
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2.1  Introduction 
Although there are many definitions, there is common emphasis that 
“culture” consists of shared elements (attitudes, beliefs, values, self-
definition) of a community (Triandis, 1996). Hofstede defines culture as 
“the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members 
of one group or category of people from another” (2001, p. 9). Human 
mental programs cannot be observed directly, but only established 
through words, attitudes to real and hypothetical dilemmas or actual 
deeds. Although some social theorists like Parsons and Shills (1951) and 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) had used the concept of cultural 
orientations/dimensions, their application of the concept was still mainly 
qualitative. “Dimensionalization” of culture in a quantitative sense by 
applying it at the ecological level of nations has become a popular 
approach, for establishing core values underlying mental programs and 
understanding cross-cultural differences, since Hofstede’s statistics-based 
cross-national comparative study. Measuring values by asking people’s 
opinions through questionnaires and classifying them by statistical 
methods is the first step to translating “dimensions” of national cultures 
into numbers allowing for large-scale cross-national comparison. Cultural 
dimensions allow us to distinguish aspects of a national culture that can 
be measured relative to other national cultures (Hofstede, 2006). More 
qualitatively oriented anthropologists have often vehemently criticized 
this line of thought as overly simplistic, methodologically flawed, lacking 
in nuance and complexity, and failing to demonstrate how underlying 
social mechanisms operate (Heine et al., 2002). Nonetheless, during the 
past three decades, the academic literature where sets of dimensions are 
applied to cultural differences has seen an impressive evolution, 
especially when it comes to generating country scores. 
During the past three decades, other authors have introduced different 
dimensions, sometimes similar, sometimes different, and sometimes 
overlapping ones. Some of these authors explicitly intended to verify, 
improve, or correct Hofstede’s work, while others show a face 
resemblance in spite of the fact that they have different academic 
backgrounds, different points of departure or different goals. Different 
researchers made attempts to explain sometimes different phenomena 
from different perspectives and the sets of cultural dimensions coming 
out of their work were extracted from different data sets, which led to a 
rich, but somewhat disorderly variety of approaches and dimensions. 
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Hofstede himself (later supplemented by his son Gert-Jan and Michael 
Minkov) has revised and readjusted his dimensions to fit new insights. 
The status quo of theoretical and methodological development in this 
field can now be qualified by two words: enriched and messy. The final 
result of the 30-year evolution has not so much been a convergence of the 
dimensions from various authors into one final and definitive model or 
set, but a collection of partly complementary, partly overlapping, and 
partly conflicting axes. This situation has the advantage of providing 
heuristic richness (culture is a multifaceted phenomenon that can not 
possibly be covered by a small number of linear dimensions) and the 
disadvantage of leading to incompatibility, inconsistency among these 
dimensions, and a lack of clarity. Until Minkov (2013) published his most 
recent monograph with an overview of all major cultural dimensions, 
scholars and professionals had no publication to turn to for a more or less 
complete overview of all relevant cultural dimensions in their research or 
work practice. The question that we will ask ourselves here is whether it 
is possible not only to generate such an overview, but in addition to group 
the major cultural dimensions into clusters. 
Attempts have been made by Schneider and Barsoux (2003) and 
Nardon and Steers (2006, 2009) to bring the most likely common 
denominators of the cultural dimensions together in an overview. 
However, their sets of 16 and 5 dimensions, respectively, were not so 
much based on any systematic matching, statistically or heuristically, of 
insights generated by other scholars, but on ad hoc considerations or 
common sense. The methodology through which they derive this 
selection is opaque and it is unlikely that it covers all relevant elements 
contained in all other series of dimensions. Their objective to synthesize 
insights from different authors and present a manageable and condensed 
set of cultural dimensions is laudable, but we think this could be done in a 
more methodologically transparent fashion. We will try to do this by 
systematically matching the dimensions of various studies with each 
other, first conceptually and then statistically. Using this “matching 
analysis,” we will present our nine clusters of dimensions. We present 
these nine as clusters of dimensions rather than as new single dimensions, 
because they may refer to similar and strongly related dimensions from 
different studies, which are however not identical. In this fashion, we 
hope to do justice to the original authors and also avoid the trap of 
collapsing phenomena into single dimensions that should not be 
completely collapsed. We have no intention to dismiss any cross-cultural 
theory in favor of another, but simply aim to show how the comparison 
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and aggregation of all dimensions from different authors can lead us to 
identify a consistent framework in which all dimensional features 
contained in the previous work reappear. 
2.2  Many Dimensions of Culture 
In this section, cultural models and dimensions theorized, defined, and 
empirically measured by leading research groups on the subject are 
briefly introduced and summarized. The aim of the chapter is to 
introduce, compare, and classify the cross-cultural studies for those 
researchers from different disciplines wishing to apply cultural 
dimensions in their comparative analysis. Although we take into account 
qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions in this study, we focus 
mainly on five distinguished cultural theories with accessible country 
scores based on their empirical quantitative analysis. In Table 2.1, readers 
can find a breakdown of some essential information on the five research 
groups. 
We should mention that there are two other recognized cross-cultural 
researches, namely, works by Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars (1996) 
and Bond et al. (2004), each of which introduced two empirically based 
cultural dimensions not covered in this study. This is due to the fact that 
they share fewer than 30 countries with other studies, which is 
problematical for the sampling adequacy of the ecological factor analysis. 
  

















































22 | Many Dimensions of Culture 
 
2.2.1  Hofstede’s Cultural Model and Minkov’s Work 
Using survey data from IBM employees, Hofstede empirically derived 
four cultural dimensions and called them Individualism versus 
Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), and 
Masculinity versus Femininity. Later on, he added a fifth dimension, 
Long (vs. Short)-Term Orientation (LTO), inspired by a group research 
called Chinese Culture Connection (1987) across 22 countries. Hofstede 
recently recalculated the LTO dimension using items from the World 
Value Survey (WVS) database and extended LTO scores to 93 countries 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). 
Collaborating with Michael Minkov, Hofstede adopted one of the 
Minkov’s three dimensions, Indulgence versus Restraint, as the sixth 
dimension in his latest book (Hofstede et al., 2010). In his book, Minkov 
(2007) introduced three cultural dimensions, namely, Exclusionism 
versus Universalism, Indulgence versus Restraint, and Monumentalism 
versus Flexumility. He extracted them from the WVS database. In 
Appendix A (Table A.1), Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as well as 
Minkov’s are briefly described. 
2.2.2  Inglehart’s World Value Survey 
Ronald Inglehart, the former director of the WVS, factor analyzed the 
national-level data from the 43 societies obtained in the 1990 survey and 
found that two main dimensions, Traditional versus Secular-Rational and 
Survival versus Self-Expression, accounted for more than 70% of the 
cross-national variance in more than 20 variables. When the factor 
analysis was replicated with the data from 1995 and 2000 surveys, the 
same two dimensions of cross-cultural variation emerged, even though 
the new analysis included more additional countries compared with the 
earlier study. Hence, Inglehart asserted that these dimensions of cross-
cultural variation are robust (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
see Table A.2 in Appendix A for the description of dimensions). 
2.2.3  Schwartz’s Cultural Value Orientations 
Shalom Schwartz defines (cultural) values as “conceptions of the 
desirable that guide the way social actors select actions, evaluate people 
and events, and explain their actions and evaluations” (Schwartz, 1999, p. 
24). Like Hofstede, Schwartz also acknowledges that cultural value 
orientations are relatively stable although cultural values do change 
gradually (Schwartz, 2006). While Hofstede derived his framework 
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empirically (i.e., he had some empirical data and based on them he 
developed his theory), Schwartz developed his framework theoretically, 
after which he empirically examined it using large-scale multicountry 
samples. 
Contrary to the method of inferring basic value priorities from 
responses to specific attitude and opinion items (used by Hofstede and 
Inglehart), Schwartz used his own value survey (SVS), which included 56 
value items to operationalize the value priorities of individuals. 
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of each value items “as a 
guiding principle in MY life” (Schwartz, 1992). Schwartz (1999) argues 
that individual value priorities are a mixture of shared culture and of 
unique personal experience. Therefore, the average priorities attributed to 
different values by members of a society reflect the essence of their 
shared culture and reveal the underlying common cultural value 
(Schwartz, 2006). 
Unlike Hofstede and Inglehart who conceptualized their dimensions as 
independent and orthogonal factors, Schwartz (2006) considers 
interrelation of cultural value orientation based on compatibility among 
them in a circular structure. Such a structure reflects cultural orientations 
(or dimensions) which are compatible (adjacent in the circle) or 
incompatible (distant around the circle). Considering important issues 
that confront all societies, Schwartz derived seven dimensions of national 
culture, which in turn can constitute three bipolar cultural dimensions: 
Embeddedness (or Conservatism) versus Autonomy; Hierarchy versus 
Egalitarianism; and Mastery versus Harmony (see Table A.3 in Appendix 
A for the definitions of Schwartz’s dimensions). 
2.2.4  The GLOBE Project 
The GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness) research program defines culture as “shared motives, 
values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant 
events that result from common experiences of members of collectives 
and are transmitted across age generations” (House et al., 2002, p. 5). The 
research by GLOBE is asserted to extend Hofstede’s work in a theory-
driven fashion (like Schwartz). The authors first specified the general 
nature of the constructs they wanted to measure before writing down 
cultural items for each dimension and developing GLOBE scales (Javidan 
et al., 2006). 
The methodology used in GLOBE project to measure cultural 
dimensions entails two major peculiarities. First, in an attempt to resolve 
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the logical problems inherent in aggregation of individual-level self-
reports, GLOBE respondents were asked to give ratings that described 
not themselves but their society. Therefore, they assumed that the 
aggregation of respondents’ ratings to higher levels would not be 
implicitly defining culture as the aggregate of individuals’ self ratings, 
but as the aggregate of their perceptions of others as a social group 
(Javidan et al., 2006; Smith, 2005). Second, respondents completed two 
sets of ratings, one describing their society “as it is” to measure practices 
and second, “as it should be” to measure values of a society (House et al., 
2004). GLOBE has introduced nine cultural dimensions: Performance 
Orientation, Future Orientation, Gender Egalitarianism, Assertiveness, 
Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Power Distance, 
Humane Orientation, and Uncertainty Avoidance (see Table A.4 in 
Appendix A). 
2.2.5  Dimensions from Conceptual Cultural 
Theories 
Apart from the aforementioned empirically based cultural dimensions, 
there are many other dimensions of culture which should be taken into 
consideration in any thorough review of cultural theories. In this section, 
we will briefly list a number of major and well-known conceptual cultural 
theories by Parsons, Kluckhohn, Hall, Douglas, Triandis, and 
Trompenaars in each of which some cultural dimensions (even though the 
relevant authors do not always call them “dimensions”) have been 
introduced and theorized. The main distinction between cross-cultural 
theories introduced in the previous sections and these theories is that the 
former enjoy a systematic and quantitative analysis of dimensions for 
national culture, while the latter proposed conceptual and qualitative 
analysis of cultural dimensions. However, as we will see, there are some 
significant similarities between definitions and concepts of many 
dimensions from different theories. Table 2.2 gives the list of 
distinguished theorists and their cultural dimensions as well as a short 
description of each dimension.  
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Table 2.2. Cultural dimensions from six major cultural theories 
Cultural	  theorist	   Short	  description	  
Parsons:	  5	  Pattern	  
variables	  
1.	  Affectivity	  (need	  gratification)	  vs.	  Affective	  Neutrality	  (restraint	  of	  
impulses)	  
2.	  Self-­‐orientation	  vs.	  Collectivity-­‐Orientation	  
3.	  Universalism	  (applying	  general	  standards)	  vs.	  Particularism	  (taking	  
particular	  relationships	  into	  account)	  
4.	  Ascription	  (judging	  others	  by	  who	  they	  are)	  vs.	  Achievement	  
(judging	  them	  by	  what	  they	  do)	  
5.	  Specificity	  (limiting	  relations	  to	  others	  to	  specific	  spheres)	  vs.	  




1.	  Human	  nature	  orientation:	  What	  is	  the	  character	  of	  innate	  human	  
nature?	  (evil-­‐mixed-­‐good)	  
2.	  Man-­‐nature	  orientation:	  What	  is	  the	  relation	  of	  man	  to	  nature	  (and	  
supernature)?	  (subjugation-­‐harmony-­‐mastery)	  
3.	  Time	  orientation:	  What	  is	  the	  temporal	  focus	  of	  human	  life?	  (past-­‐
present-­‐future)	  
4.	  Activity	  orientation:	  What	  is	  the	  modality	  of	  human	  activity?	  
(being-­‐becoming-­‐doing)	  
5.	  Relational	  orientation:	  What	  is	  the	  modality	  of	  man’s	  relationship	  
to	  other	  people?	  (lineality	  (hierarchical)-­‐collaterality-­‐individualism)	  
Hall:	  3	  Cultural	  
dimensions	  
1.	  Context	  (Low	  vs.	  High):	  Extent	  to	  which	  the	  context	  of	  a	  message	  is	  
as	  important	  as	  message	  itself	  
2.	  Space	  (Small	  vs.	  Large	  Distance):	  Extent	  to	  which	  people	  are	  
comfortable	  sharing	  physical	  space	  with	  others	  
3.	  Time	  (Monochronic	  vs.	  Polychronic):	  Extent	  to	  which	  people	  




1.	  Group:	  Degree	  of	  incorporation	  into	  a	  bounded	  social	  unit	  
2.	  Grid:	  Degree	  to	  which	  interactions	  are	  constrained	  by	  position-­‐




1.	  Complexity:	  Cultural	  uniformity	  and	  conformity	  is	  higher	  in	  simple	  
cultures	  and	  lower	  in	  complex	  cultures	  
2.	  Tightness	  vs.	  Looseness:	  Tight	  or	  loose	  rules,	  norms	  and	  ideas	  
about	  what	  is	  correct	  behavior	  in	  different	  situations	  
3.	  Individualism	  vs.	  Collectivism:	  Self	  as	  dependent	  on	  or	  
interdependent	  with	  some	  in-­‐group	  
4.	  Vertical	  vs.	  Horizontal:	  Accepting	  hierarchy	  vs.	  equality	  as	  a	  given	  
5.	  Active	  vs.	  Passive:	  Changing	  the	  environment	  vs.	  changing	  
themselves	  to	  fit	  into	  environment	  
6.	  Universalism	  vs.	  Particularism:	  Treat	  others	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
universal	  criteria	  vs.	  relationships	  
7.	  Diffuse	  vs.	  Specific:	  Judging	  an	  individual	  in	  a	  holistic	  manner	  vs.	  
discerning	  different	  roles	  
8.	  Ascription	  vs.	  Achievement:	  Judge	  others	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ascribed	  
attributes	  vs.	  achieved	  attributes	  
9.	  Instrumental	  vs.	  Expressive:	  Priority	  and	  importance	  of	  
instrumental	  relationships	  vs.	  social	  relationships	  
10.	  Emotional	  Expression	  vs.	  Suppression:	  Express	  emotions	  freely	  vs.	  
control	  the	  expression	  of	  emotion	  





1.	  Universalism	  vs.	  Particularism:	  What	  is	  more	  important;	  rules	  or	  
relationships?	  
2.	  Individualism	  vs.	  Collectivism:	  Do	  people	  derive	  their	  identity	  from	  
within	  themselves	  or	  from	  their	  group?	  
3.	  Specific	  vs.	  Diffuse:	  Are	  an	  individual’s	  various	  roles	  
compartmentalized	  or	  integrated?	  
4.	  Neutral	  vs.	  Affective:	  Are	  people	  free	  to	  express	  their	  emotions	  or	  
are	  they	  restrained?	  
5.	  Achievement	  vs.	  Ascription:	  How	  are	  people	  accorded	  respect	  and	  
social	  status?	  
6.	  Sequential	  vs.	  Synchronic:	  Do	  people	  do	  things	  one	  at	  a	  time	  or	  
several	  things	  at	  once?	  
7.	  Internal	  vs.	  External	  Control:	  Do	  people	  control	  the	  environment	  or	  
does	  it	  control	  them?	  
Source. Douglas (1973), Hall (1966, 1990), Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961); Parsons 
and Shils (1951); Triandis (1989, 2002), Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997). 
2.3  A Proposal for Clusters of Cultural 
Dimensions 
To generate a validated set of exclusive clusters of dimensions, we 
have to analyze the interrelations among these many dimensions. In this 
section, through discussing and explaining conceptual interrelations, we 
propose nine clusters of cultural dimensions and label them. 
2.3.1  Cluster One: Individualism versus 
Collectivism 
The first distinguishable cluster of cultural dimensions is comprised of 
those dimensions that represent the most famous cultural construct of 
individualism versus collectivism (I-C), which characterizes the 
interrelatedness of individuals. Indeed, all cultural models have this 
dimension under different labels, namely, individualism versus 
collectivism (Hofstede and Triandis), universalism versus exclusionism 
(Minkov), embeddedness versus autonomy (Schwartz), in-group 
collectivism (GLOBE), individualism versus communitarianism 
(Trompenaars), self-orientation versus collectivity-orientation (Parsons), 
relational orientation (Kluckhohn), and group (Douglas). Moreover, the 
cultural dimension of self-expression versus survival by Inglehart, which 
entails many different cultural traits in one dimension, includes the 
attribute of individual autonomy, and hence is associated with I-C. 
Furthermore, there are some other cultural dimensions considered as 
facets/features of the I-C dimension. Three cultural dimensions used by 
Parsons, Triandis, and Trompenaars are among such dimensions: (a) 
universalism versus particularism, which is about treating others on the 
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basis of universal criteria versus relationships. It can be conceptually 
considered as an attribute of I-C, since in a collectivist cultures the 
relationship and the loyalty to the in-group is a matter of importance, 
while in individualistic cultures, no such strong commitment exists and 
the universal rules should be ideally applied; (b) ascription versus 
achievement, which indicates whether others are judged by “who they 
are” (ascribed attributes) or by “what they do” (achieved attributes). It is 
argued that ascription is important in cultures where one’s ties and 
relations are more important than one’s individuality; (c) specificity 
versus diffuseness represents the cultural trait that determines whether 
individuals should be judged in a holistic manner or by discriminating the 
different roles they play in various social settings. In diffuse cultures, 
relations to others are not restricted to any specific sphere (e.g., work, 
family life), but taken as a whole. Hofstede (2001) and Triandis (2001, 
2004) considered these three dimensions as attributes of I-C. 
Moreover, Hall (1966) introduced a dimension called monochronic 
versus polychronic (time conception), similar in definition to what 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) labeled sequential versus 
synchronic. It refers to the extent to which people approach one task or 
multiple tasks at the same time. At the first glance it may seem unclear 
how this dimension can be related to I-C; however, in a collectivist 
culture normally people prefer not to reject tasks offered by different 
friends or relatives since the rejection could weaken this relationship. 
Thus, accepting different tasks at a time is unavoidable in many occasions 
for a person in collectivist cultures, while this is not the case in 
individualistic cultures. Adair et al. (2009) used Hall’s time theory and 
realized that polychronicity and monochronicity are, respectively, seen in 
collectivist and individualistic environments. 
There are two other well-known cultural dimensions by Hall, context 
and space, which are arguably associated with I-C. “Context” indicates 
the importance of context versus content of a message in different 
cultures, whereas “space” designates what is felt to be a comfortable 
physical distance from others in various cultures. It is argued that 
preferences of high-context and small-distance communication are 
features of collectivist cultures. Adair et al. (2009) have shown that 
small-distance communication is practiced mostly in high context 
cultures. Moreover, Gudykunst et al. (1988) mention the parallel between 
low versus high context dimension and individualism versus collectivism. 
A very recent empirical study by a large group of researchers (Owe et al., 
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2012) also confirmed a significant correlation between contextualism and 
I-C. 
The last cultural dimension related to I-C is what Triandis called 
instrumental versus expressive which indicates the priority of 
instrumental activity (e.g., doing one’s job) versus expressive activity 
(e.g., enjoying social relationships). Triandis (2000) asserted that “in 
general, individualists are more instrumental and collectivists are more 
expressive” (p.148), although he applied cultural dimensions to the 
individual and not to the ecological level. 
All things considered, individualism versus collectivism is a very rich 
and broad dimension, absorbing much theoretical and empirical work. 
However, some of the dimensions mentioned are provisionally assumed 
facets of I-C and more empirical research is needed to confirm these 
propositions. 
2.3.2  Cluster Two: Power Distance 
The second cultural cluster is known as the famous dimension of 
power distance or hierarchy, which reflects the extent to which 
hierarchical relations and position-related roles are accepted. Hofstede’s 
and GLOBE’s power distance and Schwartz’s hierarchy/egalitarianism 
belong to this cluster. Among conceptual theories of culture, the grid 
dimension by Douglas and the vertical dimension by Triandis represent 
the same cultural feature. The dimension of survival/self-expression by 
Inglehart consists of the cultural attribute of hierarchy as well. 
Although the first and second clusters can be conceptually 
distinguished, in many empirical studies beginning with Hofstede (1980), 
their corresponding dimensions are significantly and strongly correlated. 
Consequently, in some cultural models, these two constructs are merged 
into one dimension (i.e., Inglehart’s self-expression). Some scholars even 
consider individualism and power distance two sub-dimensions of a 
broader definition of individualism/collectivism (Triandis, 1998). 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), who were one of the first theorists to 
introduce cultural orientations, considered these two cultural dimensions 
as different modes of a construct called relational orientation, 
characterized by three possible modalities: lineality (hierarchical), 
collaterality, and individualism. It is likely that in individualistic cultures 
people expect and accept more egalitarianism, since the loyalty to a social 
unit is weaker and hierarchy is not a desirable way of ordering 
relationships, while in many collectivist cultures hierarchy is seen as a 
Chapter 2 | 29  
 
justified mechanism to create order in a group. Consequently, a 
meaningful relation between these two cultural orientations is expected. 
2.3.3  Cluster Three: Uncertainty Avoidance 
The third cluster is known as uncertainty avoidance (UA), which 
indicates to what extent people feel uncomfortable with uncertain, 
unknown, or unstructured situations. Hofstede (2001) mentioned that in 
uncertainty avoidant cultures, many rules, prescriptions, and proscriptions 
exist, even though they may not always be followed. 
GLOBE has also introduced a dimension with the label UA; however, 
it measures something conceptually different. Venaik and Brewer (2010) 
have convincingly argued that according to the associated question items 
for this dimension, the measured country scores and its correlations with 
other dimensions and phenomena, GLOBE’s UA represents the cultural 
trait of “rule-orientation.” As we discussed in Cluster 1, a number of 
scholars (Parsons & Shills, 1951; Triandis, 2002; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1997) have introduced a cultural dimension of rule- 
versus relationship orientation (or universalism vs. particularism). This 
dimension, which resembles GLOBE’s UA, is normally considered a 
facet of individualism versus collectivism. 
Furthermore, Triandis (1989) presents the cultural dimension of 
“tightness” (vs. looseness), which represents to what extent rules and 
norms exist and are respected in a society. This dimension has a 
conceptual commonality with UA as well as rule-orientation. It has also 
been assumed to be a feature of other cultural constructs, that is, 
individualism (Triandis, 2004) and indulgence (Minkov, 2007).1 
Among other dimensions, we can argue that those related to the issue 
of dealing with the future can be conceptually associated with this cluster. 
Avoiding any unknown and uncertain condition is the main feature of 
UA, and since the future is the most uncertain aspect of human living, it 
can be expected that attributes of future orientation are pertinent to this 
dimension. Thus, future orientation by GLOBE, which is about planning 
for future, and time orientation (future mode) by Kluckhohn can be 
categorized in this cluster. 
                                                      
1. Regarding the dimension of “tightness” (vs. looseness), we used the country scores of a 
recent empirical cross-cultural study by Gelfand et al. (2011) and found that there is a 
moderate, significant correlation between this dimension and Hofstede’s individualism (−
.47, p < .01, N = 30), which confirmed the proposition that it is a facet of rule-orientation 
(and not UA). 
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The idea that uncertainty-avoiding societies prepare for an uncertain 
future by reverting to all sorts of laws and rules (Hofstede, 2001) seems 
in contradiction with our argument. However, we argue that being 
simultaneously uncertainty-avoiding and future-oriented does occur in 
cultures with a strong rule-orientation (e.g., Japan and Germany). In fact, 
generating certainty that plans and rules will be indeed respected fully 
compensates for avoiding an uncertain future, and this makes such 
societies future-oriented. 
Among other dimensions of GLOBE, the question items regarding 
performance orientation indicate their relevance to future orientation and 
UA. “Being innovative to improve performance” and “encouraged to 
strive for continuously improved performance” have conceptual elements 
(emphasized in italic) relevant to low UA and high future orientation. 
2.3.4  Cluster Four: Mastery versus Harmony 
The fourth distinctive cluster of cultural dimensions consists of those 
constructs which manifest the cultural attributes of competitiveness, 
achievement, and self-assertion versus consensus, equity, and harmony. 
Mastery (vs. harmony) by Schwartz, masculinity (vs. femininity) by 
Hofstede and (doing) activity orientation by Kluckhohn (i.e., demand for 
activity which results in accomplishment) are conceptually associated 
with this cluster. Moreover, the relation of humans to nature is another 
facet of this cultural attribute. The distinction between an orientation 
where people try to control and change the environment and one where 
being in harmony with it is preferred has been recognized by Kluckhohn 
(man–nature orientation), Triandis (active vs. passive), and Trompenaars 
(internal vs. external control). 
We believe that Hofstede’s masculinity, based on its definition, is a 
so-called big-dimension combining cultural features of mastery, 
assertiveness, and gender egalitarianism. We will argue that the two 
cultural traits of assertiveness and gender egalitarianism should be 
embodied into two separate clusters. Masculinity is a problematical 
dimension in that it combines different cultural features. For instance, we 
can recognize cultures which have high mastery orientation, but at the 
same time have high gender egalitarianism and low assertiveness (or any 
other combination of these three features). Combining cultural features of 
mastery, assertiveness, and gender inequality in one dimension can thus 
be conceptually misleading. 
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2.3.5  Cluster Five: Traditionalism versus 
Secularism 
The fifth distinguishable cluster of dimensions accounts for the 
cultural traits of religiosity, self-stability, feelings of pride and, 
consistency between emotion felt and their expression versus secular 
orientation and flexibility. Inglehart’s traditional/secular, Minkov’s 
monumentalism, and Hofstede’s long-term orientation are three empirical 
dimensions relevant to this cluster. They share the common features of 
religiosity, traditionalism, pride, and self-stability versus secularism and 
self-effacement. We can argue that Schwartz’s embeddedness, which has 
a feature of conservatism, is partly related to this cultural orientation. 
Hofstede’s long-term orientation (LTO) is an amalgamation of 
different cultural traits (Fang, 2003), including traditionalism and two 
other cultural orientations that makes it a so-called big dimension. From 
the explanation of LTO in Hofstede’s recent book (2010), we learn that 
LTO is construed based on the three items of “thrift,” “national pride,” 
and “service to others.” The latter item represents the cultural trait of 
“humane orientation,” which is conceptually a distinct cultural feature 
from traditionalism. Among these three items, only “thrift,” which has the 
lowest loading in the LTO dimension (Hofstede et al., 2010), shows 
conceptual relevance to the cultural feature of future/long-term 
orientation. However, it can be argued that “thrift” is a questionable 
indicator for future orientation since this trait can be partially explained 
by survival factors.2 Therefore, the feature of future-orientation is not a 
dominant and main element of LTO making the label of this dimension a 
misleading one.3 
                                                      
2. Among three items comprising LTO, “thrift” (desirable trait for children) is the only 
one related to the concept of future orientation. However, we hypothesized that this trait 
can be partially explained by the survival factors. Among other desirable traits for 
children (by WVS), we hypothesized that “imagination” is the one that might better 
represent the inclination toward the future. We checked both our hypotheses, using WVS 
data from the period 2005 to 2008, and found a significant positive correlation (0.37, p < 
.01, N = 55) between “thrift” and Inglehart’s “survival” dimension, which shows the 
influence of survival situations on the nurture of thrift. Moreover, we found no correlation 
between LTO (as well as thrift) and the trait of “imagination,” while there was a high, 
significant correlation between GLOBE’s future orientation and importance of 
“imagination” (0.59, p < .01, N = 35). Therefore, both our hypotheses were confirmed. 
LTO indeed represents “traditional-stability” instead of “future orientation.” Our findings 
also lend credibility to GLOBE’s future orientation as an acceptable construct for 
measuring future orientation. 
3. In our opinion, this incongruous bundle of cultural traits also makes for confusing LTO 
rankings. In the LTO ranking for 93 countries, we see that Russia and many other 
postcommunist countries are among the highest LTO countries, and on the other hand, 
32 | A Proposal for Clusters of Cultural Dimensions 
 
Among qualitative dimensions, the temporal focus on the past in 
Kluckhohn’s time orientation can be related to the feature of 
traditionalism. 
2.3.6  Cluster Six: Indulgence versus Restraint 
The sixth exclusive dimension is indulgence vs. restraint which 
reflects the extent to which gratification of desires and feelings is free or 
restrained. This dimension was extracted by Minkov out of items making 
up Inglehart’s big dimension of self-expression. Self-expression 
incorporates a number of distinct cultural dimensions (i.e., individualism, 
power distance, and indulgence) in one dimension. Among theoretical 
dimensions, the one which is conceptually congruent with this cultural 
orientation is Parsons’ affectivity versus affective neutrality, which 
indicates the choice between gratification and evaluation, permissiveness 
and discipline (Parsons & Shills, 1951). Moreover, two dimensions 
proposed by Triandis (emotional expression) and Trompenaars (neutral 
vs. affective), which indicate whether people express emotions openly or 
control the expression of emotions, are conceptually related to the 
cultural feature of this cluster.4 
2.3.7  Cluster Seven: Assertiveness versus 
Tenderness 
The seventh cluster of cultural dimensions refers to the cultural feature 
of being assertive and aggressive versus kind and tender in social 
relationships, manifested also in communication styles. GLOBE’s 
assertiveness and humane orientation are two dimensions embodying this 
attribute. These two constructs are remarkably distinct from other 
                                                                                                                          
Nordic countries, namely, Denmark, Finland, and Norway have exceedingly low LTO 
scores, lower than Pakistan and Greece! It is also puzzling that in the first version of the 
LTO ranking, Pakistan had the lowest score on this dimension (Hofstede, 2001). In 
contradistinction, GLOBE’s future-orientation scores show that Denmark and Finland 
rank high, whereas Russia and other postcommunist countries have a lower future-
orientation, a location of countries which has higher face validity. We assert that high 
LTO ranks for postcommunist countries do not indicate a strong future-orientation, but 
instead relate to their low scores on traditionalism and national pride (Halman et al., 
2008), originating from communist ideals rejecting religiosity and nationalism. Therefore, 
we believe that this cluster and their dimensions have no meaningful relevance to the 
cultural trait of future-orientation, which is conceptually embedded in Cluster 3. 
4. Regarding the cultural trait of emotional expression, Matsumoto et al. (2008) conducted 
a cross-cultural research in 32 countries and measured “overall expressivity.” Our 
statistical analysis showed a high and significant correlation between overall expressivity 
and indulgence (0.54, p < .01, N = 31).  
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empirical dimensions and have meaningful commonalities in their 
question items. 
Although some scholars assume that assertiveness and mastery are 
two facets of the same construct (e.g., Hofstede in masculinity), these two 
features do not necessarily co-occur. Thus, assertiveness is a 
distinguishable feature of culture that can not be mixed with “mastery.” 
Moreover, as we discussed earlier, the item of “service to others” loaded 
on to Hofstede’s LTO, is a cultural trait pertinent to “humane 
orientation.” 
Kluckhohn’s human–nature orientation, which refers to the conception 
of innate human nature (evil, mixed, or good) is a conceptual dimension 
that can be tentatively assumed to be relevant to this cluster. 
2.3.8  Cluster Eight: Gender Egalitarianism 
The eighth distinct cultural construct concerns gender egalitarianism. 
GLOBE’s gender egalitarianism is the representative dimension of this 
cluster. The item to assess discriminatory gender roles has been 
embedded in Hofstede’s masculinity. Although it can be argued that in 
individualistic and low-power distant cultures, gender equality is 
expected and accepted, so this dimension is conceptually distinct. This 
dimension of culture might be drastically changed as a result of 
modernization, but we can still identify some modern societies with a 
strong role division between genders. 
2.3.9  Cluster Nine: Collaborativeness 
The ninth and final discernable cultural attribute is the spirit of “team-
work.” The empirically based cultural dimension for collaborativeness is 
institutional collectivism by GLOBE, which represents the precedence of 
group loyalty, group interest, and group acceptance beyond individual 
goals. The main cultural feature this dimension would measure is the 
inclination of people to collaborate with each other in conducting social 
tasks. This feature can not be exclusively covered by any other 
dimension, although some theoreticians (in our view erroneously) believe 
that it is an aspect of collectivism. There are several individualistic 
cultures, to the best of our knowledge, which are very good at team-
working (The Netherlands, Nordic countries) and many collectivistic 
environments in which the team-work is not strongly developed (Greece, 
Iran, Colombia). Theoretically speaking, societies enjoying higher 
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interpersonal trust, and consequently lower UA, should practice team-
work more easily. 
We could also argue that those who are concerned about the future 
should be more open to collaboration with others. Moreover, team-work 
is likely to be easier in cultures that are less aggressive and more focused 
on harmony, whereas this would be difficult within cultures characterized 
by high self-stability and low flexibility. Therefore, we expect that this 
cultural construct may have interrelations with dimensions from other 
clusters, namely, UA, assertiveness, and traditionalism. Nonetheless, we 
believe that this cultural attribute can not be meaningfully merged in any 
of the other clusters and it should not be deemed strange if institutional 
collectivism “measures mostly itself” (Minkov & Blagoev, 2011). That is 
why we propose that it can constitute a cluster of its own, labeled 
collaborativeness. 
In the next section, this conceptually grounded clustering of 
dimensions will be examined using a systematic analysis of empirically 
based dimensions. We will see whether these clusters can be justified on 
the basis of statistical analysis among quantified dimensions. 
2.4  An Empirically Based Examination of the 
Proposed Clusters 
Having proposed nine clusters of cultural dimensions, we examined 
the credibility of these clusters through analyzing statistical correlations 
and conducting an ecological factor analysis of the existing empirical 
dimensions. In a great many publications, the empirically based cultural 
dimensions have been separately and selectively compared and their 
correlations discussed (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004; House et al., 
2002; Inglehart, 2006; Javidan et al., 2006; Littrell, 2008; Minkov, 2007; 
Ng et al., 2007; Schwartz, 2006; Smith, 2005). To have a comprehensive 
comparison of all dimensions and interpret their correlations, we gathered 
all country scores of national cultures from five major empirical studies, 
using the most updated published data sources (see Table A.5 in 
Appendix A), and calculated correlations among all dimensions. The 
numbers in Table 2.3 reveal these correlations. 
While conducting our analysis and generating this table, we had the 
following considerations. First of all, considering the peculiarities and 
debates on the puzzlement of GLOBE’s cultural “values,” which are 
exhaustively discussed in the literature (Hofstede, 2006; Smith, 2006, 
2011), we decided to use only GLOBE’s societal “practices” in our 
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analysis. We are convinced that GLOBE’s practices have a stronger 
conceptual basis and face validity for our study. Second, having discussed 
the problematical meaning of GLOBE’s UA (discussed in Cluster 3), we 
exclude this dimension from our analysis. 
Table 2.3. Significant correlation between empirical cultural dimensions 
 
Note. All correlations are significant at the level of <.01 except those with an asterisk, 
which are significant at the level of <.05. A correlation in [] brackets is at the level of 0.1. 
Figures in parentheses indicate the number of common countries. 
References for countries’ score: Hofstede et al. (2010) and Minkov (2008) (for Hofstede 
and Minkov dimensions); House et al. (2004) (for GLOBE dimensions); Inglehart (2007) 
(most updated available country scores); Licht et al. (2007) (for Schwartz dimensions). 
 
Third, considering many publications concerned with the 
methodological challenges regarding response bias style (Fischer, 2004; 
Smith, 2004, 2011), we acknowledge that different cross-cultural models 
have diverging approaches to the issue. Cultural models by Hofstede 
(2001), Schwartz (2004), and GLOBE (House et al., 2004) have used 
various procedures of standardization (i.e., response bias correction). 
While Hofstede and Schwartz have only provided standardized country 
scores in their publications, GLOBE study has provided both 
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the appendix of House et al., 2004). On the other hand, Inglehart did not 
correct for the response bias and used the method of comparing extreme 
positions to extract his dimensions (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Minkov 
and Hofstede applied Inglehart’s methodology for extracting cultural 
dimensions of Monumentalism, Indulgence, and LTO, all based on the 
WVS data set (Hofstede et al., 2010; Minkov 2008). They argue that 
although the concern about response bias may be problematical, 
constructing cultural dimensions based on raw scores is justified, if 
nationally representative samples are used and the extracted dimensions 
have predictive power with respect to many external variables (Hofstede 
et al., 2010; Minkov, 2008). Taken together, we are convinced that 
dimensions with unstandardized scores should not be disregarded from 
our analysis. In generating Table 2.3, we used all available standardized 
scores of cultural dimensions by Hofstede (except LTO), Schwartz, and 
GLOBE, and unstandardized scores by Inglehart and Minkov. Scanning 
the correlations among different dimensions, we can provisionally 
confirm that the proposed clusters are plausible. 
After generating the proposal with nine clusters through reasoning and 
establishing the statistical correlations among the dimensions, we will 
examine our clusters by conducting an ecological factor analysis of 
existing dimensions. We hypothesize that our proposed clusters should 
also emerge from the factor analysis of empirically based dimensions. 
To conduct a principal component factor analysis, we had to use only 
those cultural models that had adequate number of common countries for 
a list-wise analysis of dimensions. As a test of data appropriateness, we 
checked the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy 
with the minimum acceptable level of 0.60. The number of common 
countries between Minkov’s exclusionism and other cultural dimensions 
was not adequate, and consequently, the KMO measure was too low 
(<0.5). Thus, we decided to remove this dimension from the factor 
analysis.5 
We performed ecological factor analyses of dimensions in two ways: 
(a) considering all dimensions and (b) considering dimensions with the 
largest number of common countries. For each case, we have replicated 
factor analyses for different conditions to ensure that the extracted factors 
are reliable and consistent. 
                                                      
5. The sampling adequacy of the factor analysis including Minkov’s exclusionism is 0.41 
and not statistically acceptable. However, we found no major difference in factors and 
components extracted from two analyses with and without it. As expected, exclusionism 
emerges under the cluster of individualism. 
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2.4.1  Factor Analysis of All  Dimensions 
We performed the principal component factor analysis of dimensions 
of cultural models from Hofstede (five dimensions), Inglehart (two 
dimensions), Schwartz (three bipolar dimensions), GLOBE (seven 
dimensions), and Minkov (two dimensions), for 33 countries across the 
world which have scores for all of these dimensions (see Table A.5 in 
Appendix A). Using the scree plot test as a recommended methodology 
appropriate for the theoretical interpretation (Fabrigar et al., 1999), seven 
independent factors were extracted, accounting for 87% of the variance. 
The KMO sampling adequacy of this analysis was 0.64 and Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity was significant. After doing a varimax rotation and 
considering a cutoff point of 0.5, all dimensions, except GLOBE’s 
institutional collectivism, loaded highly on only one factor, as seen in 
Table 2.4.  
Factor 1 consisted of six dimensions from two first clusters of 
individualism and power distance, Factor 2 embodied the cluster of UA, 
Factor 3 contained dimensions of the cluster traditionalism, and Factors 
4, 5, 6, and 7 matched the exclusive clusters of assertiveness, mastery, 
gender egalitarianism, and indulgence respectively. GLOBE’s 
Institutional collectivism, which is a representative of cluster 
collaborativeness, loaded moderately on both Factors 2 and 4. We 
hypothesized that this division might constitute evidence for the 
independence of this cultural construct that might emerge if more cases 
(common countries) were available. We will examine this hypothesis in 
the next mode of analysis. Except for GLOBE’s power distance, which 
unexpectedly loaded on Factor 2 instead of Factor 1, all other dimensions 
loaded on the factors predicted from our conceptual clusters. Taken 
together, we can observe that the proposed clustering has an acceptable 
empirical basis. 
Moreover, for testing the sensitivity to standardization (response bias 
correction), we repeated this factor analysis using GLOBE’s 
unstandardized scores. Similar factors and loadings (with very minor 
changes) were replicated, which revealed that the results were reliable 
and that unstandardized scores did not have significant influence on the 
findings. Furthermore, we repeated the factor analysis using the oblique 
method of factor rotation. We observed that all dimensions loaded on the 
same factors as emerged from a varimax rotation. 
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Table 2.4. Results of an ecological factor analysis of 20 cultural dimension 
scores for 33 common countries, varimax rotated with 7 factors 
















.866	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
H1:	  Individualism	   −.853	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
S1:	  
Embeddedness	  	  
.816	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
G6:	  In-­‐group	  
collectivism	  
.807	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
I2:	  Self-­‐expression	  −.790	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
S2:	  Hierarchy	   −.726	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
G2:	  Future	  
orientation	  
	   .837	   	   	   	   	   	  
H3:	  Uncertainty	  
avoidance	  
	   −.808	   	   	   	   	   	  
G7:	  Power	  
distance	  
	   −.776	   	   	   	   	   	  
G1:	  Performance	  
orientation	  
	   .774	   	   	   	   	   	  
M3:	  
Monumentalism	  	  
	   	   .938	   	   	   	   	  
H5:	  Long-­‐term	  
orientation	  
	   	   −.881	   	   	   	   	  
I1:	  Traditional	   	   	   −.864	   	   	   	   	  
G4:	  Assertiveness	   	   	   	   .883	   	   	   	  
G8:	  Humane	  
orientation	  
	   	   	   −.805	   	   	   	  
G5:	  Institutional	  
collectivism	  
	   .517	   	   −.614	   	   	   	  
H4:	  Masculinity	   	   	   	   	   .760	   	   	  
S3:	  Mastery	   	   	   	   	   .754	   	   	  
G3:	  Gender	  
egalitarianism	  
	   	   	   	   	   −.902	   	  
M2:	  Indulgence	   	   	   	   	   	   	   .764	  
Relevant	  cluster	   Clusters	  1	  
and	  2	  
Cluster	  3	   Cluster	  5	  Clusters	  7	  
and	  9	  
Cluster	  4	  Cluster	  8	   Cluster	  6	  
Note. Total variance explained: 87 %. 
2.4.2  Factor Analysis of Largest Common 
Countries 
This time, we only utilized the two cultural theories by Hofstede and 
GLOBE, which have the largest number of common countries. We 
examined whether the increase in the number of countries, and 
consequently common variances, would bring about any new exclusive 
factors. For the sake of methodological consistency, we performed the 
factor analysis without unstandardized dimensions (i.e., Hofstede’s LTO). 
The factor analysis was conducted with 12 dimensions for 51 common 
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countries, covering all continents and different regions in the world (see 
Table A.5 in Appendix A). Using the scree plot, six factors were 
extracted, explaining 85.1% of total variance. The KMO sampling 
adequacy was remarkably high (0.73). As seen in Table 2.5, after a 
varimax rotation, all dimensions loaded highly on only one factor. 
 
Table 2.5. Results of an ecological factor analysis of 12 cultural dimension 
scores from Hofstede and GLOBE models for 51 common countries, varimax 
rotated with 6 factors 












H2:	  Power	  distance	   .923	   	   	   	   	   	  
H1:	  Individualism	   −.829	   	   	   	   	   	  
G6:	  In-­‐group	  
collectivism	  
.827	   	   	   	   	   	  
H3:	  Uncertainty	  
avoidance	  
	   −.816	   	   	   	   	  
G2:	  Future	  orientation	   	   .812	   	   	   	   	  
G1:	  Performance	  
orientation	  
	   .716	   	   	   	   	  
G7:	  Power	  distance	   [.340]	   −.604	   	   	   	   	  
G8:	  Humane	  
orientation	  
	   	   −.882	   	   	   	  
G4:	  Assertiveness	   	   	   .789	   	   	   	  
G3:	  Gender	  
egalitarianism	  
	   	   	   .929	   	   	  
H4:	  Masculinity	   	   	   	   	   .938	   	  
G5:	  Institutional	  
collectivism	  
	   	   	   	   	   .785	  
Relevant	  cluster	   Clusters	  1	  
and	  2	  
Cluster	  3	   Cluster	  7	   Cluster	  8	   Cluster	  4	   Cluster	  9	  
Note. Total variance explained: 85.1 %. 
 
Factor 1 embodied two first clusters of individualism and power 
distance, Factor 2 represented the cluster of UA, Factor 3 is relevant to 
the clusters of assertiveness, and Factors 4, 5, and 6 matched to the 
exclusive clusters of gender egalitarianism, mastery, and 
collaborativeness, respectively. The main feature of this analysis was the 
emergence of GLOBE’s institutional collectivism as an independent 
factor. This confirmed our hypothesis that the larger number of countries 
might lead to manifestation of this construct as an independent factor. 
Given that the two first clusters are embedded in one factor, seven out 
of the nine proposed clusters appeared in this factor analysis. Indeed, all 
dimensions relevant to two absent clusters, traditionalism and indulgence, 
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had been excluded in this case, since we only used those dimensions with 
standardized scores and the largest number of countries in common. 
Adding Hofstede’s LTO, which also had a large number of common 
countries (47) with other dimensions, we replicated the factor analysis 
and found seven independent factors explaining 90% of the variance. 
Since GLOBE’s power distance was the only dimension which loaded on 
an unexpected factor inconsistent with the conceptual clustering, we 
removed it from this analysis. This time an independent factor for the 
LTO emerged and was added to the six former extracted factors. This 
replication affirmed the reliability of the extracted factors and the 
plausibility of having the exclusive cluster of collaborativeness. All in all, 
we can assert that the proposed clustering has a convincing empirical 
basis. 
To sum up our observations from the above: 
1. All dimensions from the first two clusters (individualism and power 
distance) loaded highly on only one factor that indicated their high 
interrelatedness. This might support the skepticism of those who 
believe that individualism and power distance can not be treated as 
different dimensions (Smith, 2002). However, as we argued earlier, 
the conceptual difference between these two dimensions is undeniable. 
At this stage, we cannot yet come to a final judgment about this unity 
since there is still some theoretical and empirical evidence lending 
support to their distinctness. For instance, GLOBE’s power distance 
dimension is one of the most recent empirical researches that shows an 
exclusive dimension for power distance. Moreover, because some 
researchers and practitioners might need to focus on one of these two 
concepts, the separation of dimensions related to each of these two 
concepts might be more helpful and explanatory. Furthermore, we can 
still name some countries with virtually the same level of 
individualism but distinguishable level of power distance (e.g., 
France, The Netherlands, Germany). Instead of drawing any final 
conclusion, we prefer to suggest further research on this subject. 
2. We found no evidence that the combination of standardized and 
unstandardized scores made any difference to the consistency of the 
empirical results of this study. Replication of the factor analysis with 
unstandardized scores of GLOBE’s dimensions in the first analysis 
and performing a factor analysis of only standardized dimensions in 
the second analysis gave highly similar outcomes, which we believe 
justifies our methodology. 
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3. GLOBE’s dimension of power distance (especially the standardized 
one) seems problematic, emerging under an irrelevant factor (UA). 
Our study reveals that unstandardized scores of GLOBE’s power 
distance show a higher correlation with Hofstede’s power distance 
(0.54, p < .01, N = 52), whereas this correlation is markedly lower for 
standardized scores (0.36). Moreover, GLOBE’s power distance has 
shown no correlation with Schwartz’s hierarchy/egalitarianism. 
Nevertheless, this dimension has a high correlation with Hofstede’s 
UA. That is why it loaded higher on the UA cluster than on power 
distance. However, when we replicated our factor analysis using 
GLOBE’s unstandardized power distance, in most cases this 
dimension did appear (or showed higher loading) on the factor 
relevant to power distance/individualism. Overall, we can not have a 
final judgment about the appropriateness of this dimension, since 
Hofstede’s power distance, as the reference construct, is itself under 
debate due to its high correlation with individualism. 
4. When considering statistical correlations, we found that some so-
called big-dimensions (Hofstede’s masculinity and LTO, Inglehart’s 
self-expression) are composed of distinguishable cultural traits. In our 
conceptual clustering, we discussed the inconsistent cultural items 
embedded in these dimensions. 
We can conclude that eight exclusive factors can be extracted from 
empirically based cultural dimensions. These factors and the loaded 
dimensions were confirmed and mapped into the proposed conceptual 
clusters. All in all, we can assert that our proposal for clusters of 
dimensions have an acceptable conceptual and empirical basis. 
2.5  A New Working Model of Nine Clusters of 
Societal Culture 
Combining the conceptual proposal with the statistical analysis, we 
propose a final working model of nine clusters of cultural dimensions, 
including all the empirical and theoretical dimensions extracted from 
several cultural theories. Table 2.6 illustrates under which cluster each 
dimension is positioned. Under each cluster in Table 2.6, we italicized 
one or occasionally two empirical dimension(s), which in our speculation 
could be the representative of cultural features of the corresponding 
cluster; Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism and Schwartz’s 
hierarchy/egalitarianism are proper representatives for the individualism 
and power distance clusters, respectively, since they have less 
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interdependence and higher face validity. Hofstede’s UA and GLOBE’s 
future-orientation are recommended for the uncertaitty avoidance cluster. 
We think the latter is a proper dimension for those who are particularly 
interested in the cultural feature of future-orientation. We are convinced 
that Schwartz’s mastery orientation better represents the mastery feature, 
because it has not been mixed with the attributes of other clusters. 
Moreover, we recommend Minkov’s monumentalism as an appropriate 
representative of the traditionalism cluster since the other dimensions of 
the cluster are mergers. However, Inglehart’s traditional/secular is, in our 
speculation, the second candidate for this cluster. GLOBE’s assertiveness 
and humane orientation seem proper dimensions for measuring the 
assertiveness cluster. Finally, each cluster of indulgence, gender 
egalitarianism, and collaborativeness has only one representative 
dimension to be utilized. 
The above are only tentative suggestions based on the embedded 
features of these dimensions, their intercorrelations and our 
understanding based on discussions of different dimensions. The final 
decision about what dimensions are useful and applicable obviously 
depends on the analyst’s objective and focus. 
2.6  Conclusion 
The appropriate number of cultural dimensions has always been a 
matter of controversy. While some scholars believe that having many 
dimensions (more than seven) is confusing and not useful (Hofstede, 
2006), others believe that we need more cultural dimensions to better 
explain the variance among different cultures (Triandis, 2001). It is 
possible to reduce the number of dimensions to just four or five, but we 
believe that this reduction weakens their explanatory power. At any rate, 
there may be a tradeoff between the simplicity of a classification system 
and its explanatory power. 
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Simply collapsing any set of the above distinguished nine clusters of 
dimensions into a smaller number of more encompassing dimensions will 
result in a failure to understand important cultural phenomena. The 
product of our synthesizing work is not a set of nine pure dimensions, but 
nine clusters of closely related (but not identical) dimensions generated 
by different authors. Nor are the importance, weight, and application of 
these nine clusters the same, but depend on the purpose of the cultural 
analysis at hand. However, jointly they generate not only a good 
overview of the state-of-the-art knowledge on cultural dimensions applied 
to cross-national comparison, but also a conceptually and statistically 
systematized understanding of how this multitude of dimensions hang 
together as shown in the clustering frame presented in Table 2.6. 
The nine clusters of dimensions generated in this contribution are not 
the final word on this topic because in our statistical analysis, we had to 
combine different data sets in which the methods used were sometimes 
different. It is also true that some clusters (especially individualism vs. 
collectivism) are much more prominent than others. We do not know 
whether this is simply because they have more explanatory power or 
whether analysts have been biased toward this topic. Finally, we were 
able to disentangle power distance from individualism on conceptual 
grounds, but not on statistical grounds, so we retained both in our final 
set. But here too, presumably more work needs to be done. 
We do believe that the given distinction in clusters of cultural 
dimensions has practical value and offers insight to those who wish to 
apply cross-cultural theories in different fields of study. At a more 
theoretical level, the clusters can reveal how some dimensions are 
actually a combination of different cultural features, awareness of which 
is crucial for the correction of the mistaken conception that a cultural 
dimension represents a specific cultural trait, justified by its distinct 
“label” (e.g., long-term orientation). The clusters can also help scholars in 
different fields to find the appropriate clusters or specific dimension 
within it for their targeted field of study. Scholars and practitioners can 
find inside the framework which authors have something to say on which 
dimension(s) or cultural phenomenon. Finally, the clusters can show how 
many resources are available for the evaluation of a given cultural 
orientation, that is, how the result for a measure of culture can be 
compared and cross-checked using several cross-cultural studies. 
Furthermore, since the quantitative approach for extracting cultural 
differences is often questioned by more qualitative researchers, showing 
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that a similar cultural construct can be extracted from two distinct cross-
cultural studies lends more credibility to the quantitative approach. 
To build further on the framework generated in this contribution, it is 
conceivable that this type of analysis be replicated using databases that 
include more common countries. This was a limitation in our work, but as 
data sets grow and become more robust, future researchers can utilize 
them for further testing and validation of the framework. An alternative 
possibility is to extract more dimensions from the WVS database to 
examine existing dimensions (e.g., power distance) and test the validity 
of clusters, especially those for which conceptual and statistical exercises 
lead to divergent outcomes. Finally, we could imagine the Herculean task 
of taking the clusters as a point of departure for a completely new 
framework, develop new question items for each cluster and base a new 
series of surveys based on them. Before such a task can be justified, the 
framework will first require thorough testing and validation by others and 
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3.1  Introduction 
A well-known and often-used framework for the analysis of culture in 
the political–administrative world is Cultural Theory (CT), also known as 
the Grid–Group theory, developed by Mary Douglas (among others, 
1970, 1978, 1992, 1996) and elaborated on by many other scholars 
(among others, Coyle & Ellis, 1994; Douglas & Ney, 1998; Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982; Hood, 1998; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson et al., 
1999; Verweij & Thompson, 2006). In this chapter, we will critically 
assess and explore attempts to operationalize and measure culture, in 
terms derived from Grid–Group theory, at the cross-national level. 
At the core of the Douglasian approach to culture are two dimensions 
of sociality—Grid and Group—that harken back to the work of 
Durkheim, and four related cultural types (or cultual biases, or ways of 
life)—individualism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, atomism—that resonate 
with many other classifications of culture (Thompson et al., 1990). The 
resulting two-by-two Grid–Group typology has inspired two basic types 
of cultural analysis. 
The first stays close to the anthropological tradition, transferred by the 
intellectual mother of the theory. This can take a form ranging from 
classic fieldwork to contemporary discourse analysis in its many versions 
(e.g., Gyawali, 2001; Hendriks, 1999; Hoppe & Peterse, 1993; Lodge & 
Wegrich, 2011; Mars, 1982). The emphasis is on the four types of culture, 
which are used as analytical coordinates, “idealtypes,” with which to 
compare empirical reality. Grid and Group are part of the multilayered 
analytical coordinates, in addition to other elements. Individualism as an 
idealtype, for instance, is assumed to be congruent with particular social 
relations (low Group/low Grid), particular values (equality of 
opportunity, choice, freedom), views of man (self-seeking), and views of 
nature (benign) (see Hendriks, 1999; Thompson, 2008; Verweij, 2011). 
The second type of analysis is less concerned with qualitative 
“verstehen” (understanding) of culture and more with quantitative 
measurement, usually in extensive, large-scale, survey research designs 
(e.g., Boyle & Coughlin, 1994; Caulkins & Peters, 2002; Dake, 1990; 
Grendstad, 1999; Gross & Rayner, 1985; Kahan, 2012; Lockhart, 2011). 
The emphasis is on the two name-giving dimensions of the theory, Grid 
and Group, which are the focus of operationalization and subsequent 
measurement. Cultural assessment, here, is derived from a set of “axes,” 
on which units of analysis have a particular position, while in the other 
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approach cultural typification connects to multilayered coordinates with 
an “onion” type of makeup. 
Various scholars tried to measure Grid and Group and test 
implications of the theory along these empirical dimensions, although it is 
known that Douglas herself was rather wary of the detailed 
operationalization and measurement of Grid and Group. Her cultural 
typology was no more and no less than “a nice little typology that goes a 
long way in understanding the world around us” (Douglas, 1992, p. 137). 
And indeed, in this vein, many “worlds around us” have been effectively 
assessed in rich cultural detail, mainly in single-case, binary-case, or 
other small-N types of research. 
Nevertheless, we think there are three good reasons to seek refinement 
of the other, “axis-oriented,” type of cultural analysis, starting from the 
Grid and Group dimensions. First, if any serious attempt to refine a 
theory deserves a fair chance to see how far it can come, then surely this 
one—elaborating on central dimensions of an influential theory—does, 
even though its main theoretician was not in favor of it. Second, Mary 
Douglas as well as other proponents of her CT have asserted that it is 
usable at different levels of analysis, those being either individuals, 
groups, or nations (Mamadouh, 1999; Swedlow, 2011). Especially in 
large-scale, cross-national research—the focus of this chapter—the use of 
measurable dimensions seems inevitable. Third, grave problems and 
challenges surround the operationalization and measurement of Grid and 
Group, which demand attention of the type that we seek to provide here. 
In this chapter, therefore, we try to contribute to the discussion on the 
operationalization of Douglasian CT by answering the following 
questions: (a) What should be the starting point of operationalization: the 
four cultural types or the two cultural dimensions of Grid–Group Theory? 
(b) What are the societal cultural traits that Grid and Group represent, if 
dimension-based operationalization is the better alternative for large-scale 
cross-cultural research? (c) What are the challenges in operationalizing 
Grid and Group at the cross-national level? (d) How can we refine and 
extend the Grid and Group dimensions to properly measure and 
adequately explain cultural variances across countries? In the following 
sections, we attempt to answer these questions. 
3.2  Operationalization of Cultural Theory (CT) 
Regarding the operationalization of CT, the first and foremost 
question is what should be operationalized to begin with: the proposed 
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fundamental dimensions of sociality (Grid and Group) or the proposed 
essential “ways of life” (the four types that are also called “worldviews,” 
“cultural biases,” and “form of solidarity” in the CT literature)? 
Inspired by the approach of Wildavsky and Dake (1990), most cultural 
theorists utilize survey items to operationalize four cultural biases. The 
most known and used instrument for operationalizing CT is a 
questionnaire designed by Karl Dake (1990, 1991) for measuring four 
worldviews. Some scholars indicate that Dake’s measures fail to display 
scale reliability and internal validity in empirical tests (Kahan, 2012; 
Marris et al., 1998; Rippl, 2002). Rippl (2002) argues that “Dake’s 
instruments are inadequate measures of Cultural Theory” because some 
“correlations were found that do not conform to the theoretical 
assumptions of cultural theory” (pp. 153-154). 
For example, the empirical tests on three measurements that utilized 
Dake’s questionnaire show strong positive correlations between hierarchy 
and individualism. This violates the theoretical assumption because these 
two worldviews have dissimilarity on both Grid and Group dimensions 
and expectedly they should have a negative correlation. Therefore, it 
indicates that Dake’s instrument is problematic for a consistent 
operationalization (Rippl, 2002). Using a different questionnaire but a 
similar approach, Coughlin and Lockhart (1998) also operationalized four 
worldviews. Similarly, their measurement suffers from a problem of 
nonconformity of correlations between worldview measures (Rippl, 
2002). 
Olli (2012) has more recently published an elaborate research on the 
survey-based operationalization of the four cultural biases. He concludes 
that “Cultural Theory still works rather poorly in surveys, and I believe I 
have pushed the limits of what can be done with Dake and Wildavsky’s 
approach to measuring cultural bias” (Olli, 2012, p. 504). However, he 
emphasizes that his “critiques of the assumptions apply only to analyses 
that rely on individual-level measurements of the four cultural biases, not 
the grid–group as two fixed dimensions. A different measurement model 
changes what one can potentially find” (Olli, 2012, p. 430). 
It is proposed, and we support the idea, that for having a more valid 
and systematic measurement of CT, one should first operationalize the 
Grid and Group dimensions and then aggregate them to measure four 
cultural types (Boyle & Coughlin, 1994; Kahan, 2012; Kahan et al., 2007; 
Rippl, 2002). This approach of developing the cultural types on the basis 
of the underlying dimensions seems more consistent with the two-
dimensional typology introduced in CT. For large-scale cross-national 
Chapter 3 | 51  
 
research, it seems to be the more promising alternative. Before discussing 
the challenges with the existing operationalization of Grid and Group, we 
first briefly elaborate on the conceptions, definitions, and measures 
introduced for these two dimensions in the CT literature. 
3.3  Definitions and Measures of Grid and Group 
Grid and Group are two bipolar cultural dimensions that were 
introduced to “account for the distribution of values within a population” 
(Douglas, 2007, p. 2) and accordingly classify different ways of life or 
worldviews. Each dimension is supposed to represent some specific 
cultural traits that cannot be explained by another dimension. 
Although there are various ways of expressing these general thoughts, 
most scholars using the theory would agree that Grid denotes the extent to 
which people’s thoughts and actions are regulated by position-related 
rankings, rules, and role prescriptions, while Group denotes the extent to 
which an individual’s life is absorbed and sustained by group 
membership (Coyle & Ellis, 1994; Douglas, 1992). 
Grid and Group are not the only bipolar dimensions of culture in 
social science. There are several other cross-cultural theories that 
introduce or extract cultural dimensions conceptually or empirically. 
Comparison of the concepts and definitions of these many dimensions of 
culture reveal the similarity and differences of dimensions. Chapter 2 
provides a summary and clustering of cultural dimensions, including Grid 
and Group. In the provided proposal of clustering the cultural dimensions 
based on the conceptual similarities and comparable definitions, Group is 
clustered with some other known cultural dimensions like individualism 
vs. collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 2002), universalism (Minkov, 
2007; Parsons & Shils, 1951; Triandis, 2002), and in-group collectivism 
by GLOBE project (House et al., 2004). These are similar conceptual, as 
well as empirical, constructs to represent (low vs. high) Group. The three 
empirical constructs by Hofstede, Minkov, and GLOBE are highly 
correlated and virtually measure the same cultural attributes of the Group 
dimension (see Table 2.3). 
Grid is clustered with known cultural dimensions like power distance 
(Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004), vertical (Triandis, 2002) and 
hierarchy (Schwartz, 1999). These dimensions represent role asymmetry 
and the extent to which hierarchy is expected and accepted in different 
societies, the attributes that the Grid dimension aims to present as well. 
Although the empirical dimensions measuring power distance/hierarchy 
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would not be completely converged, they can be considered good 
estimators for operationalization of the Grid dimension in cross-national 
level. 
 
Table 3.1. Measures and definitions of Group and Grid suggested by Gross and 
Rayner (1985) 
Measures	   Definitions	  
Group	  
	   Proximity	   Measure	  of	  closeness	  of	  group	  members,	  frequency	  of	  interactions	  
	   Transitivity	   Likelihood	  that	  if	  Member	  1	  interacts	  with	  Member	  2	  and	  2	  interacts	  
with	  3,	  then	  1	  will	  interact	  with	  3	  
	   Frequency	   Proportion	  of	  time	  a	  group	  member	  spends	  in	  some	  activity	  with	  
other	  members	  
	   Scope	   Diversity	  of	  a	  member’s	  interactive	  involvement	  in	  group	  activities	  
	   Impermeability	   Likelihood	  that	  a	  nonmember	  who	  satisfies	  membership	  
requirements	  will	  actually	  gain	  membership	  
Grid	  
	   Specialization	   Amount	  of	  possible	  roles	  a	  group	  member	  assumes	  in	  a	  given	  time	  
span	  
	   Asymmetry	   Measure	  of	  lack	  of	  symmetry	  in	  role	  exchanges	  among	  group	  
members	  
	   Entitlement	   Proportion	  of	  ascribed	  versus	  achieved	  roles	  in	  the	  group	  
	   Accountability	   Amount	  of	  member	  interactions	  in	  which	  one	  is	  dominant	  and	  the	  
other	  subordinate	  
Source. Caulkins & Peters (2002). 
 
For any cultural dimension to be measured, it should be clearly 
identified what cultural traits and attributes the dimension represents. 
However, Grid and Group tend to be defined in such broad and diverse 
terms that many different cultural values could be connected to one and 
the same dimension. The most general description is usually not the 
problem. Difficulties arise when Grid and Group are to be defined in 
ways that make them measurable. Gross and Rayner (1985) are among 
the first, and few, to provide guidelines for measuring Grid and Group. 
As illustrated in Table 3.1, they introduced different measures for each 
dimension of Grid and Group. 
With regard to the measures and definitions of Group and Grid in 
Table 3.1, we identify some ambiguities that complicate the 
operationalization of the two dimensions. The measures for Group lack 
some essential features of interrelatedness that are normally incorporated 
in individualism versus collectivism as specified and validated in cross-
cultural research (Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004). For instance, one 
of the core values for collectivism is loyalty and commitment to the 
group. It is not clear whether proximity measures can include loyalty or 
not. Another feature of collectivist culture is in-group sharing, which in 
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turn connects to another collectivist attribute of reciprocity. Living with 
parents until (even late) marriage and, reciprocally, living of parents with 
(or close to) their children are examples of collectivist sharing. Again, it 
is not clear whether or not these collectivist features can be assigned to 
frequency and proximity (as specified in Table 3.1). 
Most of the Group measures specified in Table 3.1 can be applied to 
people who join groups and clubs for volunteering. Contrary to common 
belief, joining groups and clubs is not a reliable indicator of collectivism. 
Voluntary activities are more popular among people in individualistic 
cultures than collectivistic ones because individualists see volunteering as 
a way of socializing and avoiding being alone (we will elaborate on this 
later). Thus, the Group measures in Table 3.1 are not particularly defined 
to describe the cultural orientation of “grouping with insiders” or “in-
group collectivism,” but they can also be interpreted for cultural trait of 
“grouping with outsiders” or “out-group collaborativeness.” Therefore, 
two distinct interpretations of Group are recognizable. In this chapter, we 
call the former “in-Group” and the latter “out-Group” and we argue that 
these are two distinctive dimensions of culture. 
Grid’s measures by Gross and Rayner (1985) have less ambiguity and 
more consistency with the cultural attributes of similar dimensions in 
cross-cultural research: power distance and hierarchy (Hofstede, 2001; 
House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1999). However, as we will show further 
on, some scholars place other cultural orientations like 
traditionalism/religiosity, gender egalitarianism, or indulgence on the 
Grid dimension, which increases complexity again. 
Given these considerations, we critically examine the measures and 
survey items used in the literature for the operationalization of Grid and 
Group in cross-national research. We will demonstrate that Grid and 
especially Group are operationalized based on very different 
interpretations of either Grid or Group, and in some cases, these 
dimensions are overloaded with cultural traits irrelevant to their basic 
definitions. Connecting to other cross-cultural studies that empirically 
measure cultural dimensions, we integrate three cultural dimensions of 
the GLOBE project in our study. These dimensions are pertinent to Group 
and Grid, and their definitions and question items (provided in Appendix 
B) are comparable with the measures in Table 3.1. 
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3.4  Challenges of Cross-National 
Operationalization of Grid and Group 
Most of the empirical measurements of CT have been made within a 
nation (Marris et al., 1998; Shin et al., 1989) and particularly in the 
United States (Gastil et al., 2011; Kahan et al., 2007). In recent years, few 
studies aimed to operationalize Grid and Group dimensions at the cross-
national level. Most of them have used the World Values Survey 
(hereafter WVS) database and its questionnaire (Chai et al., 2009; 
Grendstad, 1999; Melton, 2003; Torsello, 2013) and some have used 
other cross-cultural databases (e.g., Caulkins [1999] uses the Human 
Relations Area Files’ Probability Sample Files). 
We argue that inconsistency and arbitrariness are seen in selecting 
WVS items for operationalization of Grid and Group in a sense that 
different studies measure different interpretations of these dimensions. In 
some cases, items are even irrelevant to the conceptual definitions of Grid 
and Group. Chai et al. (2009) used 22 survey items from WVS as 
measures for Grid and Group (11 for each). Their selection of items has 
been questionable and authors have not performed any systematic method 
to examine the validity of their selection. Although they argued that “use 
of factor analysis is not readily compatible with deductive theories like 
Grid–Group theory” (Chai et al., 2009, p. 200), there is no convincing 
explanation of how their operationalization can be systematic and 
reliable. We recognized that some of their selective items have been 
irrelevant to definition of Grid and Group. 
Similarly, Melton (2003) used the WVS items to empirically test the 
Grid–Group theory. He administered a survey to five Groups in an 
American university, based on both WVS questions and Gross and 
Rayner’s measures. He compared the results of these two instruments and 
concluded that WVS indicators could be proper tools for 
operationalization of Grid–Group theory. Similar to Chai et al. (2009), 
Melton’s selection of WVS items for measuring Grid and Group is 
questionable. In our estimation, some of the selected items are not 
congruent with the definition of Grid and Group. 
Grendstad (1999) also put effort into operationalizing Grid and Group 
for 12 Western European countries. In his article, which is an attempt to 
extract the political–cultural map of Europe by using Grid–Group theory, 
Grendstad (1999) used four cultural items from WVS database. He 
selected two items for each dimension, performed a factor analysis to 
validate his assumption, and extracted two factors representing Grid and 
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Group dimensions. Although the factor analysis is a systematic approach 
for examining the relevance of items to cultural dimensions, a few items 
in his analysis are problematic and endanger the sampling adequacy. 
Moreover, although the factor analysis confirmed the independence of 
two pairs of items and extracted two exclusive factors, the conceptual 
relevance of adopted items for operationalizing Grid and Group 
dimensions are debatable. 
Grendstad has reported scores of Grid and Group for Western 
European countries in his article and that is why his operationalization 
has been used by other researchers, particularly in some scholarly 
publications of comparative politics in recent years (Heijstek-Ziemann, 
2014; Lockhart, 2011). In the next section, we critically assess these 
measurements and compare Grendstad’s operationalization of Group and 
Grid with GLOBE’s cultural dimensions to illuminate the challenges in 
interpretations of Group and Grid at the cross-national level. 
3.4.1  Operationalization of Group: In-Group 
Collectivism or Out-Group Collaborativeness? 
Grendstad (1999) utilized two items of “membership in voluntary 
organizations” and “work in voluntary organizations” as measures for 
Group. Here, again the aforementioned question arises regarding what 
meaning of Group has been considered in this operationalization. Being a 
member of a club/organization may not be a proper measure for 
representing high Group inclination. Indeed, we can theoretically argue 
that people in individualistic culture, who have less group ties with 
extended family or friends, would more frequently join voluntary 
organizations to make themselves busy and socialized. However, people 
in high Group cultures may have less extra time to spend in voluntary 
organizations because they have a lot of collective commitments and in-
group gatherings. For instance, Spain, Italy, and Greece display stronger 
collectivistic orientation among Western European countries (we will 
later present and discuss this in Figure 3.4) while they have a very low 
rate of membership in voluntary organization. 
A study by Rippl (2002) for examining the measurement instrument of 
the Grid–Group model indicated that the item measuring “joining clubs of 
any kind” has a very low loading on the Group dimension among a 
sample of German students. We will show later that “volunteering” is 
highly associated with the cultural trait of team working or (out-group) 
collaborativeness. 
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Comparing with one of the existing cross-cultural measurements, 
namely, GLOBE’s dimensions of culture (see Appendix B for GLOBE’s 
question items), we evaluate Grendstad’s (1999) measurement and study 
what interpretation of Group he has operationalized. His European cross-
cultural map, shown in Figure 3.1, indicates that Northern European 
countries, namely, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, as well as the 
Netherlands, score high Group and southern countries, namely, Spain and 
Italy, score low Group. This is completely contrary to the scores by other 
established cross-cultural studies, in which the Northern European 
countries score high individualistic (low Group), whereas Spain, 
Portugal, and Italy are relatively collectivistic (high Group). Considering 
face validity, the latter is much more true to life. But what is the reason 
for this discrepancy? 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Grendstad’s European cultural map (1981 & 1990) based on the 
Group–Grid model  
Note: Figure from Grendstad (1999, p. 469); the circles indicate the 1990 position 
 
As we discussed above, Grendstad used the WVS items of “voluntary 
involvement” in his study to measure the Group dimension. We indicated 
that high voluntary activity is much more popular in individualistic 
cultures than in collectivist societies because in the latter the connections 
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and interactions of people in their in-group are so much that there is less 
room for spending time with an out-group through voluntary activities. 
Thus, we expect that the involvement in voluntary organizations would 
be higher in individualistic (low Group) cultures. In support of this 
proposition, we found a high, significant correlation of .61 (p < .05) 
between a Gallup survey item measuring “the percentages of those who 
volunteered their time to an organization” (Legatum Prosperity Index, 
2011) and Hofstede’s individualism for 16 Western European countries. 
We discussed earlier that we should distinguish between two different 
perceptions of in-Group and out-Group. This ambivalence of Group, seen 
in other cross-cultural literatures as well, originates from the lack of 
distinction between in-group collectivism and out-group 
collaborativeness (see Chapter 2). Whereas the former is a cultural 
construct to represent the interrelatedness of people in their in-group 
(sometimes also called familism), the latter is related to collaborative 
activities and team working mostly with out-groups. 
Some cross-cultural scholars consider these two attributes to be two 
related facets of collectivism (Hofstede, 2001), while in practice it is not 
the case. GLOBE project (House et al., 2004) has made an effort to 
separate these two types of collectivism via introducing two exclusive 
cultural dimensions of “in-group collectivism” and “institutional 
collectivism.” The latter is associated with the spirit of team working 
while the former represents the cultural feature of interpersonal ties (see 
Appendix B for the GLOBE’s question items). An empirical study in 
China also indicates the difference between in-group collectivism and 
out-group cooperativeness (Koch & Koch, 2007). Caulkins (1994), in the 
chapter titled “Norwegians: Cooperative Individualists”, illuminates how 
the Norwegian culture accommodates the coexistence of cooperation and 
individualism. 
GLOBE’s work is a valuable effort to make a distinction between 
these two cultural features both conceptually and empirically. 
Understanding the difference between these two constructs is crucial for a 
meaningful operationalization of Group dimension in CT. We found that 
there is a high, significant correlation of .77 (p < .01) between GLOBE’s 
“institutional collectivism” and the Gallup measure of “volunteering” for 
13 Western European countries. Thus, it can be argued that what 
Grendstad (1999) has measured was not the Group dimension in its 
meaning of collectivism (in-Group) but his operationalization of Group 
resembles a facet of the cultural dimension of “collaborativeness” (out-
Group). Figure 3.2 presents high correlation of .82 between Grendstad’s 
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Group dimension (scores for 1990) and GLOBE’s institutional 
collectivism for 9 European countries in common. This corroborates our 
assertion about his operationalization. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. The relation between Grendstad’s Group (scores for 1990) and 
GLOBE’s institutional collectivism 
 
In general, we can recognize a kind of “cultural bias” in definition as 
well as operationalization of the Group dimension by scholars socialized 
in relatively individualistic cultures in the western hemisphere. For 
instance, there is no item related to interpersonal ties, family, parents, or 
friends in Kahan’s questionnaire items for measuring Group; instead, all 
items are related to the relation between government and citizens (Kahan, 
2012). This perception of Group is very different from the alternative 
perception of individualism versus collectivism based on interpersonal 
ties. An American bias, in which high versus low Group is associated 
with left versus right wing and socialism versus capitalism, seems to be 
dominant in Kahan’s measures. Kahan (2012) himself acknowledges that 
“we devised our cultural worldview measures . . . to understand variance 
in perceptions of risk within the US public” (p. 737) and he asserts that 
these measures might perform poorly in other contexts. Similarly, none of 
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two selected items by Grendstad (1999), a Norwegian scholar, are 
relevant to interpersonal ties but both are related to joining to voluntary 
organizations. 
Assessing the WVS items selected for measuring Group by three 
Eastern Asian scholars (Chai et al., 2009), we learned that they selected 
three items directly related to the importance of family, parents, and 
friends beside other items related to the private–public dichotomy. 
Influenced by relatively collectivistic cultures (Korea and China), they 
are quite likely to be more sensitive to these features of the Group 
dimension. In another attempt to measure Group using WVS items, an 
Italian scholar selected one item, among five, associated with the loyalty 
to friends (Torsello, 2013). The notion that Italian culture is more 
collectivist than American and Nordic culture, and less collectivist than 
East Asian culture, might again account for the difference in 
operationalizing Group. Thus, there are various indications that the 
operationalization of cultural bias is affected by cultural bias itself, 
ironically congruent with Douglas’s theory. 
There are more challenges of operationalization in addition to the ones 
already illustrated by Grendstad. Among the selected items for the Group 
dimension by Chai et al. (2009), the variable, “trust people,” seems not so 
relevant to the Group dimension. The authors seem to assume that a 
higher level of trust is associated with high Group. However, other cross-
cultural scholars (Hofstede, 2001; Minkov & Hofstede, 2014a) have 
demonstrated that the issue of trust is not related to the Group concept but 
is conceptually relevant to another cultural construct called “uncertainty 
avoidance.” Besides, in the ranking of interpersonal trust index, using the 
same item from WVS, many countries with high individualist culture 
(low Group) enjoy high interpersonal trust (Medrano, 2008). Our 
calculation shows that interpersonal trust index has a significant positive 
correlation (.49, N = 65) with Hofstede’s individualism. This is in 
complete opposition to Chai and associates’ assumption that “trust” has a 
positive interrelatedness with high Group. 
Among other WVS items used by Chai et al. (2009) for 
operationalizing Group, some measure the preference for the control of 
government on society and economy (e.g., “who should run business/take 
responsibility: government vs. private”). They assumed that the emphasis 
on the role of government is an indicator for high Group. It implies that 
welfare states would have a higher Group dimension in comparison with 
more capitalistic countries. It is again questionable whether this is a 
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pertinent indicator for measuring Group, given the definition by Gross 
and Rayner (1985). 
Furthermore, in Melton’s, (2003) operationalization of Group, one 
item is about “the preference for new ideas vs. preference for those that 
have stood the test of time” (p. 140). We argue that the relevance of this 
item to the Group dimension is dubious. To the best of our knowledge, 
this item is also better matched to the cultural dimension of uncertainty 
avoidance (Hofstede, 2001). 
3.4.2  Operationalization of Grid: Power Distance or 
Religiosity? 
Regarding the Grid dimension, Grendstad (1999) used two items: 
“discuss political matters” and “persuading others to share your views” 
(p. 468). He asserted that Grid “refers to negotiation, autonomy and 
networking.” It can be argued that these features are not directly relevant 
to the definition of Grid, which refers to the acceptance of hierarchy and 
differentiation and asymmetry of roles (Gross & Rayner, 1985). 
Nevertheless, these two items are not totally irrelevant to Grid definition; 
however, it is debatable to what extent they really measure Grid. To 
evaluate this, we utilize GLOBE’s power distance as an 
operationalization of Grid. The content analysis of the questionnaire used 
for measuring GLOBE’s power distance shows that all Grid’s measures, 
indicated in Table 3.1, are covered by GLOBE’s question items (see 
Appendix B for GLOBE’s question items). Figure 3.3 shows the relation 
between GLOBE’s power distance and Grendstad’s Grid dimension 
(scores for 1990) for nine European countries in common. As can be seen 
they have a moderate correlation of .57. 
Chai et al. (2009) used the items “importance of religion/God,” 
“justifying of homosexuality/prostitution/abortion/divorce,” and “equal 
job opportunity for men and women” from the WVS database as 
measures for the Grid dimension. The last item is about “gender 
egalitarianism,” which is related to an independent cultural construct 
(House et al., 2004). The first two items are associated with the cultural 
trait of religiosity/traditionalism, which is also distinct from the Grid 
dimension. Caulkins (1999), in a pilot study employing factor analysis of 
variables from 60 cultures, shows that the items related to religiosity 
(ideology) are independent from the factor representing Grid dimension. 
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Figure 3.3. The relation between Grendstad’s Grid (scores for 1990) and 
GLOBE’s power distance 
It is widely assumed that there is a plausible association between 
power distance (or Grid) and religiosity but empirical evidence indicates 
that no strong correlations exist between them. In some cases, societies 
with high religiosity have high power distance but the reverse is not 
necessarily true. For instance, among European countries, while Portugal 
has a high score of religiosity as well as a high score of power distance, 
France has a high power distant culture while its religiosity is very low. 
On the contrary, Ireland has high religiosity but low power distance. 
Moreover, the United States is an example of having low hierarchy/power 
distance but virtually high religiosity while China is totally opposite. 
Thus, these two cultural features cannot be combined in one dimension. 
Given this, using cultural items related to religiosity as measures for Grid 
dimension, like what Chai et al. (2009) and Torsello (2013) did, is 
questionable.  
Furthermore, in Melton’s (2003) operationalization, one of the WVS 
items used for measuring Grid is related to “the acceptance of enjoying 
complete sexual freedom” (p. 141). Again, it can be argued that this item 
is less relevant to the definition of Grid and more connected to the 
cultural dimension of religiosity/traditionalism or even more to another 
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distinct dimension called “indulgence,” extracted by Minkov (2007) and 
adopted by Hofstede as an exclusive dimension of culture (Hofstede et 
al., 2010). 
All in all, we observe that the existing measurements of both Grid and 
Group suffer from inconsistency and arbitrariness. This does not mean 
that the survey-based method of measuring culture should be rejected and 
disqualified per se. Survey methods and statistical tests are established 
instruments that allow ongoing improvement. Many dynamic social 
phenomena are measured and evaluated in this way. The main challenge 
of using these instruments for measuring culture is fundamental to 
measuring social phenomena in general: safeguarding the validity and 
reliability of measures. Regarding validity, Grid–Group CT needs to 
answer the question of what cultural values and conceptual definitions are 
attributed to Grid and Group; accordingly, proper measures and survey 
items need to be selected. Grid–Group theory needs to clarify what the 
Group dimension represents: in-group collectivism or out-group 
collaborativeness, and what the Grid dimension represents: power 
distance or religiosity. 
Answering these questions is more important for measuring culture at 
the cross-national level than at the national level because within a specific 
society some cultural orientations might appear either to be highly 
interrelated to other cultural orientations or to be totally intangible and 
irrelevant within that society, while at the cross-national level these 
cultural differences do matter. 
3.5  Measures of Cultural Values or Situational 
Attitudes? 
Normally, it is not expected to observe very sharp changes in the deep 
cultural patterns of a society over a short period of time. Situation-
specific attitudes may change and fluctuate relatively fast but underlying 
cultural values change more gradually. If Grid and Group are indeed 
fundamental cultural dimensions, then they should be operationalized 
using value items rather than attitudinal questions. Grendstad (1999), for 
instance, tried to measure changes of Grid and Group from 1980 to 1990. 
Considering a minimum of 0.10 as a remarkable change in his Grid and 
Group scale suggested that in many Western European countries Grid has 
had higher variability than Group (see Figure 3.1). In some countries, like 
Spain, Ireland, and the Netherlands, strong fluctuations in Group are 
reported as well. 
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In our estimation, these variations are related to the items selected for 
measuring these two dimensions. Items on discussing politics, which 
have been used for measuring Grid, can be considered situational items 
that may change from time to time. One may discuss political matters a 
lot around election time and not before or after that. Asking about 
“belonging to voluntary organizations” and “currently doing unpaid 
voluntary work” may also measure situational attitudes and not cultural 
values on the Group dimension. Melton (2003) also used items asking 
about political activism, namely, signing petitions, joining boycotts, and 
attending demonstrations, for measuring Grid. It can be argued that these 
items are also indicators of situational attitudes rather than cultural 
values. 
The findings from another operationalization of Grid and Group 
support our line of reasoning. Chai et al. (2009) used items from two 
waves of WVS to operationalize and compare Grid and Group over time. 
The items selected by them are more relevant to cultural values, rather 
than situational attitudes. Accordingly, the scores of Grid and Group for 
23 countries in two waves of surveys are consistent and the variation of 
each dimension is low (see Figures 5 and 6 in Chai et al., 2009). This is in 
accordance with the expectation of low fluctuation of cultural values over 
a decade. 
We do not assert that cultural values and situational attitudes are fully 
independent but we argue that they present different kinds of social 
phenomena; proper indicators for measuring the two need to be different. 
Indeed, the level of variation of an index over time might show whether it 
measures cultural values or situational attitudes. 
Our assumption, in accordance with most students of culture, that 
cultural values change gradually is not incompatible with the approach 
taken by some authors in CT who put great emphasis on the dynamic 
interplay between the four cultural types. Most prominently, Thompson 
(2008) argues that the four cultural types are repeatedly splitting and 
coalescing, increasing and decreasing. In our view, the interplay between 
cultural biases can be highly changeable indeed, while the underlying 
value patterns and dimensions—which are played and tossed with—are 
highly durable. Against this background, we propose to better distinguish 
between cultural values and situational attitudes while selecting items for 
measuring Grid and Group. 
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3.6  How Many Dimensions of Culture? 
So far, our discussion reveals the challenges of operationalizing 
multifaceted dimensions such as Grid and Group. In principle, there is no 
problem if different, adjacent cultural values are attributed to one and the 
same dimension; “cooperation” and “interpersonal ties” could be assigned 
to the Group dimension, and “role-asymmetry” and “religiosity” could be 
linked to the Grid dimension. In making sense of empirical phenomena, 
however, the overloading of Grid and Group could lead to confusion in 
understanding cultural diversity—especially across nations, as we 
demonstrate in this study. 
Cultural dimensions are constructed to help in mapping differences 
among groups of people. When a set of interdependent values is 
differentiated from others, a new dimension is needed to represent them. 
Dimensionalization is a kind of classification of cultural values. A 
classification can be broader or narrower and its number of categories 
depends on different criteria, some objective and some subjective. The 
proper number of dimensions should be determined based on the 
conceptual theory as well as the existing diversity in reality. A 
parsimonious classification can be useful and appropriate for a specific 
purpose but it might be nonexplanatory for other purposes. Grid–Group 
theory made a parsimonious model at the expense of explanatory power 
of having more, distinctive cultural dimensions. 
The number of cultural dimensions is always a matter of controversy. 
Whereas some cross-cultural scholars believe that having more 
dimensions is better for explaining the variance of differences among 
communities (Triandis, 2001), others believe that the number of 
dimensions should be as few as possible for the sake of parsimony 
(Douglas, 1999; Hofstede, 2001). Although there is always a trade-off 
between the principle of parsimony and explanatory power, a middle 
approach might have the benefit of the both. Working with two big-
dimensions of culture is simple and preferable but can be nonexplanatory 
of subtle differences, especially when we utilize big-dimensions for 
explaining cross-national differences among countries with a similar 
cultural background. Big-dimensions can only explain big differences. 
New dimensions are required for explaining some variances that 
cannot be explained with the help of existing dimensions. So a new 
construct (dimension) must be introduced; otherwise, a latent cultural trait 
might be embedded into existing dimensions. This overburdens a 
dimension and can even make it a combination of contradictions. 
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We already signaled that Chai et al. (2009) define the Grid dimension 
as an amalgamation of “respect authority” (or acceptance of hierarchy), 
“gender inequality” and “religiosity.” If these three measures do not have 
a conceptual relevance and significant correlations with each other, 
combining them in one big-dimension can be seriously misleading. When 
we have a group of people with high inclination to accept hierarchy and 
at the same time with high gender equality and low religiosity (e.g., 
France), then how can one combine these different aspects and make one 
construct to judge about the community’s culture? Thus, if different 
attributes of culture are not conceptually relevant and statistically 
correlated to each other, binding them into one dimension is problematic. 
Grid and Group theory is not the only parsimonious, two-dimensional 
cultural theory in the field of cross-cultural studies. Another famous bi-
dimensional cultural model is that empirically extracted by Inglehart from 
the WVS database (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). There is a principal 
difference between Douglas’s theory and Inglehart’s model; while the 
former is a theory-based model, the latter is an empirically driven model. 
Nevertheless, both believe that a major variance of values and attitudes 
among societies is embedded in and explained by their two dimensions of 
culture. In Chapter 2, we argued that Inglehart’s big-dimension, namely, 
survival versus self-expression, is the combination of three separate 
cultural dimensions, namely, individualism, power distance, and 
indulgence. This big-dimension might be useful to explain some 
variances for a specific purpose but the problem arises when someone 
needs to compare a particular cultural trait, for instance, power distance 
or indulgence, among societies. That is why in recent years, Minkov 
(2007) tried to break down Inglehart’s big-dimension of self-expression 
and extract new dimensions out of it. 
In the next section, we argue that the Grid–Group model suffers from 
the lack of, at least, a third cultural dimension, without which CT cannot 
explain some major cross-national differences, and sometimes intra-
national differences as well. We assert that this third cultural orientation 
cannot be incorporated into Grid and Group either conceptually or 
empirically. 
3.7  Grade: A Missing Dimension of CT 
Group and Grid represent two important cultural orientations that 
differentiate societies or groups of people. Group, in the meaning of what 
is called collectivism in other cross-cultural theories, is one of the most 
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elaborated dimensions of culture in the literature. Grid, or hierarchy, or 
power distance, as labeled by other cross-cultural scholars, is also a well-
known dimension in cross-cultural studies. 
CT scholars argue that Group and Grid aim to answer two central 
questions that confront individuals in all societies: “Who am I?” and 
“What shall I do?” (Wildavsky, 1987, p. 6). That is, “Am I an individual 
or a member?” and “Shall I behave as a free equal or a regulated 
ordinal?” But there is another identity question that should be responded 
to, namely, “How shall I deal?” with the follow-up question suggested by 
cross-cultural research, “Shall I compete or compromise?” This reveals a 
crucial cultural dimension, not covered by Grid or Group, needed for a 
fuller understanding of cross-cultural variation, as we will substantiate. 
This cultural orientation distinguishes societies/groups in which people 
are more focused on dominance, achievement, and excellence versus 
those societies/groups in which harmonious, agreeable, and relaxed 
relations are key. Trying to find a label alliterating with Grid and Group, 
we name this third dimension “Grade.” 
High Grade culture represents societies in which dominance and 
mastery are valued, whereas low Grade cultures are more in favor of 
harmony and compromise. High Grade culture emphasizes grades of 
achievement and the importance of standing out. Low Grade culture is 
less focused on exceptional excellence and more interested in acceptable 
averages. Table 3.2 presents some features related to high versus low 
Grade cultures. 
In the CT literature, competition is loaded on either Grid or Group. 
For instance, Hampton (1982) and Mars (1982) put competition on the 
Grid dimension, while Dake and Thompson (1999) loaded competition on 
the Group dimension. Douglas (1970) assigned this cultural value to the 
features of an “individualist worldview” (low Grid and low Group) which 
is also called “competitive individualism” in the literature (Douglas, 
1999; Wildavsky, 1987). This implicitly assumes that people with high 
Grid or high Group cultures have less inclination toward competition and 
self-assertion. However, the empirical evidence does not confirm this 
proposition. For instance, at the cross-national level, Japan displays a 
high Grid and a competition-oriented culture. South Korea has a high 
Group/high Grid culture as well as a highly competitive culture. Thus, we 
can have “competitive hierarchy” or even “competitive atomism” in 
practice. 
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Table 3.2. Some features related to high versus low Grade 
High	  Grade:	  Standing	  out	   Low	  Grade:	  Settling	  for	  
High	  mastery	   Low	  mastery	  
Competition	   Compromise	  
Dominant	   Reclining	  
Restless	   Laid-­‐back	  
Ambitious	   Contented	  
Adventurous	   Relaxed	  
Quantity	  of	  achievement	   Quality	  of	  life	  
Excellence,	  maximizing	   Average,	  satisficing	  
 
Grade is compatible with the third dimension of “activity,” which was 
once suggested by James Hampton (1982) after his attempt, together with 
Mary Douglas, to give the Grid/Group dimensions an operational 
definition. Grade is also reminiscent of the third dimension, 
“manipulation” or “Grip,” which was suggested at one point (Thompson, 
1982; Thompson et al., 1990), but not further developed as such, to catch 
positive and negative attitudes to dominance and the exertion of power. 
Thompson introduced Grip to justify the existence of a fifth way of life 
(autonomy or hermit), which was not originally in Douglas’s typology. 
Grip is not an orthogonal axis similar to Grid and Group, but is 
“concomitant of the other two” (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 399). Having an 
extra, independent dimension will double the number of cultural types, or 
ways of life, from four to eight. This invalidates the “impossibility 
theorem,” which asserts that “five and only five ways of life” are viable 
(Thompson et al., 1990, p. 3). 
In his PhD thesis, Pepperday (2009) argues for the necessity of 
employing a third dimension in CT. His proposed dimension, called 
competition, is compatible with our Grade dimension. He provides a 
valuable review of other social interaction theories that have implicitly or 
explicitly proposed a third dimension (Pepperday, 2009). He indicates 
that “geometrically, three dichotomized dimensions yield eight types,” 
but he draws a similar conclusion as Thompson: “four of them are not 
viable and do not arise” (Pepperday, 2009, p. iii). This means that his 
third dimension is also a concomitant and not an independent dimension. 
The advantage of Grade over theoretically compatible items such as 
“activity,” “grip,” and “competition” is that it can be pinpointed and 
substantiated, both conceptually and empirically. In the dimensional 
approach of CT, the expansion of cultural types (or ways of life) due to 
the presence of a third dimension is not in and of itself undesirable. The 
number of cultural types is not set in stone and can be revised if 
additional viable types emerge. After all, cultural dimensions and cultural 
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types are man-made constructs that are meant to help us in explaining 
social relations and behavioral patterns. 
In a recent symposium on CT, Verweij, Luan, and Nowacki (2011) 
presented suggestions for testing CT in future research. They indicate that 
there is an affinity between CT and the analysis of social interaction 
systems developed by Robert Bales and associates. They asserted that 
Bales’s analyses have many features in common with CT. They notify 
that Bales (2002) measures the conflicting values and manifested 
behaviors using three bipolar dimensions: friendly versus unfriendly 
(conforming to high vs. low Group), rejection of authority (resembling 
low vs. high Grid), and dominant versus passive. The latter seems to be 
the very missing dimension in CT that we discussed above. This 
dimension resembles the cultural features of Grade. The lack of this 
dimension would limit the explanatory power of CT. 
This cultural dimension has been introduced and operationalized in 
other cross-cultural theories as well (see Chapter 2). Hofstede’s 
masculinity versus femininity has some features in common with Grade. 
Mastery orientation, operationalized cross-nationally by Schwartz (1999), 
measures more specifically this cultural dimension. Schwartz (1999, 
p.28) defines mastery as “a cultural emphasis on getting ahead through 
active self-assertion (ambition, success, courage, competence).”  
Schwartz’s mastery does not have any significant correlation either 
with Grendstad’s Grid and Group measures or with other empirical 
dimensions measuring collectivism and power distance. This corroborates 
our proposition that Grade is an independent dimension whose cultural 
values cannot be represented by Grid and Group. 
As an illustration for cross-national comparison, comparable with 
Grendstad’s mapping, Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 present three-
dimensional mappings of Western European countries. They illustrate 
two different interpretations of the Group dimension, in-Group and out-
Group. Scores of GLOBE’s in-group collectivism, institutional 
collectivism, and power distance (House et al., 2004), and Schwartz’s 
mastery (Licht et al., 2007) are used as empirical operationalization of in-
Group, out-Group, Grid, and Grade respectively. Comparing these two 
figures, we see how the different interpretations of Group can result in 
different cultural mappings of countries. Moreover, the figures also 
indicate the differences in the Grade dimension across Western European 
countries. 
The lack of this dimension can also be felt in some applications of CT 
in the study of democracy. Hendriks (2010), in his book Vital 
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Democracy, discusses the affinity between two dimensions of democracy, 
namely, integrative versus aggregative and direct versus indirect 
democracy, and two dimensions of “political culture” as well as “societal 
culture.” For political culture, he uses two bipolar dimensions of power 
distance (vs. power equality) and contest (vs. convergence). For societal 
culture, he utilizes the Grid and Group dimensions. He argues that the 
two dimensions of democracy display “elective affinity” with the two 
dimensions of societal culture and political culture. If elective affinity is 
narrowed down to conceptual similarity, then the two dimensions of 
political culture and societal culture should be connected. Grid and power 
distance should present the same cultural orientation and the same should 
go for Group and convergence. However, the latter is debatable. The 
measures distinguishing high and low Group (see Table 3.1) seem to be 
not closely related to the distinction between contest and convergence. If 
the third dimension of Grade would be available, then a better connection 
to the cultural attributes of contest versus convergence could be made. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. In-Group/Grid/Grade map of Western European countries (based on 
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Moreover, this dimension, for instance, can significantly contribute to 
explaining variance in models of democracy in different countries. In 
Chapter 5, we present a significant association between the mastery 
dimension and the adopted model of democracy (i.e., consensual or 
majoritarian) in action. It will be theoretically argued and empirically 
demonstrated how cross-national variance in mastery (or Grade) predicts 
the inclination of different countries to different models of democracy. 
All in all, we propose that a third independent dimension is required to 
explain the variance of culture; without Grade, CT scholars would have to 
overload the Grid and Group dimensions in dubious ways. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Out-Group/Grid/Grade map of Western European countries (based 
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3.8  Conclusion 
Summing up and referring back to the four initial questions, this 
chapter suggests some considerations for operationalizing Douglasian CT 
for cross-national research: 
 
1. For a systematic and testable measurement of CT, cultural 
dimensions instead of cultural types should be operationalized. A 
survey-based approach has been problematic so far in 
operationalizing cultural types but it appeared to be promising in 
operationalizing dimensions; other cross-cultural research 
corroborates this. 
2. The definition and measures of Group and Grid need to be specified 
and, accordingly, adequate question items need to be selected and 
systematically analyzed. Two distinctive interpretations of Group, 
namely, in-group collectivism and out-group collaborativeness, and 
two different interpretations of Grid, namely, power distance and 
religiosity need to be distinguished. Some cultural orientations might 
be highly correlated within a particular society or among a limited 
range of countries (e.g., Western European countries), while being 
clearly distinctive dimensions among a broader range of countries. 
3. In selecting the proper measures for each dimension, survey items 
representing “cultural values” and “situational attitudes” need to be 
discriminated. Although the two are interrelated, their variability is 
quite different; while attitudes can change rapidly, values change 
slowly and gradually. 
4. Not all relevant cultural values and orientations can be incorporated 
sensibly in two big-dimensions. The cultural orientation that 
discriminates between the preference for competition or compromise 
cannot be reliably loaded on Group or Grid. For this reason, we 
propose the third dimension, of Grade, to be introduced to CT. 
 
This chapter gives some reflections on operationalization of CT at the 
cross-national level. First, we argued why for a systematic 
operationalization of CT, particularly for cross-national research, one 
should measure Grid and Group dimensions instead of direct measuring 
of four ways of life, which are supposed to be idealtypes extracted from 
the combination of Grid and Group axes. 
We debated that, in some works, different definitions and cultural 
values—some of which are not interrelated, are used in operationalization 
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of Grid and Group. This can be confusing if it is not clarified what exact 
meanings and measures are assigned to Grid and Group. Having a very 
broad definition of a dimension makes its operationalization arbitrary and 
selective. Thus, both validity and reliability of such operationalization 
would be questionable. 
We established that two different interpretations of Group are evident 
in the literature. These two perceptions of Group, called in-Group and 
out-Group, are related to two distinct cultural dimensions, namely, [in-
group] collectivism and [out-group] collaborativeness. This is a crucial 
specification, regardless of the level of measurement. We assert that the 
puzzling emergence of two exclusive facets of Group in operationalizing 
this dimension (Boyle & Coughlin, 1994; Hampton, 1982) can be 
resolved by understanding this differentiation. 
We also discussed the importance of differentiation between cultural 
values and situational attitudes in operationalizing dimensions of culture. 
Although there is no doubt that cultural values do change over time, it is 
widely emphasized that they would change slowly and gradually, whereas 
situational attitudes might change fast. In any effort for measuring 
culture, it is very important to distinguish indicators that measure cultural 
values and situational attitudes. 
We believe that the main message of CT and the approach of 
involving cultural differences for explaining variances in sociopolitical 
institutions and outcomes are valuable and promising. However, we 
should not restrict ourselves only to qualitative applications of the theory, 
nor to the two-dimensional model introduced by Douglas. As we argued 
above, the two dimensions of Grid and Group cannot cover some cultural 
variances between as well as within societies, and hence, we should 
introduce and add other dimension(s) when required. This is also 
applicable to other parsimonious models of culture like the two-
dimensional model proposed by Inglehart. 
It is understandable that a cultural model might dismiss a dimension in 
a specific context in which there is no societal variance in that excluded 
dimension. It is also conceivable that a cultural bias could be seen in the 
definition and interpretation of a cultural dimension (e.g., Group) 
operationalized by different scholars socialized in different cultural 
backgrounds. But when the application of a model goes beyond a specific 
context, specification of each dimension and adoption of new 
dimension(s) would be unavoidable. We think CT should consider this if 
it is supposed to be utilized in cross-national studies. That is why we 
argued that the third dimension for representing the cultural orientation of 
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competition, which we named Grade, can be complementary to the two-
dimensional model of CT. 
Finally, we suggest that other existing dimensions of national culture, 
measured and extracted by other cross-cultural scholars who are mostly 
affiliated with cross-cultural psychology, can be utilized as a kind of 
operationalization of CT in cross-national level, at least until a systematic 
and robust operationalization of Grid, Group, and Grade are available. In 
a recently published article, some Cultural Theorists also argue that they 
have identified “the remarkable overlap between concepts and theories in 
cross-cultural psychology and Douglas’ approach” (Verweij et al., 2014, 
p. 83). 
We are aware of challenges of the existing dimensions of national 
culture. They implicitly ignore the variances of culture within nations 
because they use the average tendency of individuals for measuring 
cultural orientation of a nation. In any comparative study, one has to 
select a unit of analysis, either a small group of people or a larger 
population. The aim of cross-cultural comparative research is to compare 
the average tendency or dominant cultural orientation of different groups 
or populations. We are aware of the variations underlying all averages, 
which is neglected in this procedure. This is one of the major limitations 
of any cross-national analysis working with averages. Moreover, these 
theories consider cultural values as static constructs and say less about the 
cultural changes over time. Another challenge to these measurements of 
national culture is that sometimes operationalization of a cultural 
dimension (e.g., power distance) by different scholars are not converging. 
Some of these limitations are inescapable for any cross-national study and 
some should be treated and improved. 
There is no doubt that we need to have more systematic and 
comprehensive operationalization of cultural dimensions. For now, 
however, we can utilize those existing cultural dimensions that have been 
extracted based on a systematic analysis and specified measures. It is time 
to reconcile the different cross-cultural studies and make benefit from the 
variety of efforts, gathering them under the broader umbrella of cultural 
theory. We have begun to realize this purpose in the field of comparative 
politics and obtained interesting findings in democratization studies as 
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4.1  Introduction 
Democracy is a core concept in political science and in many political 
systems (Lijphart, 1999; Dahl, 2000). It is one of those words that is 
widely used as something that goes without saying, as if everyone knows 
what it implies. In actual fact, however, democracy is understood and 
operationalized in many different ways. It is an essentially contested 
concept, disguised as a commonplace (Gallie, 1955). The contested 
nature of democracy has complicated many discussions, among them the 
academic debate about the best way of measuring democracy. Serious 
attempts at measuring democracy in larger-N research began in the post 
World War II period, but as Coppedge (2002, p. 35) writes “it has not 
been and may never be measured in all its many-faceted, 
multidimensional glory.” 
The various attempts in measuring democracy have focused on at least 
three aspects. Firstly, the level (and presence) of democracy: which 
countries exhibit the ‘minimum criteria’ that qualify them as a democratic 
country? Secondly, the mapping of models: which models of democracy 
can be distinguished in various countries? Thirdly, the performance of 
democracy: how do democracies score on measures of good governance, 
effectiveness and legitimacy? These issues imply crucial preliminary 
questions. Firstly, what are the minimum criteria of democracy? 
Secondly, what are the crucial dimensions underlying different models of 
democracy? Thirdly, which are the crucial performance criteria? The 
interaction of these three aspects of democracy – level, model and 
performance - is an interesting and repeatedly debated subject in 
comparative politics.  
Many research efforts and indices in the literature aim at measuring 
the level (or quality) of democracy (EIU, 2010; Freedom House, 2012; 
Kaufmann et al., 2009; Marshall et al., 2011; Przeworski et al. 2000; 
Vanhanen, 2002;). Some other indices measure the performance of 
[democratic] governance (EIU, 2010; Kaufmann et al., 2009; UNDP, 
2012). These measures are available for a large number of countries, 
some for virtually all countries.  
Different types and models of democracy and their conceptual 
specifics have been elaborately discussed in the literature (Dahl, 2000; 
Held, 2006; Hendriks, 2010). In recent decades, some attempts have been 
made to empirically assess the different models of democracy by 
identifying and measuring some indicators. The seminal research by 
Lijphart (1999, 2012) on Patterns of Democracy is one of the best-
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known, comprehensive and systematic works categorizing models of 
democracy.  
This chapter aims to address and improve some challenges in 
measuring models of democracy in practice. We focus on the 
operationalization of democratic models based on two crucial dimensions 
of democracy, which subsequently help us to map a large number of 
countries, which are deemed democratic to at least some extent.  
4.2  Two Dimensions of Democracy: 
Contestation and Participation 
In Dahl’s theory of democracy (Dahl, 1971), contestation and 
participation are considered the two main dimensions of democracy. 
There are two different approaches to study these dimensions. In the first 
approach, the constitutional facilitation or ‘right’ of contestation and 
participation in a country are assessed, while in the second approach the 
actual incidence, or ‘rate’ of contestation and participation in action are 
measured. The former is about institutional capabilities; the latter is about 
practical realities. The former is used for establishing the necessary 
degree or ‘level of democracy’; a political system needs to pass a certain 
threshold in terms of democratic rights to be recognized as an electoral 
democracy (of whatever type). The latter is used for gauging the 
particular ‘model of democracy’; the rate of participation and contestation 
determines the incidence of different variants of electoral democracy in 
practice. Figure 4.1 summarizes this schematically. Dahl himself used the 
approach pictured left in establishing polyarchy - i.e. a political system 
that satisfies at least a minimum ‘level’ of democratic rights (Coppedge 
& Reinicke, 1990).  
Lack of constitutional rights may hamper actual contestation and 
participation, but the incidence of such rights does not fully determine the 
actual rate and pattern of contestation and participation. The actual rate of 
contestation (versus pacification) and participation (versus spectating) is 
rather different in various democracies. This variety produces different 
models of democracy in action. We will extend the analysis of 
contestation and participation to measuring ‘models’ of democracy, as 
picture right in Figure 4.11. 
                                                      
1. Vanhanen (2000) and Altman & Perez-Linan (2002) partially utilized the empirical 
‘rate’ of contestation and participation for measuring level (or quality) of democracy. 
Their measures are highly correlated with the well-known indexes of level of democracy 




Figure 4.1. Different operationalization of Dahl’s dimensions of democracy 
4.3  Measuring Models of Democracy  
Regarding measuring models of democracy, the work by Lijphart 
(1999, update 2012) has been a major breakthrough. Lijphart 
operationalized contestation by utilizing five measures and distinguished 
between majoritarian and consensus models of democracy2. In recent 
years, some other empirical studies, aiming to operationalize the different 
dimensions of democracy, have come forth (Fortin, 2008; Kriesi and 
Bochsler, 2012; Vatter, 2009). These tried to replicate as well as extend 
the Lijphart’s model. However, they cover only a limited number of 
democracies. Lijphart (1999, 2012) included 36 ‘established 
democracies’ in his book. Vatter (2009) performed his operationalization 
for 23 ‘advanced industrial democracies’. Fortin (2008) tried to measure 
patterns of democracy for 19 ‘post-communist democracies’. Recently, 
Kriesi and Bochsler (2012) have made an effort to measure and map 
‘varieties of democracy’ for 50 countries.  
In our estimation, there are three major problems with these works: 
firstly, they do not include many new and developing electoral 
democracies; secondly, their method of selection and combination of 
                                                                                                                          
namely Freedom House and Polity IV. Their efforts are not focused on measuring models 
of democracy. 
2. Lijphart’s second dimension, federal vs. unitary, is related to the issue of concentration 
and centralization of power. It is argued that this dimension is provisionally connected to 
the size of countries (Taagepera, 2003). 
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indicators is debatable and revisable; thirdly, participation is less often 
elaborated in the more specialized literature on the multi-dimensional 
modeling of democracy. In the more general literature on democracy it is, 
however, broadly recognized as vital and attention-deserving (Coppedge 
et al., 2008). To improve these shortcomings, in this study we aim to 
operationalize two dimensions of democracy, contestation and 
participation, for a broader range of ‘electoral democracies’ in a 
sufficiently systematic way.  
We acknowledge that for examining the reasons and consequences of 
having different models of democracy in different countries, especially 
for studying this for new democracies, we need, first of all, to 
operationalize models of democracy for a broader range of countries than 
available in the existing literature3. In particular, the debate on the 
superiority of a model of democracy (i.e. majoritarian vs. consensual), by 
comparing the effectiveness and responsiveness of different models, has 
been ongoing and seemingly endless. We have no inclination towards one 
particular form or model of democracy. We speculate that a democratic 
model is not per se a determinant of the grade or quality of democracy. 
We will examine this thesis at the end of the chapter by performing a 
correlational analysis between dimensions of democracy and indices of 
level and performance of democracy.  
A country needs to pass a certain threshold in order to be grouped with 
other democratic countries. The latter implies that we have to deal with 
the issue of minimum requirements of democracy first. We will do that in 
the next section, dedicated to recognizing democracies. 
4.4  Recognizing Democracies 
Although there are tens of conceptualizations and definitions of 
democracy (Held, 2006; Hendriks, 2010; Saward, 2003), there is one core 
element in all definitions of democracy at the country level, and that is 
the notion of electoral contestation. In the literature it is widely assumed 
that having contested elections - free, fair and frequent enough to 
legitimate elected officials - is the minimum requirement for democracy, 
                                                      
3. We should also mention a herculean, in-progress project named Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem) which aims to operationalize seven different conceptions of democracy for a 
large number of countries over two centuries, through measuring hundreds of indicators 
(Coppedge et al., 2012). The comparison of our operationalization with the aggregated 
results of V-Dem project, which presumably will be available by 2015, could be 
beneficial and supplementary to both studies.   
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at least at the country level that we are focusing on here (Bowman et al., 
2005; Dahl, 1971; 2000; Przeworski et al. 2000). As Dahl (1971) put it: 
“democratic are all regimes that hold elections in which the opposition 
has some chance of winning and taking office”. A political system 
satisfying this criterion is classified as electoral (or formal or procedural 
or institutional) democracy (Dahl, 2000; Diamond, 1996; EIU, 2010; 
Vanhanen, 2002).  
Using three distinguished studies evaluating countries’ level of 
democracy, namely Polity IV (Marshall et al., 2011), Freedom in the 
World (Freedom House, 2012) and Democracy Index by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2010)4, we selected 80 countries from around the 
world from 1990 to 2009 that have enjoyed electoral democracy for at 
least seven consecutive years (for in seven years a country can have at 
least two elections)5. 
In order to operationalize different models of democracy in action, we 
need to identify the type of political regime of each country.6 Different 
typologies for distinguishing types of political regimes have been 
recommended by leading scholars (Cheibub, 2007; Cheibub et al., 2010; 
Norris, 2008). In spite of differences, such scholars distinguish three main 
types of democratic regime: parliamentary, presidential and semi-
presidential (or mixed). However, they categorize countries differently.  
In this study, we need a classification that distinguishes between 
popularly elected and non-elected executives (e.g. USA vs. Switzerland) 
and between ceremonial and hands-on presidents (e.g. Austria vs. France) 
as well. These differentiations are not recognized by the typology 
                                                      
4. In our study, we consider a country an electoral democracy: 
- if a country is recognized under concepts seven (restricted election) or eight (competitive 
election) of Polity IV 
- if a country’s score of Freedom House’s ‘political rights’ is lower or equal to four  
- if a country’s score of EIU’s ‘electoral process’ is higher than five 
In the occasional cases that Polity IV has no final assessment for a country or there is a 
lack of full consensus between different studies, we assess the case based on the highest 
consensus between the criteria. 
5. There are some more electoral democracies in the world but due to the lack of data 
required (i.e. election results, non-electoral participation) for many small countries, we 
could not include them in this study. 
6. It is important for our study because in calculation of some indicators, namely electoral 
disproportionality and voter turnout, the type of political regime determines whether or 
not the results of the presidential elections should be involved. That is, if a country has a 
presidential or semi-presidential regime then the disproportionality and turnout of the 
presidential election must be included otherwise only parliamentary elections are taken 
into consideration. 
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recommended by Norris (2008), Cheibub (2007) and Cheibub, Gandhi 
and Vreeland (2010). We reformulated and rearranged the criteria by 
Cheibub (2007, p. 35) and accordingly classified the regime types of 80 
countries under study (see Table E.1 in Appendix E). The rationale and 
criteria of our classification can be found in Appendix C.   
Recognizing 80 electoral democracies and their regime type, we aim 
to operationalize two dimensions of democracy, contestation and 
participation, for these countries. To this aim, we will go through the 
three main stages of developing an index: conceptualization, 
measurement and aggregation (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). In the 
following sections each stage for each dimension is separately discussed. 
4.5  Operationalizing the First Dimension: 
Contestation 
4.5.1  Conceptualization 
Competition may be the necessary spice of democracy, but the desire 
for it depends on the different democratic tastes. No contestation means 
no real democracy, though this can be institutionalized differently. 
Power-sharing or integration versus majority-rule or aggregation are two 
rival conceptions of contestation (Hendriks, 2010; Lijphart, 2007; Norris, 
2008).   
In the real world of democracy, contestation can be conceptualized 
through power fragmentation and power distribution. Power is 
fragmented and distributed in different ways. Power fragmentation is 
manifested in the role and independence of political bodies (i.e. 
legislative and executive) and the number of parties competing to take 
control of these bodies. Power distribution is manifested in the share of 
power of each party, as well as the power sharing of different political 
bodies. Power distribution is regulated through the electoral system (i.e. 
majoritarian, proportional representation, and mixed) and the types of 
regime (i.e. (semi-) parliamentary and (semi-) presidential).  
4.5.2  Measurement: Power Fragmentation and 
Power Distribution  
Lijphart’s first dimension, executives vs. parties, indicates the 
systematic power sharing among different political parties as well as 
political bodies (executive vs. legislative), and the influence of electoral 
systems on this (Lijphart, 1999). He turned to five measures to determine 
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the type and level of party-political contestation: the effective number of 
parliamentary parties, disproportionality of the electoral system, 
executive-legislative relations, cabinet inclusiveness and the role of 
interest groups (Lijphart, 1999). He asserted that his five measures are 
meaningfully and significantly correlated. However, some critics have 
argued that some of these measures (e.g. cabinet inclusiveness, executive-
legislative relation, interest groups) are incoherent, problematical and not 
logically related to this dimension (Ganghof, 2010; Taagepera, 2003; 
Vatter, 2009).  
Taaggepera (2003) argued that Lijphart’s interest group measure is not 
logically related to the executive-parties dimension. Moreover, he 
mentioned that while the other four measures are quite simple, Lijphart’s 
measure for interest groups is very complex. He also criticized Lijphart’s 
method for operationalizing ‘executive-legislative relations’. Lijphart 
(2003) himself mentioned that the indicator to measure executive-
legislative relations, based on the duration of the cabinet, has been one of 
the most troublesome.  
All in all, we have been convinced that three attributes in Lijphart’s 
work can adequately help to operationalize political contestation. In the 
following, we elaborate on them.  
4.5.2.1 Effective Number of Parties in the Parliament (ENPP) 
This is a well-known and popular measure among political scientists 
for measuring power fragmentation in parliament. The index developed 
by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) to measure the effective number of 
parliamentary parties is widely used in comparative political science. We 
have used several datasets (mentioned under Table E.1 in Appendix E) to 
find ENPP for elections in 80 countries between 1990 and 2009.  
In a democratic country the ENPP is necessarily more than one. The 
highest number in practice is around 10 (e.g. in Poland 1999 and Brazil 
2006). Having multiple parties in parliament is a characteristic of 
integrative democracy, we argue. In our model, the importance of this 
attribute follows a logarithmic rule. It means that the increasing effective 
number of parties from two to three or three to four should have higher 
relative importance than the increase of number of parties from eight to 
nine, or nine to ten. That is why we use the logarithmic scale of the ENPP 
to extract our indicator:  
LENP = Log (Effective Number of Parties in Parliament) 
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Moreover, by using a logarithmic rule, we scale the LENP between 
zero and one. If only one party is in parliament (e.g. China) then the 
LENP score will be zero, which is not the case for a democratic country. 
The highest score of the indicator can be reached when ENPP is 10 or 
beyond.  
4.5.2.2 Number of Parties in Government (NPG) 
In order to measure power fragmentation in the executive, also called 
the cabinet inclusiveness (Ganghof, 2010), we employ an indicator 
measuring the effective number of parties in government. This indicator 
distinguishes between one-party and multi-party government. Using the 
Database of Political Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al., 2001) and employing 
the same formula by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), we calculate the 
“(Effective) Number of Parties in Government (NPG) for 80 countries in 
the period between 1990 and 2009. In practice, the lowest score of NPG 
is one, normally for those countries having two-party presidential system, 
and the highest NPG is around 9 (e.g. India in 1998)7.  
Consistent with our argument for the LENP indicator, we again use a 
logarithmic formula for developing an indicator for NPG. In many 
majoritarian democratic countries, the number of parties in government is 
one. As a logarithm of zero would not be sensible in these cases, we add 
one to the NPG before making its logarithm. The final LNPG indicator is 
calculated as follows: 
LNPG = Log (Number of Parties in Government + 1) 
The lowest score of LNPG is 0.30 (Log (2)) and the highest possible 
score will be one. 
This indicator is used as an alternative to the “minimal winning one 
party cabinets” in the study of Lijphart (1999, 2012). Empirically we 
found a high and significant correlation of -0.69 (N=33, p<0.001) 
between Lijphart’s variable for the range of 1981-2010 and the LNPG 
scores for the range of 1990-2009. We consider it a successful test of 
reliability of our indicator.  
                                                      
7. Importantly and indirectly, NPG integrates the influence of presidentialism. In a full 
presidential system, the cabinet is often led by a party that the president belongs to. 
However, there are some countries with presidential system and a multi-party parliament 
(e.g. Brazil). In such countries and also in semi-presidential systems in which the cabinet 
must have parliamentary support, multi-party cabinets are more common. 
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4.5.2.3 Total Electoral Proportionality (TEP) 
The electoral system is an important determinant of the distribution of 
power. Three major electoral systems, namely majority/plurality, 
proportional representation (PR) and the mixed system can be 
distinguished. Each of these three systems has several methods 
elaborately discussed in the literature (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005). 
Disproportionality of the electoral system is an important indicator, 
measuring the difference between the percentages of votes and seats that 
each party achieves in an election. There are some indices to measure the 
disproportionality of parliamentary elections (Gallagher, 1991). 
Gallagher’s least square index is a famous formula, used by Lijphart, for 
measuring disproportionality in practice. Many political researchers 
calculate Gallagher’s index for parliamentary elections and present it in 
their cross-national datasets (Carey & Hix, 2010; Democracy Barometer, 
2010; Gallagher, 2012). We have used all the abovementioned datasets 
and other sources in the literature to find the disproportionality index for 
elections in 80 countries between 1990 and 2009. For some cases missing 
in the literature, we ourselves have calculated Gallagher’s 
disproportionality index. 
This index is usually connected to parliamentary elections only (Kriesi 
& Bochsler, 2012; Vatter, 2009), even though in presidential systems the 
disproportionality of presidential elections is not only higher but possibly 
also more fundamental. Lijphart (1999) has wisely included the 
disproportionality of presidential elections in his analysis. He suggested 
that presidential elections could be considered as parliamentary elections 
with only one seat. Following the methodology employed by Lijphart 
(1999, p. 161), we included presidential disproportionality in our 
calculations for those countries with presidential and semi-presidential 
regimes. To this end, we use the vote percentage of the elected president 
(Beck et al., 2001; Nohlen, 2005; Nohlen & Stöver, 2010), to calculate 
the presidential disproportionality (100 – vote percentage of the elected 
president). For those countries that have no majority threshold for the 
presidential election (i.e. without the 2nd round election), we estimate a 
disproportionality of 49.9 percent; this is the maximum disproportionality 
of an election.  
Since the disproportionality index is inversely related to the other two 
indicators (i.e. LENP and LNPG), we calculate the electoral 
proportionality by subtracting the electoral disproportionality from 1. 
Mackie and Rose (1991) have used the same method to calculate the 
proportionality index. Finally, following Lijphart’s method, we use the 
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geometric mean for aggregation of parliamentary and presidential 
proportionalities. Thus, the final formula for the “Total Electoral 
Proportionality (TEP)” indicator is: 
TEP = (parliamentary proportionality * presidential proportionality) 1/2 
The TEP score, consistent with our other two indicators, has the range 
of 0.5 to one in practice. So, the three indicators display no scaling 
discrepancy for the aggregation.  
4.5.3  Aggregation: Towards the Integrative 
Dimension of Democracy (IDD) 
We have identified three distinct indicators, each contributing one 
aspect of the realization of political contestation. Now we should 
combine these, using a proper methodology, to develop an index for 
measuring the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy. 
Despite the conventional approach to combine the measures through 
factor analysis (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Lijphart, 1999; Vatter, 2009), 
we assume that if there is no strong correlation between these measures, 
we should apply another mathematical method to combine these 
measures.  
As expected, the two indicators of LENP and LNPG are highly and 
significantly correlated. However, the total electoral proportionality 
(TEP) indicator has no significant correlation with the indicators of 
effective number of parliamentary parties (LENP). In Lijphart’s work, 
there is a moderate and significant correlation (-0.50, p<0.001) between 
disproportionality and effective number of parliamentary parties.8 This 
significant correlation exists because there are only six countries with 
presidential and semi-presidential regimes in Lijphart’s study. As in our 
study the number of countries with presidential and semi-presidential 
regimes increases to 34 countries, a very weak correlation between LENP 
and TEP appears (0.19, p<0.10, N=80). Knowing that there is no strong 
correlation between the electoral proportionality and the other two 
indicators, we cannot use factor analysis to aggregate the indictors.  
                                                      
8. Lijphart (1999) plausibly asserted that the majoritarian electoral system leads to a 
smaller number of parliamentary parties. Nevertheless, some exceptions can be mentioned 
like India which has more than five effective parliamentary parties in spite of its plurality 
voting system. On the other hand, a PR system does not necessarily result in a large 
effective number of parliamentary parties. Indeed, we can point to many democratic 
countries having PR voting system but a low effective number of parties (e.g. Albania, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, South Africa). 
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These three measures represent three distinct aspects of the integrative 
dimension of democracy and consequently the low score of any of them 
cannot be completely compensated with the high score of the other. 
Therefore, we think the multiplicative rule (geometric mean) is a proper 
method to aggregate these three measures (Munck, 2009). The index of 
integrative dimension of democracy is then calculated as follows: 
Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD) = (LENP * LNPG * TEP) 1/3 
By way of reliability test, we calculated the correlations between our 
IDD index and other, conceptually similar, indices in the literature. IDD 
is theoretically similar to Lijphart’s executives-parties dimension and we 
predict that they correlate empirically as well. As expected, we found a 
very high and significant correlation (0.88, p<0.001, N=33) between our 
IDD and Lijphart’s dimension 9 . Moreover, we found a high and 
significant correlation of 0.77 (p<0.001, N=23) between the IDD index 
(range of 1990-2009) and the first dimension (parties–interest groups) 
extracted by Vatter (2009) (which was in turn a replication of Lijphart’s 
dimension). The correlation between IDD and the consensus-majoritarian 
dimension by Kriesi and Bochsler (2012) is very weak and non-
significant. This is expected as their dimension includes some 
(conceptually) inconsistent indicators, excludes presidential 
disproportionality and lacks a variable measuring cabinet inclusiveness. 
Their dimension is not strongly correlated with Lijphart’s dimension 
either (0.49, P<0.01, N=29).  
In sum, our IDD index replicates Lijphart’s executives-parties 
dimension for a larger number of countries by employing simpler, widely 
available and updated measures. We may assume that the IDD-index 
systematically operationalizes the political consociation (versus 
contestation) attributes of democracy in action. The scores of IDD and 
three indicators (LENP, LNPG, TEP) for 80 countries for the period of 





                                                      
9. We calculated the correlation between the IDD scores for the years 1990 to 2009 and 
the scores for Lijphart’s first dimension for the years 1981 to 2010 (Lijphart, 2012). 
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4.6  Operationalizing the Second Dimension: 
Participation 
4.6.1  Conceptualization 
Participation is an important pillar of democracy. As mentioned 
before, in many definitions of democracy and particularly in Dahl’s 
theory, it is one of the main attributes of democracy. Regarding 
participation, on the one hand, a democratic political system must 
institutionalize and facilitate participation rights of citizens, and on the 
other, people should use their participation rights and be involved in the 
political process. The institutional provisions enabling popular 
participation resemble the ‘main gate of Participation Hall’, which must 
be open. But, citizens should also participate to some extent otherwise 
“Participation Hall” will remain empty even when its gates are wide 
open. Many indices of democracy measure the institutional “room for 
participation” by assessing political rights (e.g. freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, free and fair electoral process) and universal 
suffrage. If we are interested in actual or “realized participation”, which 
we are in this chapter, then an independent index is needed to represent 
this attribute.  
Electoral participation is a useful first indicator of political 
participation. Higher turnout in parliamentary or presidential elections 
indicates a stronger inclination of people to influence politics in their 
country. There is also a more direct method of electoral participation, 
through referendums or similar direct votations. Referendums can be 
government-initiated or citizen-initiated. The latter normally originate 
from popular initiatives, which represent the possibility of bottom-up 
involvement in the political issues. Furthermore, several manifestations of 
non-electoral involvement of citizens can be identified, namely: ‘interest 
in politics’, ‘membership of parties’ and ‘engagement in political actions’ 
or in other words: ‘political involvement’, ‘party activities’ and ‘protest 
participation’ (Norris, 2002; Verba et al., 1978).  
In the literature, there is a debate on what should be considered 
political ‘participation’. Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) suggest a distinction 
between ‘political involvement’, which incorporates interest in politics 
and discussions about politics, and ‘political participation’ which is 
defined as activities directed to influence the governmental process. 
Party-related participation is normally considered as conventional 
political participation, pertinent to electoral participation. It has also been 
argued that interest in and discussion of politics is not necessarily 
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connected to political participation since it can be merely ‘expressive’. 
Hence, some scholars excluded it from their analyses of political 
participation (Parry et al., 1992; Verba et al., 1978). Considering these 
reflections, we decided to involve only political action or protest 
participation as a mode of non-electoral participation in practice. 
Altogether, we conclude that three components - ‘general-electoral 
participation’, ‘referendum-electoral participation’ and ‘non-electoral 
participation’ - can adequately represent the main modes of political 
participations in practice. The next step is to look for proper measures of 
these three components.  
4.6.2  Measurement: Electoral and Non-Electoral 
Participation  
Many indices of democratic participation are based on subjective 
experts’ assessments (Freedom House, 2012; Polity IV, 2014). 
Developing an index for political participation based on ‘objective’ and 
measurable indicators is what we aim to do in this section. Vanhanen 
(2000) used one measurable indicator - voter turnout - as a proxy of 
participation in his Index of Democratization. Later, he added 
referendums in the calculation of his indicator (Vanhanen, 2002). This 
measure has been criticized by other political scientists as a narrow and 
improper indicator of quality of democracy (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).  
Peterlevitz (2011) also tried to add the “processes of direct 
democracy” to voter turnout arguing that a measure merely based on 
turnout in periodic elections is too “thin” for assessing political 
participation. He combined voter turnout of legislative or presidential 
elections and number of referendums in each year. Although a valuable 
attempt, the resulting index is problematic in some respects. Peterlevitz 
(2011) weighs the compulsory and optional voting systems equally. 
Moreover, he multiplies turnout of regular elections with the number of 
referendums, while there is no convincing justification for doing so. 
Following our conceptualization, we will identify measures for both 
electoral participation as well as non-electoral participation. We introduce 
and discuss each relevant indicator and its formulation. 
4.6.2.1 General-Electoral Participation (GEP)  
Regarding participation in general elections, we accept voter turnout 
as the appropriate indicator. In (semi-)presidential systems, we take the 
average turnout of parliamentary and presidential elections. In our study 
we use the Voting Age Population (VAP) turnout because it better 
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demonstrates the real share of the population that participates in 
elections10. Moreover, it is argued that ‘inclusiveness’ is one of the more 
important criteria of a democratic system (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012). 
Using VAP turnout, we implicitly include the extent of suffrage in our 
indicator, since the more inclusive democracy has the larger denominator 
in the turnout ratio11. As it is estimated that the turnout in countries with 
compulsory voting system would be magnified by 7 to 16 percent on 
average (Blais, 2006; Lijphart, 2007), we multiply a reduction coefficient 
of 0.85 to the corresponding electoral turnouts. We gathered the list of 
countries with the compulsory voting from the IDEA (2013) database.12 
The final countries’ scores of the General-Electoral Participation (GEP) 
indicator for the years 1990 to 2009 were calculated and tabulated in 
Table E.1 in Appendix E. 
4.6.2.2 Referendum-Electoral Participation (REP) 
Developing an indicator for referendum-electoral participation is a 
challenging task. In recent years some scholars attempted to measure 
direct democracy, most of which considered the occurrence and number 
of referendums as the main indicator (Altman, 2011; Kriesi & Bochsler, 
2012; Peterlevitz, 2011).  
In his book, Altman (2011) explains different mechanisms of direct 
democracy. He compiled a table of worldwide events of direct democracy 
between 1984 and 2009, listing the number of top-down as well as 
citizen-initiated occasions of direct democracy in 108 countries. As 
mentioned before, Peterlevitz (2011) supplemented voter turnout with the 
number of referendums to make an indicator for political participation.  
                                                      
10. The turnout is usually measured using two different formulas: one is the percentage of 
total number of votes cast divided by the registered electors (voting eligible population), 
and the other one is called VAP turnout which has the Voting Age Population as the 
denominator. The VAP includes all citizens above the legal voting age. The database of 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2013) provides 
both voter and VAP turnouts for virtually all countries. In the case of missing data for 
some countries, we use other sources namely African Elections Database (2012), IPU 
(2012), Keesing (1998) and Nohlen & Stover (2010). 
11. In theory, the VAP turnout must be lower than the registered-based voter turnout 
(because the voting age population is always more than the registered voters). However, 
since the voting age population is calculated based on the most recent and available 
census, in some cases the VAP is not updated and consequently the reported VAP turnout 
is higher than the registered-based voter turnout. In such cases we will consider the lower 
turnout as the more realistic indictor in our calculations. 
12. We apply the reduction factor to 17 countries having compulsory voting. We are 
aware that this decision may be debated, however, it does not have a major impact on the 
general pattern of PDD.  
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In some publications (Altman, 2012; Fiorino & Ricciuti, 2007; Gross 
& Kaufmann, 2002; Vatter, 2009), authors used the constitutional 
allowance of referendums, instead of the frequency of referendums, as the 
measure for direct democracy. In his effort to replicate Lijphart’s study, 
Vatter (2009) even added a third dimension of direct democracy to 
Lijphart’s two-dimensional model. He developed a new index for ranking 
direct democracy in OECD countries by weighting different types of 
referendums (i.e. controlled vs. uncontrolled referendums in his 
terminology) considering the constitutional allowance and the incidence 
(regardless how frequent) of referendums. In our opinion, this kind of 
indicator, based on the constitutional provisions for referendums, cannot 
be a valid proxy for direct democracy in action.  
We therefore developed an indicator for measuring referendum-based 
participation by considering the average number of referendums in a 
decade, at both national and local level. We use different weights for 
different types (top-down vs. bottom-up), levels (national vs. local) and 
effects (binding vs. advisory) of referendums (The description of varieties 
of referendums and the rationale behind our weighting factors are 
presented in Appendix D). We aggregate all referendums according to the 
following formula: 
aggregated score of referendums = Σ (K effect * K level * K type * N type ) 
In this formula, N type is the number of realized referendums of each 
type in each year. Since in practice we should “take into account the 
declining marginal importance of additional referendums” (Kriesi & 
Bochsler, 2012, p. 146), the direct participation indicator would be 
calculated in a logarithmic scale. Thus, we define the Referendum-
Electoral Participation (REP) indicator as follows: 
REP Indicator = Log (aggregated score of referendums + 1) 
We added 1 to the formula before taking the logarithm in order to give 
the zero score to the countries with no referendums. We assume the 
highest score limit of 1 for the REP. The countries’ REP scores for the 
range of 1990 to 2009 have been calculated and tabulated in Table E.1 in 
Appendix E.  
As expected we found high and significant correlations of 0.71 and 
0.66 (p<0.001, N=80) between the REP indicator and the referendum 
indicators by Altman (2011) and Kriesi & Bochsler (2012) respectively. 
There is also a moderate correlation of 0.55 (p<0.001, N=80) between 
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REP and Vatter’s indicator of direct democracy. This correlation is not 
unexpected since in both studies a comparable coding of referendum 
types has been used. As anticipated, there is only a modest correlation of 
0.39 (p<0.01, N=64) between our REP indicator and the DDI indicator by 
Fiorino & Ricciuti (2007), which is mainly based on the institutional 
provisions for referendums. In conclusion, the REP indicator is in line 
with other indices of direct democracy, while including some relevant 
aspects and nuances not considered by others.  
4.6.2.3 Non-Electoral Participation (NEP) 
Although the identification of good measures for non-electoral 
participation is not easy, it is not impossible. For instance, there are some 
relevant questions regarding the three categories of non-electoral 
participation in the European Value Survey (EVS, 2012), Afrobarometer 
(2012), Latinobarometro (2012), Globalbarometer (2012) and the World 
Value Survey (WVS, 2012). Following the discussion in the 
conceptualization section, we searched in the question items in several 
waves of surveys between 1990 and 2009 to gather the data for ‘political 
action’ as the main manifestation of non-electoral participation.  
We considered three forms of political action as proper measures for 
non-electoral participation: ‘signing a petition’, ‘joining in boycotts’ and 
‘attending lawful demonstrations’. For each action, the percentage of 
respondents who choose ‘have done’ is assumed to be the score of the 
measure. The three forms of political action can be considered as 
alternatives to each other in different countries. Signing petitions is the 
user-friendliest form of participation. In some contexts, however, it is 
believed to be impotent and those with demands prefer ‘protest 
participation’. For instance, attending demonstrations is more popular 
than signing petitions in countries like Greece and Spain.13 We apply the 
‘maximum’ aggregation rule that is proper for the conceptual attributes 
with the compensatory relationship (Munck, 2009). It means that the 
highest score among three measures will be the proxy of non-electoral 
participation14. Therefore, the final score for Non-Electoral Participation 
(NEP) indicator is calculated using the following formula: 
                                                      
13. According to the WVS, in the survey of 2007-2008, 36% of Spanish and 23% of 
Greek respondents mentioned that they ‘have attended in lawful demonstrations’ while 
23% of Spanish and 19% of Greek respondents declared that they ‘have signed petition’.  
14. This aggregation rule is acceptable and reliable if the three measures display a 
minimum level of internal relatedness. The result of Cronbach’s alpha reliability test is 
0.61(N=72), which represents a meaningful level of internal consistency. For those 
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NEP Indicator = Maximum percentage of people who ‘have done’ 
signing petitions or joining boycotts or attend demonstrations 
4.6.3  Aggregation: Towards the Participative 
Dimension of Democracy (PDD)  
Deciding about the proper aggregation rule is again challenging. We 
found a weak Cronbach’s alpha (~ 0.40) for these three indicators which 
reveals that factor analysis is not an appropriate method. What else is 
possible? The proposed index for political participation in the Polyarchy 
dataset by Vanhanen (2002) is calculated by adding two components of 
turnout and referendums. In his formula the highest possible score would 
be 70 points, 30 points of which can be attributed to referendums. Thus, 
referendums could compensate low turnouts. In this formulation, if a 
voter turnout in a country is 70 percent or more, then the highest score 
would be achieved15. Altman (2012), in his effort to ‘bringing direct 
democracy back in’, suggests an additive formula that gives a 25 percent 
weight for referendums and 75 percent for other components of 
democracy. Unlike the earlier formulas, Altman’s aggregation rule is not 
fully compensatory or substitutive but is additive with the specific weight 
for each component.  
We could argue that each of our three indictors (i.e. GEP, REP and 
NEP) represents one particular mode of political participation. The 
scarcity of one cannot be fully compensated by the abundance of the 
other. For instance, it might be argued that the high frequency of 
referendums in Switzerland could compensate its low turnouts in general 
elections. But the former ‘high’ should not overcompensate the latter 
‘low’. (It is also true for the reverse that the lack of referendum-based 
participation cannot be ignored due to the high level of voter turnout in 
general elections.) Needless to say, that the non-electoral participation 
also cannot be a substitute for the representative participation and 
referendums.16  
                                                                                                                          
African and Latin American countries that all three items of political action have not been 
surveyed, we used only available data to find the NEP score. 
15. Peterlevitz (2011) revised the Vanhanen’s formula without changing the main logic of 
it. He considered the same way of aggregation in which the score of referendums is an 
additive to the turnout. In his formula, the highest score would be 100, which can be 
achieved by either turnout or number of referendums in a substitutable manner. 
16. All sorts of electoral participation need the formal process to be fulfilled and hence 
take plenty of time and resources. In an occasion that people are not satisfied with adopted 
policies or the way of governance, the non-electoral participation is the main means of 
political activism. The political action or protest participation is an important ‘control 
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Considering the different aggregation rules, we conclude that the 
additive rule with the different weights for each mode of participation is 
the appropriate approach for aggregating three modes of participation and 
developing the participative dimension of democracy. Although a 
selective weighting would always be debatable, an equal weighting for all 
three modes of participation would be more problematic. We argue that 
general elections are still the most important locus of national 
participation, because of the significant role of elected representatives in 
democratic governance. Thus, the GEP should have extra weight. 
Regarding the growing importance of direct participation, manifested in 
referendums and (new) social movements, it should have a proper weight 
as well. All in all, we propose a 3:1:1 relationship as a sound ratio of the 
GEP, REP and NEP respectively. Thus, the final formulation of 
participative dimension of democracy will be as follows: 
Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD) = 0.60 * GEP + 0.20 * 
REP + 0.20 * NEP 
In which GEP= General-Electoral Participation, REP= Referendum-
Electoral Participation and NEP=Non-Electoral Participation. 
The scale of all three components is between 0 and 1. Hence, the final 
score will have the same scale. All in all, the proposed ratio is not only in 
line with the provisional weightings of other scholars, but is also 
consistent with the theoretical and practical weight of three modes of 
political participation. The scores of PDD and three components (GEP, 
REP, NEP) for 80 countries for the period of 1990 to 2009 are listed in 
Table E.1 in Appendix E. 
As a reliability test we can examine the correlation between PDD and 
indices by Vanhanen (2002) and Peterlevitz (2011). PDD and these two 
indices have two components (i.e. turnout and referendum) in common. 
As expected, PDD has high and significant correlations of 0.82 (p<0.001, 
N=69) and 0.76 (p<0.001, N=62) with Vanhanen’s and Peterlevitz’s 
indices respectively17. Moreover, we checked the correlation between the 
‘political participation’, subcategory of the Economist Index of 
                                                                                                                          
force’ to regulate the function of power holders. That is, if the power holders know that 
the public participation and people’s surveillance are not only there in election times but 
also realized in different forms of non-electoral participation, then their accountability 
would be different. Therefore, lack of non-electoral participation cannot be fully 
compensated by having high electoral participation. 
17. The statistical correlations between PDD and two indices by Vanhanen (2002) and 
Peterlevitz (2011) were calculated for the years 1990 to 2000.  
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Democracy (EIU, 2010), and PDD. Among indices of democracy, this is 
the only index we found that contains an element of non-electoral 
participation in addition to turnout. The EIU employed some items from 
WVS similar to what we used in developing the NEP indicator. EIU’s 
‘political participation’ is available as of 2006 only. We calculated its 
average score from 2006 to 2010. This average has a high and significant 
correlation of 0.70 (N=80, p<0.001) with the PDD for the 2000s. 
Finally, in order to corroborate the assumption that these two 
dimensions of democracy, i.e. IDD and PDD, are independent and they 
cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional model (Coppedge et al., 2008), 
we calculate the correlation between the two dimensions. As expected, 
only a very weak correlation of 0.24 (N=80, p<0.05) between IDD and 
PDD is found. It confirms that these two dimensions of democracy are 
independent and non-integrable. 
4.7  Two-Dimensional Mapping of Democracy 
Our main goal in this chapter is the operationalization of models of 
democracy on two dimensions, and the subsequent construction of a 
comparative map for a large number of electoral democracies. Extracting 
the empirical scores, we map democracy on a global scale for the years 
1990-2009. In Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 the horizontal axis represents the 
integrative (versus aggregative) dimension of democracy and the vertical 
axis shows the participative (versus spectative) dimension of democracy. 
The right side of the maps exhibits countries with a more integrative (or 
consensual) practice of democracy; the left side indicates more 
aggregative (or majoritarian) democracies. The upper side of the map 
presents countries with more participative democracy, and the lower zone 
is ascribed to countries with a more spectative type of democracy.  
Four typical combinations or types of democracies can be 
distinguished. The type with high scores on both the participative and 
integrative dimension could be called integrative-participative 
democracy. A strong example here is Switzerland, known for its highly 
consensual system, which brings elites of various persuasions in 
permanent relations of cooperation, but also its strongly developed 
arsenal of direct democracy, which gives the general public many ways to 
participate (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). This category also includes the 
Nordic and Low Countries in North-Western Europe, which may not 
have the same level of referendum-related participation as Switzerland, 
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but do display comparatively high general-electoral and non-electoral 
participation, compared to the bulk of other countries on the map. 
High scores on the participative dimension together with low scores 
on the integrative dimension gives a combination that we label 
aggregative-participative democracy. The prototype here is the USA, 
which has been known for its highly competitive, majoritarian political 
system and its relatively participative ‘civic culture’ for long (cf. Almond 
& Verba, 1963, 1980; Norris, 2002). Aggregative-participative 
democracy coincides remarkable, but not exclusively, to the English-
speaking group of countries. 
 
Figure 4.2. Two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the 
electoral system highlighted 
 
The type of democracy with low scores on both the integrative and the 
participative dimension could be called aggregative-spectative 
democracy. Here, a highly majoritarian, ‘winner takes all’ model 
coincides with a strong tendency to ‘spectator democracy’, with citizens 
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showing thumbs up, or down, in general elections but not a lot of 
additional political participation. An apt illustration is Greece, with its 
adversarial, dichotomous political system, and its relatively detached 
culture of citizenship (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002)18 . Patterns of 
democracy in Mexico and some other Latin-American countries and new 
democracies in Africa appear to be even more spectative on the 
aggregative side of the map (cf. Reid, 2007). 
The combination of high scores for integrative democracy and low 
scores for participative democracy could be named integrative-spectative 
democracy. An extreme variant here is post-conflict Bosnia, where the 
Dayton agreements have established highly consociational structures (of 
almost Belgian or Swiss complexity), which are however not combined 
with the levels of participation found in established consociational 
countries like Belgium or Switzerland. More typical seem to be the Baltic 
States, combining more moderate levels of integrative and spectative 
democracy than outlier Bosnia (Bose, 2005; Patrick & Hamot, 2005). 
Lastly, at the bottom-left part of the map, we could distinguish a fifth 
category of countries, with such a low level of democratic participation 
that we propose to name this category abstention democracy. In this 
category, we find countries like Senegal, Zambia, Mali, Paraguay and 
Guatemala. 
In Figure 4.2, the electoral system of each country (as specified in 
Table E.1 in Appendix E) is highlighted on the map. All countries with a 
majoritarian electoral system - except for the persistent ‘puzzle of Indian 
democracy’ (Lijphart, 1996) - and the majority of countries with a mixed 
system are located on the left side of the map. The right side of the map is 
dominated by countries with a system of proportional representation 
(PR). Both observations suggest patterns consistent with democratic 
theory, but it should be noted that especially PR systems are dispersed 
along the horizontal axis. A considerable number of countries with a 
proportional electoral system are on the side of aggregative democracy in 
Figure 4.2. This indicates that the institutional provisions for proportional 
representation may be conducive to, but not necessarily connected to, the 
integrative model of democracy. It seems that other institutional and 
contextual factors play a role in the ultimate development of integrative 
or aggregative democracy; this will be studied in the next chapter. 
 
                                                      
18. Our data for the 1990-2009 period cannot tell whether patterns of political 
participation have fundamentally changed following the outbreak of the recent financial 
crisis in 2009. 
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Figure 4.3. Two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the 
regime type highlighted 
 
Figure 4.3 highlights the regime type of countries. The top of the map 
(the realm of more participative democracy) is dominated by countries 
with a (semi-)parliamentary system. The notable exception is the USA, 
combining a clearly presidential system with a top score on the 
participative dimension. Uruguay is another exception having a 
presidential system and a rather high participative model. However, there 
are also many parliamentary democracies located at the spectative part 
and even at the bottom of the map (e.g. Bosnia and Jamaica, where a 
parliamentary system comes together with abstention rather than 
participative democracy). Although most presidential regimes are on the 
left side of the map, there are some exceptions - namely Brazil, 
Indonesia, Benin and Ecuador. The most remarkable exception here is 
Brazil, which combines a presidential system with a relatively high score 
on the integrative dimension of democracy. Pattern-defying cases like 
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these show that the level of integrative or participative democracy in a 
particular country is not simply determined by regime type.  
 
Figure 4.4. Two-dimensional map of democracy for 1990 to 2009 with the 
region highlighted 
 
Finally, regions of countries are highlighted in Figure 4.4. Although 
there are a few cluster-defying exceptions, it is striking to discover that 
countries with geographical or cultural affinities tend to practice, more or 
less, similar models of democracy. Figure 4.4 depicts eight country 
groups, referring to categorizations often-used in the literature (Gupta et 
al., 2002; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). The Anglo group of countries sits, 
without exception, in the aggregative-participative quadrant of the map. 
The Latin-European group resides here as well, with the exception of 
Portugal, and despite a somewhat less participative score for Spain and 
France. The North/West European cluster is clearly grouped in the 
participative-integrative quadrant, with the tiny exception of 
Luxembourg, and a location of Finland closer to the Baltic/East European 
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group. With the notable exceptions of Brazil and Uruguay, the Latin-
American countries spread out the aggregative-spectative quadrant, where 
one part of the African cluster also resides at the most aggregative side; 
another part (Senegal, Zambia, Mali) is closer to what we earlier called 
abstention democracy. Benin is the only African country located in the 
integrative-spectative quadrant. Similar to young democracies in Latin 
American countries, the large part of Central/Eastern European group are 
mainly in the spectative-aggregative section of the map, with Bosnia, 
Slovenia and Slovakia as outliers. Lastly, one group is more dispersed: 
the Asian group, with one subgroup in the aggregative-spectative, and 
another in the integrative-spectative quadrant. 
Having operationalized dimensions of democracy for the years 
between 1990 and 2009, we can present the changes of democratic 
models in countries under study over two decades.19 Figure 4.5 (top) 
shows the changes in IDD in 77 countries. Assuming the alteration more 
than 0.05 as a remarkable change (outside of the shaded area in Figure 
4.5), we observe some twenty countries in each side of the figure that 
have had a considerable shift in their democratic model. Colombia and 
Croatia experienced the highest shift from an aggregative to an 
integrative model of democracy (a change more than 0.15). On the 
opposite, Thailand, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine have had the highest 
shift towards a more aggregative model of democracy. Austria, Benin, 
Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Indonesia, Malta, Namibia, Sri Lanka, United 
Kingdom and the United States have had virtually no changes in their 
democratic models (less than 0.01). Expectedly we can see that a majority 
of ‘established democracies’ have experienced less change in their 
democratic models. Exceptions are Japan, Italy and France that present 
changes toward a more aggregative model; Norway, Finland and Costa 
Rica, on the other hand, display shifts to a more integrative model.  
                                                      
19. Since there are two countries (Bosnia, Senegal) which converted to democracy in 
2000s and also due to the missing electoral disproportionality for Mali in 2000s, these 
three countries were excluded from Figure 4.5 (top). 
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Figure 4.5 (down) demonstrates in a substantial number of electoral 
democracies a shift towards a more spectative model of democracy over 
the past decade. Considering the same threshold of 0.05, we see that 
eighteen countries experienced a drop in the participative dimension 
(PDD), while eleven countries had a slight increase in this dimension.20 
As illustrated in the figure, Lithuania, Albania and Romania are countries 
with the highest rate of decrease (more than 0.15) in PDD; Macedonia is 
the only country that experienced an increase of more than 0.10 from 
1990s to 2000s. Twelve countries (Spain, Hungary, Sweden, 
Luxembourg, Finland, Malta, Australia, Croatia, India, Iceland, Norway 
and Brazil) displayed almost no change in PDD over two decades (less 
than 0.01). Almost all established democracies (except the UK that has 
experienced a considerable drop in PDD) had no major change in PDD 
(see countries in the shaded area). This implies that changes in models of 
democracy are seen more in new and developing democracies. The 
operationalization of democratic models in this study could be 
instrumental for future research on the changes in democratic models. 
4.8  Conclusion 
The central aim of the previous undertaking was to operationalize 
models of democracy in action, based on ‘two persistent dimensions of 
democracy’ (Coppedge et al., 2008), namely contestation and 
participation. We recognized three conceptual attributes for each 
dimension and accordingly developed three indicators to measure each of 
them. In the aggregation of each of the three indicators, we developed 
two bipolar indices called the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension and 
the participative (vs. spectative) dimension of democracy. Statistical 
calculation reveals that these two dimensions have a weak correlation 
(0.24, p<0.05) with each other, which validates the two-dimensionality of 
our model.  
The additional aim of this undertaking was to empirically map a large 
number of democratic countries, spread across the globe, connecting 
them to our two-dimensional model. In the previous section we 
summarized the empirical findings in three comparative graphs, using and 
assembling data from a number of well-known databases. We noted a 
number of remarkable country cases as well as some emergent empirical 
                                                      
20. In addition to two countries that have converted to electoral democracy in 2000s, due 
to missing data of NEP for 9 countries in 1990s, we could not compare PDD for eleven 
countries.    
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patterns. We also identified pattern-defying cases (a.o. India and Brazil) 
as well as theory-challenging observations (e.g. some PR-systems located 
at the aggregative, left side of Figure 4.2, when PR is usually understood 
as indicative of integrative democracy), which demand further and deeper 
analysis.  
We finally presented countries’ changes in IDD and PDD over two 
decades and identified electoral democracies with major changes as well 
as countries with minor variation, which have been mostly established 
democracies. Much can and will be done by way of subsequent empirical 
research. But in this chapter, we set out to do first things first - that is: the 
systematic operationalization and subsequent empirical mapping of 
democracy for a large-N study of countries.  
We started our research with the speculation that the shape of the 
democratic model is not per se a determinant of the level and 
performance of democracy in a country. To examine this thesis, we 
calculated the correlations between different dimensions of democratic 
models and the existing indices of level (or quality) and performance of 
democracy. 
Table 4.1 presents the correlational scores of three groups of indices. 
As we can see, there is a very weak, positive correlation between IDD 
and the indices measuring level of democracy (the highest correlation is 
0.34 (p<0.01) with the Polity IV index and the lowest correlation is a 
non-significant one with the Freedom House index). The same goes for 
correlations between IDD and indices measuring performance of 
democracy (the highest is 0.30 (p<0.01) with Human Development Index 
and the lowest is a non-significant correlation with democratic 
satisfaction). Lijphart’s Executives-Parties dimension shows somewhat 
higher positive correlations with these indices. This implies that 
Lijphart’s conclusion on the superiority of consensus democracy is not 
robust when new and developing democracies are involved. It is striking 
that Vatter’s and Kriesi-Bochsler’s dimensions have no significant 
correlations with any indices of level and performance of democracy.  
On the other hand, PDD shows higher, positive correlations with the 
indices of level and performance of democracy, although the correlations 
between PDD and some indices of level of democracy (i.e. Polity IV and 
EIU) are not very strong (equal or less than 0.50). However, the direction 
of causality between the participative dimension and level and 
performance of democracy is a question to be addressed in further 
research. 
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All in all, from our operationalization of two dimensions of 
democracy for a broad range of electoral democracies, we can conclude 
that ‘model’ of democracy (as operationalized here) is distinguishable 
from other aspects of democracy namely ‘level’ and ‘performance’ of 
democracy. Moreover, the associations between democratic models and 
performance indicators show that a final, conclusive verdict regarding the 
superiority of one democratic model over another (i.e. majoritarian vs. 
consensual) cannot be passed. 
This raises the (new) research question as to what factor can explain 
emergence and workings of different models of democracy in different 
countries. Although we did not elaborate on this specific question here, 
we could speculate that the effectiveness and acceptability of each model 
of democracy is context-sensitive. That is, each model of democracy 
could be credible and effective in one context and problematic and 
ineffective in another. In our view, models of democracy should be 
compatible with the context of democracy in order to be vital. This thesis 
will be elaborated and scrutinized in follow-up chapters. 
We finish this chapter by listing the distinctive features of our two-
dimensional approach to democracy. 
1. The first, ‘integrative’ dimension of our two-dimensional model 
operationalizes the extent of contestation (and competition) in 
democracy, or the other way around: the level of pacification (and 
consensualism). It can be considered, to a large extent, a replication of 
the first, ‘executives-parties’ dimension in Lijphart’s seminal study 
Patterns of Democracy (1999, 2012). It has, however, the advantage of 
covering more countries from all over the world, including the newest 
democracies. Moreover, we opted for the more simple and measurable 
indicators and excluded the more controversial ones (as elaborated in 
Section 4.5.2).  
2. The second, ‘participative’ dimension is less often elaborated in the 
more specialized literature on the multi-dimensional modeling of 
democracy. In the more general literature on democracy it is, however, 
broadly recognized as vital and attention-deserving. By assembling 
usable, but scattered, measures of electoral and non-electoral 
participation in one dimension we tried to add something that was not 
there yet. Participation in direct, referendum democracy is considered 
together with participation in general elections, as well as participation 
beyond the realm of elections and votations. 
3. We have used only ‘objective indicators’ of real political practices. 
None of our measures is dependent on the subjective assessments of 
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third parties (i.e. experts who give a subjective assessment of 
participation or integration in a particular democracy).  
4. We have considered subtleties in the calculation of indicators largely 
ignored in other works, such as the incidence of compulsory voting in 
some countries (which needs to be corrected for), local and non-
binding referendums (which need to be considered besides national, 
binding referendums), and presidential disproportionality (which 
needs to be included in the estimation of total electoral 
disproportionality).   
5. We have scaled our measures using the original scores to avoid the 
problem of interpretation of standardized data. We have been as 
transparent as possible about the formulation of our indicators as well 
as the applied aggregation rules. Using the original scores and 
providing them in this book gives other researchers the opportunity to 
replicate the analysis by using different aggregation rules; this is often 
lacking in this kind of research (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).   
6. We have operationalized the two dimensions of democracy for two 
decades (1990 to 2009). The starting date of 1990 marks the beginning 
of a new era of democratization after the fall of communism in many 
countries. We have carefully assembled data, as comprehensively as 
possible, so that at least the data of two elections could be included for 
each country in each decade.  
Finally, we should recognize that this study like any other scientific 
research of this type implies some challenges: 
1. The number of variables measuring the two dimensions of contestation 
and participation could be debated. Although we believe that our three 
measures for each dimension are both necessary and adequate, other 
authors may come up with convincing arguments that more measures 
are needed. Our view is that it should be possible to add an indicator, 
if it is objectively measurable and, more importantly, if there is a 
strong theoretical argument for its inclusion. 
2. The participative dimension introduced in this chapter represents one 
of the first attempts to combine three different aspects of political 
participation, which implies room for improvement. In the 
development of this dimension, we had to work with available - 
restricted and imperfect - sources of data for referendums as well as 
non-electoral participation. The items we have selected from the value 
surveys and the method for averaging and aggregating them could be 
challenged. We have tried to operationalize participation as 
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consistently and convincingly as possible, but we should not rule out 
future improvements. 
3. Our aggregation method differs from the common factor analysis used 
by various scholars in the field, which may therefore lead to raised 
eyebrows. However, factor analysis is only possible if there is a 
meaningful correlation between variables; and it is only useful if a 
convincing theory for aggregation is lacking (Munck & Verkuilen, 
2002). Here, we have tried to formulate an appropriate, theoretically 
informed, aggregation rule for both dimensions of democracy. We 
find the arguments for proceeding this way convincing, but this can be 
debated. 
4. The range of twenty years (1990-2009) may be too short for those 
researchers who would rather see a longer time span than a longer list 
of countries mapped along the same dimensions. This shortcoming 
can be tackled by performing complementary research at later points 
in time, if and when more longitudinal data for the full set of countries 
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5.1  Introduction  
The relation between democracy and culture is a long-lasting subject 
of interest in political science. The mainstream of research has focused on 
finding a relation between qualities of a democratic system (e.g. effective 
democracy) and the existence of essential values (e.g. self-expression 
values). Some empirical efforts were made to unravel the relation 
between cultural values and the level of democratization (see Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005, p. 245 for the list of literature). In most of these attempts, a 
number of cultural values were introduced as important drivers or 
blockers on the track of democracy.  
There is, however, an understudied question as to what the relation 
between cultural values and ‘models of democracy’ in different countries 
exactly entails. We know that there are different models or patterns of 
democracy (e.g. majoritarian vs. consensus and participatory vs. spectator 
democracy) in various countries (see Chapter 4 and Anderson & Torpe, 
2000; Dahl, 2000; Held, 2006; Lijphart, 1999, 2012). But why does a 
particular country, or country group, treasure and accept one model of 
democracy, while suspecting and discrediting another type? Does culture 
matter in adopting and practicing a particular model of democracy?  
In this chapter, we explore an alternative - not primarily functionalistic 
but culturalistic - way of understanding the adoption of different models 
of democracy in different countries. First of all, we will shortly review 
different perspectives on the relation between culture and democracy. 
Second, we will briefly review our operationalization of models of 
democracy in 80 countries based on two dimensions of contestation and 
participation. Then we will introduce a set of cross-cultural research 
projects that empirically extracted dimensions of national culture. Next, 
we will discuss different features of those cultural orientations that are 
conceptually relevant to the two dimensions of democracy - contestation 
and participation – that we elaborated on. Accordingly we will formulate 
a number of hypotheses regarding the relation between dimensions of 
national culture and these two dimensions. Finally, we will examine the 
hypotheses empirically and draw some conclusions and give suggestions 
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5.2  Culture and Democracy: A Triangular 
Relationship 
The interaction between culture and democracy can be studied in 
different ways, as Figure 5.1 shows.  
 
Figure 5.1. The triangular relations between culture, structure and performance 
 
Some authors focus on the relation between cultural values and 
democratic performance (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Licht et al., 2007). 
For instance, Inglehart and Welzel (2005, p. 154) in their seminal work 
on modernization theory argue that there is a casual relation between 
cultural values and democratization. Based on a massive body of cross-
national data, they assert that higher levels of self-expression values lead 
to higher levels of ‘effective democracy’, which they define as the 
product of ‘Presence of Democracy’ and ‘Quality of Democracy’.1  
The causal arrow that Inglehart and Welzel draw goes from cultural 
values to democratic performance. They do, however, not examine the 
interrelation between culture and structure of democracy, nor the possible 
connection between these two together and democratic performance. 
Regarding the role of, and interaction between, culture and democratic 
institutions, some political scientists argue that ‘just institutions matter’, 
or that ‘inclusive institutions’ matter most (among others: Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012; Rothstein, 1998). These scientists eventually try to 
explain the relation between the institutions and the performance of a 
nation. They argue, for instance, that it is not culture that determines the 
                                                      
1. To construct the index of effective democracy, they multiply the Freedom House 
measures of civil and political rights by the World Bank’s anticorruption scores. 
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performance but institutions. We do not disagree with the core message 
of these theories but we speculate that the compatibility of cultural 
orientations and institutional design matters as well for the performance 
of institutions. In this study, we aim to examine how cultural orientations 
codetermine and influence the preference for different arrangement of 
democratic institutions, i.e. models of democracy.  
Democracy is practiced in different models or patterns. The dichotomy 
of majoritarian vs. consensus democracy, elaborated and operationalized 
by Lijphart in his seminal research into Patterns of Democracy, is vastly 
discussed and debated. Some other distinct models like participatory vs. 
spectator or active vs. passive democracy are identified (Anderson & 
Torpe, 2000). Each of these models has its own proponents and 
opponents. No conclusive empirical evidence, however, has shown the 
consistent outperformance of one particular model by another.  
Lijphart (1999) examined the relation between ‘structure’ and 
‘performance’ of democracy and concluded that the consensus model is a 
“kinder and gentler” model of democracy. He argued that in a fragmented 
society, the majoritarian model of democracy is conflict-prone and hence 
the consensual model should be practiced. Norris (2008) also assessed the 
relation between democratic institutions and quality of democracy and 
mainly supported the Lijphartian approach. Linder and Bachtiger (2005) 
asserted that the consensus model (power-sharing) is crucial for 
democratization in developing countries in Asia and Africa. Moreover, 
they examined the influence of the cultural trait of familism on the level 
of democracy and concluded that this cultural factor would play a more 
pivotal role (negatively) than economic factors for these societies. 
These scholars, however, did not discuss the relation between cultural 
orientations and models of democracy in their works. Only at the end of 
his book, Lijphart briefly mentioned some plausible interactions between 
culture and democratic models. In his review of Lijphart’s theory and its 
critics, Bormann (2010, p. 9) concluded that “in future research 
endeavors, political scientists in Lijphart’s footsteps should try to 
disentangle the intricate relationship between culture and political 
institutions to gain a deeper understanding of how the two influence each 
other”. He emphasized that “Lijphart’s repeated claim of the superiority 
of consensus over majoritarian democracies in the presence of evidence 
to the contrary should be continuously revisited, especially in novel 
environments”.  
In his ‘theory of democracy in action’, Hendriks (2009, 2010) 
conceptualized the relation between various models of democracy and 
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compatible socio-political cultures. He theoretically argued that “political 
cultures and societal cultures are the foundations underpinning the 
models of democracy” (Hendriks, 2010, p. 32). His study is one of the 
rare ones that explicitly posits a relation between dimensions of 
democracy and dimensions of culture. He hypothesized that two 
dimensions of democracy and two dimensions of culture are associated: 
the integrative (vs. aggregative) dimension of democracy would relate to 
the cultural orientation of convergence (vs. contest) and the direct (vs. 
indirect) dimension of democracy would relate to the cultural orientation 
of power equality (vs. power distance). Utilizing Hendriks’ theoretical 
model, Heijstek-Ziemann (2014) recently tried to examine the match 
between mass cultures and models of democratic reform for Western 
democracies.   
All in all, the association between cultural orientations and models of 
democracy is the most understudied side of this triangle. Nevertheless, 
diversity of cultural values is likely to underpin the diversity of 
democratic ‘tastes’ (people in different countries, with distinguishable 
cultural values, may well prefer different types of electoral systems and 
forms of government). Differences in culturally-inspired democratic 
tastes are not automatically related to differences in the level and 
functionality of democracy. States like the United States, France and the 
Netherlands are all established ‘full democracies’, but their democratic 
institutions differ significantly and in some respects even dramatically. 
We assert that the influence of culture on this diversity is considerable 
and needs to be systematically studied. This relation - between culture 
and democracy - is the black box that we aim to open up in this chapter.  
5.3  Dimensions of Democracy  
In recent decades, various attempts have been made to empirically 
assess different models of democracy by identifying and measuring 
particular indicators. The breakthrough work by Lijphart - developed in 
the 1990s and recently updated - is one of the most comprehensive works 
categorizing different models of democracy in a systematic way. Lijphart 
(1999, 2012) utilized ten measures to distinguish between majoritarian 
and consensus democracy. Other empirical studies, aiming to 
operationalize different dimensions of democracy, have been presented in 
recent years (Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Vatter, 2009). These tried to 
replicate as well as extend the Lijphartian model through adding new 
dimensions of democracy. 
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In earlier work, Dahl (1971) considered contestation and participation 
the two main dimensions of democracy. As elaborated on Chapter 4 of 
this book, we have operationalized models of democracy in action for 80 
‘electoral democracies’, measuring the practice and realization of 
contestation and participation along two dimensions. The first dimension 
is called the ‘Integrative Dimensions of Democracy (IDD)’, which is a 
replication of the parties-executives dimension of Lijphart for a larger 
number of countries. The second dimension is labeled the ‘Participative 
Dimension of Democracy (PDD)’ and operationalizes political 
participation. We will briefly describe the components of these 
dimensions in the following.  
5.3.1  First Axis: Integrative Dimension of 
Democracy (IDD) 
Power is fragmented and distributed in a democratic regime. The 
diversity in the modalities of power fragmentation and the process of 
power distribution determines the variety of democracies. Competition is 
the necessary spice of democracy, but the desire for it depends on the 
different democratic tastes.  
Power fragmentation is manifested in the effective number of parties 
and the share of power of each party, as well as the power sharing of 
different political bodies (i.e. legislative and executive). Power 
distribution is regulated through the electoral system (i.e. majoritarian, 
proportional representation (PR) and mixed) and the types of regime (i.e. 
(semi-) parliamentary and (semi-) presidential).  
Taking into account the indicators used in Lijphart’s first dimension 
and considering the criticisms on some indicators, we have employed 
three indicators to operationalize the integrative dimension of democracy:   
1- Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP)  
2- (effective) Number of Parties in Government (NPG) 
3- Total Electoral Proportionality (TEP) 
Although these three indicators are very similar to three variables of 
Lijphart’s first dimension, they were differently formulated and 
aggregated. We used the logarithmic rule for scaling ENPP and NPG in 
order to consider an appropriate weighting for increase of number of 
parties. Moreover, with this formulation the highest score for the 
indicators will be a unit and hence all three indicators would have the 
same scale.  
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These three indicators are aggregated using the multiplicative rule 
(geometric mean). The index of integrative dimension of democracy is 
then calculated as follows: 
Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD) = (LENP * LNPG * TEP) 1/3 
This dimension represents to what extent the model of democracy in a 
country is integrative (or consensual), versus aggregative (or 
majoritarian). The countries’ average score of the LENP, LNPG and TEP 
and the IDD score for 80 countries in years between 1990 and 2009 are 
listed in Table E.1 in Appendix E. 
5.3.2  Second Axis: Participative Dimension of 
Democracy (PDD) 
Participation is an important pillar of democracy. As mentioned 
before, in many definitions of democracy and particularly in Dahl’s 
theory, it is one of the main attributes of democracy.  
Similar to the first dimension, we have measured the realized 
participation (and not the institutionalized right of participation), focusing 
on two major manifestations of political participation: electoral and non-
electoral participation.  
Electoral participation can be expressed in the different types of 
elections namely legislative elections, presidential elections and 
referendums. Voting in conventional elections, i.e. parliamentary or 
presidential, is a useful first indicator of political participation. Higher 
turnout indicates a stronger inclination of people to influence politics in 
their country. There is also a more direct method of participation, through 
referendums or direct democracy. 
Regarding scoring General-Electoral Participation (GEP), we used the 
voting age population turnout as the appropriate indicator. In (semi-) 
presidential systems, the average turnout of parliamentary and 
presidential elections is considered. We modified turnouts of countries 
having compulsory voting by a reduction coefficient of 0.85.  
We developed a formula for scoring the Referendum-Electoral 
Participation (REP) using different weighting coefficients for different 
types (top-down or bottom-up), levels (local or national), effects (binding 
or non-binding) of referendums (see Appendix D). Since in practice there 
is a declining marginal importance of additional referendums, the final 
score of REP would be calculated in a logarithmic scale and be ranged 
between zero and one.  
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In order to operationalize the Non-Electoral Participation (NEP), we 
have considered three forms of political action as proper measures for 
non-electoral participation: signing a petition, joining in boycotts and 
attending lawful demonstrations. Using the global surveys (e.g. WVS, 
EVS, Afrobarometer, Latinobarometer etc.), the maximum percentage of 
respondents who choose ‘have done’ for any of three actions is assumed 
to be the score of the NEP.  
We finally aggregated these three indicators using the additive rule. 
We argued that general elections are still the most important locus of 
national participation, because of the significant role of elected 
representatives in democratic governance. Thus, the GEP should have 
extra weight. Regarding the growing importance of “direct participation”, 
manifested in referendums and ‘social movements’, it should have a 
considerable weight as well. All in all, we proposed a 3:1:1 relationship 
as a sound ratio of the GEP, REP and NEP respectively. Thus, the final 
formulation of participative dimension of democracy will be as follows: 
PDD (Participative Dimension of Democracy) = 0.60 * GEP + 0.20 * 
REP + 0.2 * NEP 
The scale of all three components is between 0 and 1. Hence, the final 
score will have the same scale. The countries’ average score of the GEP, 
REP and NEP indicators and the PDD score for 80 countries in years 
between 1990 and 2009 can be found in Table E.1 in Appendix E. Having 
two dimensions of democracy, we now identify the dimensions of culture, 
using the major cross-cultural studies.  
5.4  Dimensions of Culture  
Although there are many definitions, there is a common emphasis that 
“culture” consists of shared elements - attitudes, beliefs, values, self-
definitions - of a community (Triandis, 1996). A society’s culture is 
inherent in values, in the sense of broad tendencies to prefer certain states 
of affairs over others (Hofstede, 2001). The notion is accepted, largely, 
that value orientations codetermine the behavior of people in social, 
economic and political realms. Cross-cultural scholars acknowledge that 
cultural value orientations are relatively stable although they do change 
gradually (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1999). 
Many scholars in comparative politics use individual question items 
from public surveys, particularly the World Value Survey (WVS), to 
examine the relation between culture and politics (among others: 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lane & Ersson, 2005; Lane & Wagschal, 
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2012; Norris, 2011). Some fundamental cultural dimensions extracted 
from cross-cultural research are, however, less utilized in the field of 
comparative politics, unlike elsewhere. Since the early 1980s when 
Hofstede’s initial indices were established in a large statistical cross-
national comparative study, dimensionalization of culture has become a 
popular approach for understanding cross-cultural differences.  
After Hofstede, other cross-cultural researchers and teams - such as 
Schwartz, Inglehart, GLOBE and Minkov - have also introduced and 
empirically extracted different dimensions, sometimes similar, sometimes 
different and sometimes overlapping ones. In this study, we attempt to 
utilize these cultural models, which elaborately discussed in Chapter 2, 
for our analysis. 
5.4.1  Selecting from the Many Dimensions of 
Culture 
The dimensions underlying different cultural models often present 
conceptual similarities as well as strong empirical correlations. In the 
attempt to show the interrelatedness of different dimensions, we 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 the similarities and differences of dimensions 
and finally identified nine clusters from 25 cultural dimensions 
introduced by abovementioned cross-cultural researchers.  
Here, we utilize four cultural orientations that in our estimation are 
conceptually most pertinent to the described dimensions of democracy. 
We utilize those cultural dimensions that were operationalized over the 
1990s or 2000s, the time span at which the dimensions of democracy 
were measured as well. Although Hofstede (2001) has argued that 
cultural values of societies change only very slowly, we use the scores 
from the most recent operationalizations of culture, to forestall possible 
worries that using scores of a cultural model based on a dataset from 
the1960s (like Hofstede’s) is neither reliable nor representative for people 
living in recent decades. Therefore, in this study we utilize: 
• two dimensions of national culture from Schwartz’s study namely 
Hierarchy and Mastery, which were measured through  a sample of 
over 15,000 urban teachers in 51 countries, surveyed in 1988–1998 
(Licht et al., 2007, p. 667).  
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• one cultural dimension from GLOBE’s study namely Future 
Orientation, measured via middle manager samples in 62 countries, 
surveyed between 1995 and 1999 (House et al., 2004).2 
• one cultural dimension from Minkov’s study namely 
Monumentalism, which was extracted from WVS data after 1995 
(Minkov, 2008).3  
 
In the next section we will propose how these cultural orientations can 
be related to the two dimensions – contestation and participation – of 
democracy.  
5.5  Hypotheses on the Relation between 
Dimensions of Culture and Democracy 
The aim of this study is to examine the relation between cultural 
orientations and the models of democracy at the national level. We 
hypothesize that the preference and inclination for a specific cultural 
orientation in a society can explain the preference for and practice of one 
model of democracy or another. 
A mastery orientation displays an emphasis on the cultural attributes 
of competitiveness, achievement and self-assertion. The societies with 
higher mastery orientation stress mutual competition, high ambition and 
performance. Hardworking is admired there. Mastery orientation gives 
more sympathy for the strong. Wealth and recognition are two important 
values in this culture. On the contrary, in a society with low mastery, 
consensus, solidarity and harmony are more emphasized and the 
sympathy for the weak is praised. Knowing these attributes, we posit a 
plausible relation between mastery orientation and the integrative 
dimension of democracy.  
We argue that in a mastery-oriented society, the heatedly competitive 
and partisan elections are expected and accepted. We posit that the 
majority/plurality electoral system would be more practiced in these 
societies. In this environment, “big is beautiful” and thus people mainly 
support and vote for big and major parties. It is less likely that the 
                                                      
2. Regarding the notion of representativity of matched samples (i.e. samples used by 
Schwartz and the GLOBE project) see the discussion in Minkov (2013, p. 94).  
3. As showed in Chapter 2, monumentalism is strongly associated with Inglehart’s 
traditionalism, which is more known in the literature, however, we decided to use the 
former because its concept as well as its label better represent the cultural trait that is 
pertinent to our purpose.   
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emerging small parties can absorb remarkable votes because mastery-
oriented people do not like to vote for a predetermined loser. Given this, 
the effective number of parties at the electoral level as well as at the 
parliamentary level would be few, generally less than four. There is a 
common conviction that few numbers of parties is a result of majoritarian 
electoral system and having a PR system, number of parties automatically 
increases (Duverger, 1964; Lijphart, 1999). We think that this 
generalization is problematic. We argue that cultural factors, particularly 
the mastery orientation, have an important influence on ‘effective’ 
number of parties. We will examine this proposition that the presence of 
proportional electoral system cannot per se lead to the rise of ‘effective’ 
number of parties.  
Furthermore, ‘winner takes all’ mentality is expected to be popular in 
mastery-oriented societies. Thus, big parties are less cooperative and the 
one party cabinet would be a norm. Altogether, we assert that mastery-
oriented societies would incline to aggregative (majoritarian) model of 
democracy.  
On the contrary, in a harmony-oriented culture, the electoral 
competitions are expected to be less adversarial. The ‘small is beautiful’ 
attitude is admired, and hence, higher supports for small and minority 
parties are predicted. A balanced distribution of votes is anticipated and 
parties would rarely achieve a majority of votes. The proportional 
electoral system and the lower electoral threshold would be more 
acceptable. Therefore, the effective number of parties would be higher. 
The cooperation between parties to make a consensus and form a 
coalition government would be a normal practice. All in all, countries 
having harmony-oriented culture are expected to lean more towards 
integrative (consensual) model of democracy. 
Hypothesis 1: Societies with a higher Mastery orientation tend 
towards a less integrative model of democracy.  
The cultural traits of self-stability, pride and religiosity are capsulated 
under the dimension of monumentalism (Minkov, 2008). Societies with 
high monumentality do more strongly believe in their thoughts and 
convictions. That is why they respect religion and traditions more. They 
are normally less into compromise and more into dominance. They like to 
be exceptional. Having distinguished identity is a matter of importance in 
this culture. Presenting charismatic characteristics is praised and 
encouraged. That is why many charismatic figures and leaders, 
sometimes known internationally, are usually emerged in such societies.  
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On the contrary, there are societies that stress dialectical thoughts and 
secular orientation. Religion is not an obsession there. People in these 
societies are more flexible to change their thoughts and compromise in 
conflicts. Charismatic figures rarely appear in such societies.  
Knowing these features, we can expect that societies with strong 
monumentality are less inclined to the integrative model of democracy. In 
these societies, the majority of people are loyal supporters of large and 
strong parties. People would like to see charismatic leaders in power. It is 
expected to see the presidential system with powerful president in these 
countries. Elections are preferably very competitive and political 
discourse is adversarial. The majority/plurality electoral system would be 
accepted and adopted. In total, it is predicted that there would be fewer 
effective number of parties in elections and in parliament, even if the PR 
system would be employed. In a country with the mentality of ‘fighting 
until the best wins’, the one-party cabinet is anticipated to form. All in all, 
likewise the mastery-oriented societies, the monumentality-oriented 
countries are expected to go for the aggregative (majoritarian) model of 
democracy.  
Hypothesis 2: Societies with a higher Monumentality orientation tend 
towards a less integrative model of democracy.  
Hierarchy (or power distance) is a cultural orientation that reflects the 
extent to which hierarchical relations and position-related roles are 
expected and accepted. In societies with large power distance, power-
holders are entitled to privileges and subordinates expect to be told what 
to do (Hofstede, 2001). Decision-making is seen as a capability of experts 
and powerholders and is not a task for which the powerless expect to be 
consulted. Public participation should be only in general elections for 
selecting representatives and delegating the power of governance to them. 
Involvement of ordinary people in policy-making would be seen as a kind 
of anarchism. Role of politicians and public managers is seen more 
important than the role of citizens in politics and governance. In general, 
there is an elite-oriented attitude towards politics and society. Societies 
with lower hierarchy orientation have opposite preferences.  
Considering these features, we hypothesize that political participation, 
and especially the engagement beyond the general elections, would be 
lower in countries with large power distance (hierarchy). People in power 
distant culture are expected to involve passively. That is, they participate 
in general elections and other formal instances of participation, but being 
an active citizen is uncommon in those societies. These societies are 
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expected to incline more towards the so-called ‘spectator democracy’ 
(Anderson & Torpe, 2000) instead of participatory democracy.  
Hypothesis 3: Societies with a stronger Hierarchical orientation tend 
towards a less participative model of democracy.  
Future orientation is a cultural trait reflects the long-oriented behavior 
of people such as planning for or investing in the future (House et al., 
2002). Democratic participation is not a ‘quick return’ business but rather 
is a medium- or long-term investment. The tree of democracy will be 
fruitful if people foster it constantly. People should be ready to invest 
personally in participation in order to benefit of a democratic system. 
This needs a future oriented mentality. Short-term oriented people are not 
enough patient to accept the gradual changes and improvements out of 
their small acts of political participation. They seek for ‘fast’ and ‘big’ 
changes in ‘short’ time and so they are more in favor of revolutionary 
changes rather than gradual reforms via continuous participation. Given 
this, we can expect to see the different preference of modes of 
participation for societies with long- vs. short-term orientation. That is, 
while in the former a large number of people engage and prefer to 
practice more deliberative and discursive modes of participation (Dutch 
and Japanese style), in the latter a less number of people participate and 
they adhere mostly to ‘protest participation’ (e.g. Spanish and Greek 
style).  
Participation is crucial for having a sustainable democracy. 
Democracy in countries with very low political participation (abstention 
democracy) is extremely fragile. If people do not involve and give their 
voice in political decisions, powerholders can easier abuse their power. 
People’s surveillance and feedback can control the health of democratic 
institutions and responsiveness of elected authorities. Taken together, we 
hypothesize that future oriented societies would lean to more participative 
model of democracy.  
Hypothesis 4: Societies with stronger Future orientation tend towards 
a more participative model of democracy.  
In the next section, we will empirically examine these four 
hypotheses. 
5.6  Data and Results 
Thus far, we identified two dimensions of democracy and four 
dimensions of culture at the national level. Using the operationalized 
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dimensions of culture and democracy (see Table A.5 and Table E.1 in 
Appendices), we now empirically examine our hypotheses in the previous 
section. Table 5.1 gives a first overview of the relations between cultural 
orientations and the integrative dimension of democracy (IDD) (see Table 
E.2 in Appendix E for correlations). The significant correlations between 
the IDD (and its sub-components) and the cultural dimensions of mastery 
and monumentalism provide support for the first and second hypotheses.  
 
Table 5.1. Correlations between two dimensions of national culture and IDD, 
and its components (including outliers) 
 IDD	   LENP	   LNPG	   TEP	  


















Note: Pearson correlations, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; number of countries is in 
parentheses. 
 
Figure 5.2 gives a more detailed picture of the relation between IDD 
and the mastery orientation.4 As can be seen, there is a rather strong 
reverse association between IDD and mastery. As the most conspicuous 
outlier on the map, India confirms its reputation as a theoretical puzzle 
(Lijphart, 1996). Brazil and Israel (and to a lesser extent the Netherlands 
and Switzerland) are also out of the predominant pattern. Relatively 
integrative democratic institutions in these countries go more or less 
against the grain - theoretically assumed and empirically corroborated by 
most other countries - of relatively competitive, self-assertive (mastery) 
orientations. If the main three outliers are excluded, there will be a high 
correlation of 0.64 (p<0.01, N=41) between IDD and mastery (the 
correlation will be 0.73 if the Netherlands and Switzerland would be 
excluded as well). In Figure 5.2, the regime type of countries is also 
highlighted. No meaningful pattern associated with regime type is 
observed.   
 
                                                      
4.  The regression lines shown on figures have been calculated after removing the outliers.  
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Figure 5.2. The relation between IDD and Mastery dimension of national culture 
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relation between IDD and monumentalism. A 
correlational pattern is evident, although there are some outliers: Taiwan, 
Moldova, and, again, Brazil (now more monumental than countries with 
similarly integrative institutions). When the outliers are excluded, the 
correlation is 0.52 (p<0.01, N=53). This pattern corroborates the second 
hypothesis. Moreover, as implied in the second hypothesis, the full 
presidential regimes are mostly seen in countries with high 
monumentality (the exception is South Korea which is an outlier and 
needs to be further studied). 
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Figure 5.3. The relation between IDD and Monumentalism dimension of 
national culture 
 
Table 5.2 presents the correlations between dimensions of culture and 
PDD (as well as its components). We can see moderate correlations 
between PDD and two cultural dimensions, hierarchy and future 
orientation, which give support to the third and fourth hypotheses. 
Regarding the three components of political participation (i.e. GEP, REP, 
NEP), we excluded two countries with an exceptional number of 
referendums (Switzerland and the USA) prior to calculating the 
correlations.  
In accordance with the third hypothesis, the main variance explained 
by hierarchy is related to direct participation. Schwartz’s hierarchy has a 
weak, negative and low-significant correlation with GEP (turnout), but 
has higher and significant correlations with the two components of direct 
democracy namely referendum participation and non-electoral 
participation. The correlation of Schwartz’s hierarchy and the aggregated 
indicator of ‘direct participation’ (i.e. REP + NEP) is -0.52. On the other 
hand, future orientation has a significant association with GEP and NEP 
while it has no significant correlation with REP.  
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Table 5.2. Correlations between two dimensions of national culture and PDD, 
and its components (including outliers) 

























Note: Pearson correlations, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10; number of countries is in 
parentheses. 
 
For taking a closer look at the relation between PDD and cultural 
dimensions, scatter plots are provided. The pattern displayed in Figure 
5.4 mainly confirms the third hypothesis, suggesting an inverse 
relationship between the participative dimension of democracy (PDD) 
and Schwartz’s hierarchy orientation. As evidenced in the scatter plot, 
and also based on bivariate regression analysis, Estonia and New Zealand 
emerge as outliers. Without these two countries the correlation between 
PDD and Schwartz’s hierarchy is 0.52 (N=43, p<0.001). Hierarchy or 
Power Distance is operationalized quite differently by Hofstede, GLOBE 
and Schwartz (see the discussion in Chapter 2). Nevertheless, the 
measures of power distance by all three are significantly, negatively 
correlated with PDD.  
Despite some extreme outliers, Figure 5.5 displays a correlational 
pattern between PDD and future orientation consonant with our fourth 
hypothesis. Excluding the outliers of New Zealand, Italy and Malaysia, 
we found a high and significant correlation of 0.68 (N=43, p<0.01) 
between PDD and GLOBE’s future orientation. It is striking to see that 
the correlation between non-electoral participation and future orientation 
(excluding outliers) is 0.72 (N=43, p<0.01) and has the main loading on 
the correlation between PDD and future orientation. This strongly 
supports our fourth hypothesis.  
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Figure 5.4. The relation between PDD and Schwartz’s Hierarchy orientation 
 
 
Figure 5.5. The relation between PDD and GLOBE’s Future Orientation 
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5.6.1  Impact of Socio-economic Factors 
Thus far, our findings suggest a meaningful association between 
dimensions of national-level democracy and societal culture. In order to 
check the robustness of culture as an explanatory factor, we will examine 
the impact of some socio-economic factors on dimensions of democracy 
via a multiple regression analysis. These socio-economic factors are 
asserted to influence the emergence, preference and practice of different 
models of democracy across countries. 
One of the factors, which is widely mentioned in the literature is 
fractionalization; the ethno-linguistic diversity within a nation. Lijphart 
(1977, 1984) argues that the integrative model of democracy, or power 
sharing, is crucial for achieving and maintaining democracy in plural or 
divided societies. Norris (2008, p. 24) writes, in support of integrative 
democracy: “power-sharing is theorized to temper extreme demands and 
dampen expressions of ethnic intolerance among elites. In segmented 
societies, the leaders of all significant factions at the time of the 
settlement are guaranteed a stake in national or regional governments”. 
On the other hand, Snyder (2000, p. 36) refutes that in the early stages of 
democratization, politicians may stress ethnic hatred and nationalism to 
build popular support. He argues that “creating an institutional setting for 
democratization that de-emphasizes ethnicity might turn these identities 
towards more inclusive, civic self-conceptions”.  
Economic development and affluence is always a fundamental factor 
to be examined. There are many theories regarding the relation between 
economic development and democratization (among others: Inglehart, 
1997; Przeworski et al., 2000; Zakaria, 2003). One can argue that the 
poor have many survival issues to be engaged with, which overshadows 
the attention to issues like political participation and power sharing.  
Size of population is another contextual factor that might affect the 
practice of different models. Countries with lower population can easier 
facilitate and afford the participation of a larger portion of the populace. 
It is also expected that accommodation of different political views is 
easier in less populated nations.  
Finally, the colonial history, particularly the British colonial legacy, 
can be expected to have a considerable influence on the practice of 
democratic models. The term ‘Westminster model’, used by Lijphart, also 
suggests a British legacy under the majoritarian or aggregative model of 
democracy.  
To examine the impact of these socio-economic factors, we use the 
natural logarithms of countries’ population in 1990 and the average of per 
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capita gross domestic product (GDP) between 1990 and 2009. The data 
are derived from the World Development Indicators of The World Bank 
(2013). The data for ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) is taken from 
Roeder (2001). Moreover, a dummy variable is calculated for British 
colonial legacy based on de Blij (1996) and Norris’s (2009) data set. 
The results of a multiple regression analysis for the integrative 
dimension of democracy (IDD) are presented in Table 5.3. In accordance 
with residual statistics, we excluded those countries that emerged as 
outliers in the multiple regression analysis (Brazil, India and Israel are 
outliers as also seen in Figure 5.2).  
 
Table 5.3. Multiple OLS regression of IDD on cultural and socio-economic 
factors (1990-2009) 
	   Integrative	  Dimension	  of	  Democracy	  (IDD)	  
	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   Model	  5	   Model	  6	  
Mastery	  (Schwartz)	   -­‐	  0.64***	   -­‐	  0.45***	   -­‐	  0.61***	   -­‐	  0.49***	   -­‐	  0.32**	   	  
Monumentalism	  
(Minkov)	  
	   	   	   -­‐	  0.21	   -­‐	  0.05	   	  
British	  Colonial	  
Legacy	  
	   -­‐	  0.30*	   	   	   -­‐	  0.27*	   -­‐	  0.52***	  
Ln	  Population	  
(1990)	  
	   -­‐	  0.24*	   	   	   -­‐	  0.37**	   -­‐	  0.35***	  
Fractionalization	  
(ELF)	  
	   -­‐	  0.01	   	   	   0.11	   	  
Ln	  GDP/capita	  
(1990-­‐2009)	  
	   	   0.17	   	   	   0.25*	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
F	  statistic	   26.67***	   9.14***	   14.53***	   8.89***	   5.59***	   9.02***	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.39	   0.45	   0.40	   0.32	   0.40	   0.37	  
Number	  of	  
Countries	  
41	   41	   41	   35	   35	   41	  
 Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Model 1 shows that Mastery alone explains 39 percent of the variance 
in the integrative dimension of democracy. Model 2 indicates the 
influence of three socio-historical factors. We observe that although 
British colonial legacy and population size partially reduce the 
explanatory power of mastery, they add modestly to the total variance 
explained. Fractionalization shows no impact on the integrative 
dimension of democracy. Model 3 reveals that the economic factor has 
low and non-significant impact on IDD. We learned that adding the 
cultural factor of monumentalism does not increase the explanatory 
power of the model, as seen in models 4 and 5. It means that when 
mastery culture is included, monumentalism has no significant impact. 
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Finally, model 6 presents the influence of socio-economic factors in the 
absence of cultural factors. British legacy then emerges as the main 
predictor of the integrative dimension of democracy. In accordance with 
our theoretical prediction, population size shows a significant, negative 
impact on IDD. However, the total variance explained by these socio-
economic factors together is less than what the mastery dimension 
explains alone.   
Regarding the participative dimension of democracy (PDD), we 
performed a similar multiple regression analysis, as presented in Table 
5.4. In accordance with residual statistics, we excluded the three 
aforementioned outliers from the analysis (New Zealand, Italy and 
Malaysia). Among the socio-economic factors, population size and 
British colonial legacy have no correlation with PDD (see Table E.2 in 
Appendix E for correlations). Thus, we excluded these variables from the 
multiple regression analysis. In addition to Schwartz’s hierarchy and 
GLOBE’s future orientation, we included natural-logged GDP per capita 
and fractionalization. There appears to be a significant correlation 
between the GDP and cultural factors. Fractionalization is also correlated 
with the economic factor. Therefore, a considerable multicollinearity 
exists between these variables, and consequently we have to check the 
influence of independent variables on the dependent variable in separate 
models.  
 
Table 5.4. Multiple OLS regression of PDD on cultural and socio-economic 
factors (1990-2009) 
Note: Standardized coefficients are shown. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
Model 1 then shows that the two cultural dimensions of hierarchy and 
future orientation explain more than half of the variance (57%) in the 
 Participative	  Dimension	  of	  Democracy	  (PDD)	  
 Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	   Model	  4	   Model	  5	  
Hierarchy	  (Schwartz)	   -­‐	  0.32**	   -­‐	  0.32**	   -­‐	  0.15	   	   	  
Future	  Orientation	  
(GLOBE)	  
0.64***	   0.64***	   0.52***	   0.49***	   	  
Fractionalization	  
(ELF)	  
	   0.01	   	   	   	  
Ln	  GDP/capita	  (1990-­‐
2009)	  
	   	   0.30	   0.41***	   0.67***	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
F	  statistic	   22.33***	   14.28***	   16.64***	   24.65***	   24.68***	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.57	   0.56	   0.59	   0.60	   0.43	  
Number	  of	  Countries	   33	   33	   33	   33	   33	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PDD across 33 countries from all over the world. As seen in model 2, 
adding the fractionalization variable has no impact on the coefficients and 
on the variance explained.  
Adding GDP per capita, although it has non-significant coefficient, 
increases the variance explained slightly but reduces the influence of 
hierarchy drastically, as seen in model 3. The latter is not beyond 
expectation since GDP and hierarchy have a strong collinearity. In this 
model, though, future orientation still has the highest explanatory power. 
Removing hierarchy, we observe that the explanatory power and the 
significance of the economic factor increases (model 4). The effect of 
GDP in the absence of cultural factors is presented in model 5. The 
economic factor alone explains more than forty percent of the variance, 
however, this is less than what the cultural factors explain (model 1).  
All in all, due to the high intercorrelation between the economic factor 
and cultural factors, particularly hierarchy orientation, it is not easy to say 
which one has the dominant effect on the participative dimension of 
democracy. Nevertheless, there is a solid basis under the suggestion that 
cultural orientations codetermine the tendency toward more participative 
or spectative models of democracy.   
5.7  Conclusion  
As Ross (2009, p. 161) suggested, “cultural analysis could enhance 
our understanding of when specific institutional arrangements and 
practices are accepted and when they may prove to be problematic”. Our 
analysis reveals that cultural orientation can indeed explain the variance 
in models of democracy significantly. The inclination towards integrative 
(versus aggregative) expressions of democracy is strongly correlated with 
the cultural orientation of mastery. The actualization of participative 
(versus spectative) democracy is associated with GLOBE’s future 
orientation and Schwartz’s hierarchical orientation.  
We observed that cultural orientations could also explain why some 
countries incline to a presidential model. These countries mostly display 
high monumentality or low future orientations (see Figure 5.2 and Figure 
5.5). Our data show that presidential countries (except USA and to a 
lesser extent Uruguay) have an affinity with the spectative model of 
democracy (see Figure 5.4). Our data also show that an integrative model 
of democracy can be combined with a presidential regime. Brazil is a 
salient example (Benin, Indonesia and Ecuador are other examples) 
which demands and deserves separate, more-detailed examination. Our 
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analysis to a large extent corroborated the hypothesized association 
between cultural orientations and models of democracy. The question 
now is, what is the significance of this relationship?  
Both functioning and malfunctioning states can be found among 
countries adopting similar models of democracy. An ‘end of history’ – 
culminating in one universally appreciated, working model of democracy 
– has not been reached, and will probably never be reached considering 
the tenacity of cultural differences. Our more specific findings suggest 
more specific lessons for the institutionalization and reconstruction of 
democracy. Where democratic models and cultural orientations are 
incompatible, adaptations, one way or another, seem to be indivertible. 
An interesting example is South Africa, where the formal institutions 
strongly encourage an integrative (consensual) model, not entirely 
compatible with its dominant cultural orientation (van Cranenburgh & 
Kopecky, 2004). More aggregative, and thus culturally more compatible, 
is its democratic practice, with two effective parties in parliament and 
basically one party in government over the past two decades.  
In this study, we shed light on one - relatively understudied - side of 
the triangular relationship between culture, structure and performance of 
democracy. Within the confines of this chapter, we can only hypothesize 
that the relation between culture and structure impacts the relation 
between structure and performance. The goodness of fit, the compatibility 
of the cultural orientation of a society and its modeling of democracy 
could be crucial to the satisfaction with democracy in that country (see 
the next chapter). Cultural orientations might help to understand why 
aggregative democracy has proved to be sustainable in countries like the 
USA, the UK and Australia, and integrative democracy in countries like 
Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands.  
Incompatibility of cultural orientations and democratic institutions, on 
the other hand, could contribute to the malfunctioning of democracy. This 
might have grave consequences for the reputation and popularity of 
democracy, particularly in new and fragile democracies. Our conclusion 
is that ‘culture matters’ for the inclination to, adoption and practice of 
different democratic models. Sen (1999) has argued that democracy is a 
“universal value”. We conclude that the general idea of democracy is 
indeed globally dispersed, and in that sense non-particularistic – inspiring 
countries in West, East, North and South– but also that the operational 
modeling of democracy is culturally dependent to a significant extent. 
The implications of cultural analysis for the design of democratic 
institutions, particularly in new democracies, should be elaborately 
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studied in further research; in next chapters I hope to contribute more to 
this discussion.   
 
 
Chapter 6  
Cultural Compatibility Matters:   
The Relation between Democratic 
Models and Satisfaction with 
Democracy in Developing 
Democracies * 
                                                      
*  This chapter is based on the article presented in the 85th Southern Political Science 
Association (SPSA) Annual Conference in New Orleans, the USA, January 2014. 
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6.1  Introduction 
The relation between institutional arrangements, or models of 
democracy, and the outcome and legitimacy of democratic systems is an 
ongoing, important question in comparative politics. Many scholars 
theorize about, and some put effort into examining, which institutional 
setting would outperform others, as well as what is the best practice or 
superior model of democracy (Crepaz, 1996; Doorenspleet & Pellikaan, 
2013; Horowitz, 1990; Lijphart, 1999; Linz, 1993; Olson, 1986). These 
efforts have brought about mixed results. Not only could no definite trend 
of convergence of democratic models be observed in established 
democracies over the past decades (Vatter et al., 2014), but different 
institutional settings are adopted in new democracies across the world.  
The relation between democratic models and outcomes of democracy 
cannot be studied systematically without answering another question first: 
why do different countries adopt different models of democracy in 
practice? Among the many factors that codetermine the preference for a 
model of democracy in a country, the influence of contextual factors, and 
particularly societal culture, have been less studied. Cross-national 
studies on the relation and interaction between institutional structure, 
societal culture and system performance are scant in comparative politics. 
This is even more understudied for non-Western, developing 
democracies. This chapter aims to contribute to this theme of research by 
theorizing and examining the interrelation and interaction between the 
three abovementioned factors, focusing on developing democracies.  
In this chapter, we argue, first of all, that factors explaining 
democratic satisfaction may differ for old and developing democracies, 
and then theorize and examine how the compatibility of societal culture 
(i.e. mastery vs. harmony orientations) and democratic model (i.e. 
majoritarian versus consensual models) affects the public’s level of 
satisfaction with democracy (as an outcome indicator) in developing 
democracies. This will be done in a quantitative comparative study for a 
large number of developing democracies across the world.  
6.2  Why Satisfaction with Democracy? 
Many researchers over past decades have tried to examine the impact 
of institutional structure or democratic models, namely majoritarian 
versus consensual democracy in the terms of Lijphart (1999), on 
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democratic performance. In these studies, two different approaches are 
utilized for evaluating system outcome. The first approach uses 
performance indicators provided by the international monitoring 
institutions. These, in turn, are divided into either expert-evaluated or 
statistics-based indicators. The example of the former is the Worldwide 
Governance Indicator (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2012); and examples of 
the latter are the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), GDP growth 
rate, and the Gini index of economic inequality, all reported by The 
World Bank (2013).  
In the second approach, questions in public surveys that measure 
citizens’ evaluation of the democratic system or democratic legitimacy 
are used. A prominent example of these citizen-evaluated indicators is a 
question item measuring citizens’ ‘Satisfaction With Democracy’ 
(hereafter SWD). This question has been asked in many different cross-
national surveys, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), European 
Values Survey (EVS), Latino-barometer, Afro-barometer, Asia-
barometer, etc. Many scholars employ SWD as a dependent variable to 
examine the relation between institutional setting and the functioning of 
democracy in the eyes of citizens.  
There is a debate in the literature on the meaning and validity of the 
survey question on SWD. While some scholars reject the validity of this 
item (Canache et al., 2001) or challenge its ambiguity (Norris, 1999), 
many others find it a proper, ‘outcome-oriented’ indicator for measuring 
the ‘functioning’ of democratic institutions, in spite of its shortcomings 
(Anderson, 2002; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Fuchs et al., 1995; Linde 
& Ekman, 2003; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Wagner et al., 2009).  
There is a wide agreement, supported by some empirical and 
systematic analyses (c.f. Klingemann 1999), that the SWD question does 
not measure support for the legitimacy or principle of democracy, but 
rather the performance of the democratic structure, and not the incumbent 
government, in the eyes of citizens (Anderson, 2002; Linde & Ekman, 
2003; Sarsfield & Echegaray, 2006; Wagner et al., 2009). Fuchs et al. 
(1995, p. 332) call SWD an indicator for evaluating a “country’s 
constitutional reality” or “constitution in operation.”  
Considering the different arguments, this study assumes that SWD is a 
relevant indicator for this research for two reasons. First, it is evaluated 
by citizens whose attitudes are presumably codetermined by their societal 
culture. And second, SWD supposedly evaluates the level of satisfaction 
with the institutional model in operation, and not satisfaction with the 
formal constitution. Therefore, the two major components that this study 
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is interested in, i.e. societal culture and democratic model, seem to be 
involved in citizens’ evaluation of SWD. Given this, we utilize SWD as 
the dependent variable of this study while employing other statistics-
based performance indicators as controlling variables.  
6.3  Patterns of Institutions and Democratic 
Satisfaction 
This research aims to focus on the relation and interaction between 
political institutions (or democratic models), ‘informal institutions’1 (or 
societal culture) and democratic satisfaction (as indicator of democratic 
outcome) in developing democracies.  
The combination of formal constitutional/institutional choices such as 
regime type (presidential or parliamentary), electoral system and electoral 
threshold shape different models of democracy in action. In the literature, 
the famous dichotomy of institutional settings is the integrative (or 
consensual) versus aggregative (or majoritarian) model of democracy 
(Hendriks, 2010; Lijphart, 1999, 2012).  
In the mainstream of research studying the relation between political 
institutions and democratic satisfaction, the former is considered the 
independent variable for predicting the latter. The outcomes, however, are 
mixed and inconclusive. While some researchers conclude that 
consensual democracy outperforms the majoritarian model (Anderson, 
1998; Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Lijphart, 1999, 2012), others assert the 
reverse (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Berggren et al., 2004; Norris, 1999, 
2004). This might be due to the plausible presence of, and a spurious 
relationship with, a third, unseen factor. Another reason may be the 
analysis of different sets of countries in different studies. In this study, we 
argue that if the mechanisms and factors explaining the variance in SWD 
would differ for old and developing democracies, then analyzing all these 
democracies together could bring about mixed and contradictory results.  
Most cross-national studies on the relation of institutional setting and 
SWD only include Western and established/old democracies. There is 
scant research on this interrelation for developing democracies. One of 
the reasons for this is that many researchers utilize Lijphart’s 
operationalization of democratic models in their studies (Anderson, 1998; 
Anderson & Guillory, 1997); consequently, they do not have the 
                                                      
1. See (Williamson, 2009), or for different meanings of ‘informal institutions’ see 
(Helmke & Levitsky, 2003). 
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operationalized models of democracy for developing democracies. Those 
studies that have aimed to study the impact of institutional settings on 
SWD in developing democracies have often used a dummy variable 
based on the formal electoral system of the country for grouping 
countries as majoritarian versus consensual democracies (Aarts & 
Thomassen, 2008; McAllister, 2005). This approach could be problematic 
because the formal electoral rule cannot precisely represent the model of 
democracy in practice. That is, we can recognize many countries with 
proportional electoral systems that have a majoritarian democracy in 
practice (e.g. South Africa, Spain, Argentina and Romania), and by 
contrast, there are some countries with majoritarian or mixed electoral 
rules that maintain a form of consensual democracy in action (e.g. India, 
Lithuania and Ukraine) (see Chapter 4). Therefore, for studying the 
influence of institutional settings on SWD, it is crucial to have a proper 
operationalization of democratic models that includes developing 
democracies (this is what have been done in Chapter 4).  
6.4  Theoretical Hypotheses about Variances in 
SWD  
As mentioned above, most research that has examined the impact of 
democratic institutions on SWD has focused on old, and mostly Western, 
democracies. Many of these studies conclude that their findings may have 
implications for institutional design in new democracies (Anderson & 
Guillory, 1997; Berggren et al., 2004; Farell & McAllister, 2006). 
Considering the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), and 
particularly the democratization peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
there are many countries that have experienced democratic institutions for 
twenty some years. By studying the relation between institutions and 
SWD in developing democracies, we can examine whether or not the 
findings of previous studies on established/old democracies are applicable 
to and relevant for developing democracies.  
This study argues that the factors explaining democratic satisfaction 
are likely to be different for old and developing democracies. That is, the 
age of a democracy matters; and accordingly, in established democracies 
the levels of satisfaction should be higher in general. Moreover, in old 
democracies, the institutional arrangements and societal culture have 
been aligned for a longer time. Therefore, in those societies, citizens’ 
evaluation of ‘how democracy works’ may be mainly based on their 
perception of economic performance, rather than on institutional setting.  
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Anderson (2001), in his European cross-national analysis, asserts that 
the structure of democratic satisfaction differs in old and new 
democracies. He asserts that the conventional theories of system support 
that can explain variances in SWD among mature democracies cannot 
explain variance in satisfaction levels in developing democracies. Other 
scholars also indicate that the distinction between old and new 
democracies should be taken into account when studying democratic 
satisfaction (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008). For instance, it is argued that in 
new democracies, lower economic performance and lack of ‘diffuse 
support’ for democracy result in lower levels of satisfaction than in old 
democracies. Given these, we formulate the first hypothesis as two sub-
hypotheses, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1-1:  Age of democracy is a determinant factor in explaining 
the different levels of SWD in old and developing democracies. That 
is, older democracies have higher levels of satisfaction.  
Hypothesis 1-2: Factors explaining the variance in SWD would differ for 
old and developing democracies. 
 
This study proposes a new theory and new predictors for explaining 
the variance in SWD among developing democracies. We theorize that 
although system performance is likely to affect citizens’ evaluation of 
democracy in all countries, the compatibility of a democratic model and 
contextual factors can play a crucial role in citizens’ evaluation of 
democratic satisfaction in developing democracies. This assertion is more 
plausible when we assume that SWD is ‘a measuring instrument for a 
generalized attitude towards the political system on the legitimacy 
dimension’ (Fuchs 1993, p. 242) and not a measure for the performance 
of and support for the incumbent government (Anderson, 2001). 
As in developing democracies the institutional arrangement and the 
process of decision making are new and different from past experiences, 
people may judge the political institution based on their attitudes toward 
the acceptable form of representation and governance, rather than merely 
on the economic performance of the political system. There are attitudinal 
differences among people in different countries regarding which 
institutional arrangement can better represent citizens and make the 
power-holders more responsive and accountable. These differences exist 
both between and within countries. However, the model of democracy at 
the national level is expected to match the preference of the majority. 
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When values, orientations, and preferences of a society are concerned, the 
role of societal culture should be taken into account.  
Societal culture, or the cultural orientation of a society, is a set of 
“shared motives, values, beliefs and interpretations” that “guide the way 
social actors select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their 
actions and evaluations” (House et al., 2002, p. 5; Schwartz, 1999, p. 24). 
These definitions imply that societal culture may codetermine people’s 
evaluation of different institutions in their society. Accordingly, when 
citizens assess the democratic model or institutional setting of their 
country, the compatibility of cultural orientations and democratic model 
may be determinant, that is, the cultural compatibility may matter in 
democratic satisfaction.  
Hendriks (2010), in his theory of democracy in action, argues for a 
sociological relation between models of democracy and societal culture. 
He calls this relation ‘elective affinity’ and exemplifies it as follows: “If 
all intervening factors are removed, one might expect, in a logical sense, 
that a magnet and a horseshoe will be attracted. Similarly, in a 
sociological sense, one might expect that participatory institutions and 
egalitarianism, in a democratic setting, will be attracted… To what degree 
and in which way such elective affinity arises in actual fact are 
codetermined by intervening factors” (Hendriks, 2010, p. 39).  
In order to study the effect and importance of this ‘elective affinity’ in 
action, we hypothesize that cultural orientation of Mastery affects the 
relation between democratic model and levels of SWD in developing 
democracies. The mastery orientation connotes an emphasis on the 
cultural attributes of competitiveness, achievement and self-assertion. 
Societies with higher mastery orientation stress mutual competition, high 
ambition and performance (Schwartz, 1999). Mastery orientation is more 
sympathetic toward the strong. On the contrary, in a society with low 
mastery, consensus, compromise and harmony are more emphasized, and 
sympathy for the weak is praised. 
Accordingly, we posit that in a country in which competition, 
excellence and achievement are more valued than consensus and 
harmony, citizens may prefer a competitive and aggregative model of 
democracy rather than a consensual and integrative model. Therefore, if 
in such a society the consensual institutions would be transplanted and 
practiced, the reaction and reception of society, as well as the workability 
and functionality of the model, may become problematic. Considering 
Hendriks’ analogy, it is expected that in normal conditions and in absence 
of other intervening factors, integrative (consensual) institutions would 
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attract societies with a low mastery culture and the aggregative 
(majoritarian) arrangement would attract societies with a high mastery 
culture. Consequently, we hypothesize that the affinity and compatibility 
between democratic model and cultural orientation will affect the levels 
of democratic satisfaction. That is, in developing democracies in which 
the cultural orientation and democratic model mismatch, satisfaction with 
democracy would be lower. Figure 6.1 presents this hypothesized 
relation. This hypothesis is formulated in the following and examined 
empirically in the next section: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Cultural compatibility between mastery orientation and 
integrative dimension of democracy matters for the level of SWD in 
developing democracies. That is, mastery culture has a moderation 




Figure 6.1. Hypothesized relation between democratic model, mastery 
orientation and SWD across developing democracies 
6.5  Data and Research Method 
We perform multiple regression analyses to test the hypotheses of this 
study. In order to examine the relation and interaction between 
democratic models, societal culture, and democratic satisfaction, all on 
the national level, we need a proper operationalization of these three 
concepts. Regarding the level of analysis, there are some mixed 
Chapter 6 | 139  
 
approaches in the literature. While some political scholars have combined 
the individual (micro) and national (macro) levels by using standard, 
ordinary statistical and regression analyses (Anderson & Guillory, 1997; 
McAllister, 2005), others have criticized their work and tried to employ 
multi-level regression methods to examine the interactions between 
different levels (Bernauer & Vatter, 2012; Wells & Krieckhaus, 2006). 
The individual level analysis is performed to evaluate the impact of 
voters’ ideology or party preference on citizens’ evaluation of system 
performance (e.g. Anderson & Guillory, 1997). In comparative studies 
that aim to discover a relational pattern on the cross-national level – such 
as this study – only aggregated data is utilized, and data on the individual 
level are not taken into account (e.g. Lijphart, 1999, 2012).  
6.5.1  Dependent Factor  
SWD, as a citizen-evaluated indicator, is the dependent variable in this 
analysis. Data on SWD is gathered from several cross-national surveys 
between 1990 and 2009 (see note under Table E.1 in Appendix E for the 
list of datasets). Differently from the common practice in the field, this 
study uses longitudinal data on SWD. In the literature, the common 
practice for studying democratic satisfaction is to use cross-national data 
of SWD for a specific year (or a short period). These studies mostly focus 
on the micro-level or multi-level analyses.  
As one-year data is less reliable and may be affected by an incidental 
event, in this study we use aggregated, longitudinal data of SWD (c.f. 
Wagner et al., 2009). Gathering longitudinal, comparable data for a large 
number of countries is not an easy task. However, thanks to many cross-
national survey studies, I was able to find data on SWD for the two 
decades, namely the 1990s and 2000s, for 70 electoral democracies 
whose democratic models have been operationalized in Chapter 4. As the 
data on SWD should be comparable and nationally representative, I only 
utilize known and reliable datasets in which the famous question item of 
‘satisfaction with democracy’ is asked as follows: 
“On the whole are you 1- very satisfied, 2- rather satisfied, 3- not very 
satisfied or 4- not at all satisfied with the way democracy works (is 
developing) in your country?”2 
                                                      
2. The formulation of this question is somehow different in the dataset of International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) as follows: ‘All in all, how well or badly do you think 
the system of democracy in (country) works these days? 
1- It works well and needs no changes 
2- It works well but needs some changes 
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These 70 electoral democracies have had data gathered on SWD for 
both decades. Among them, three countries (Bosnia, Indonesia and 
Senegal) have no data for the 1990s, as they converted to democracy in 
the late 1990s or in the 2000s. Excepting 11 countries that have only a 
one-year dataset for the 1990s, for the other 56 electoral democracies, 
data on SWD have been gathered for at least two years in each decade. 
For most of these countries, SWD data for 10 years over the two decades 
are used. This makes the analysis and findings more reliable.  
The score of SWD is calculated for each country by aggregating the 
percentage of responses selecting ‘very satisfied’ or ‘rather satisfied.’ It is 
argued that using percentages is better than using the average score of 
responses (i.e. the average of Likert-type scale from 1 to 4), as in the 
averaging method, which has been used in many cross-national studies 
(Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Berggren et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2009), 
the ‘response style’ bias can make the comparative study problematical, 
especially if the study involves culturally diverse countries and regions 
(Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Farrell & McAllister, 2006)3. The aggregated 
scores for all these countries, as well as the references, are listed in Table 
E.1 in Appendix E. 
 
                                                                                                                          
3- It does not work well and needs a lot of changes 
4- It does not work well and needs to be completely changed’ 
We use this dataset for only those countries that have no data in other datasets.  
3. Response style concerns the respondents’ tendency to answer to questionnaire items 
systematically. Much research has shown that the systematic response style differences 
between countries make a comparison of mean scores across countries problematic and 
misleading (Harzing, 2006). In some countries, people tend to select the extreme or 
middle response categories on rating scales. They are called extreme response style (ERS) 
and middle response style (MRS) respectively. Regarding the question of SWD, for 
instance, middle response style means that the majority of respondents in a country prefer 
to give the modest answer and select the middle category (in our case, ‘rather satisfied’) 
regardless of whether they are satisfied or very satisfied. On the other hand, in a country 
with extreme response style, most people prefer to give a very strong answer and choose 
‘very satisfied.’ It is argued that this response style is associated with cultural 
characteristics (Hui & Triandis, 1989). Thus, using the mean score can make the cross-
national comparison problematic if this response style would not be treated. To eliminate 
the response style problem, some cross-national researchers use the percentage of 
respondents in each country that select positive or negative answers (Inglehart & Baker, 
2002; Minkov, 2008; Minkov & Hofstede, 2012). This can reduce the effect of the 
response style problem. We use the same approach in this study and calculate the score of 
countries by aggregating the percentage of positive responses (answers 1 and 2) to SWD 
question. 
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6.5.2  Independent Factors 
Thanks to previous empirical studies, we have a systematic 
operationalization of societal culture and democratic models. Regarding 
societal culture, we utilize Schwartz’s cultural orientation of Mastery, 
which has been measured and operationalized for the cross-national level 
for 59 countries through data gathered by surveys between 1988 and 2007 
(scores for a larger number of countries were provided in a personal 
communication and are different from mastery scores in Table A.5 in 
Appendix A). Schwartz used his own value survey (SVS), which included 
56 value items (Schwartz, 2006). Respondents were asked to rate the 
importance of each value item as a guiding principle in their life. 
Schwartz (1999) argues that individual value priorities are a mixture of 
shared culture and unique personal experience. Therefore, the average 
priorities attributed to different values by members of a society reflect the 
essence of their shared culture, as well as reveal the underlying common 
cultural value (Schwartz, 2006).  
With respect to democratic models, in Chapter 4 we put effort into 
operationalizing the dimensions of democracy for 80 electoral 
democracies for the time period of 1990 to 2009. We operationalize the 
integrative dimension of democracy (IDD) in practice, which consists of 
three institutional components: effective number of parliamentary parties, 
effective number of parties in government, and total electoral 
proportionality. IDD can be considered a replication and extension of 
Lijphart’s first dimension (Lijphart, 2012) for a larger number of 
countries4. The scores of IDD are utilized as the measure discriminating 
consensual versus majoritarian models of democracy for both old and 
developing democracies (see Table E.1 in Appendix E for the scores).  
Last but not least is the age of democracy as the independent variable 
for examining the first hypothesis. The starting year of practicing 
democracy after the Second World War, reported by Cheibub (2007) and 
the Polity IV individual country regime trends, is used to calculate the 
countries’ age of democracy by 2010. 
6.5.3  Controlling Factors  
Some macro-level factors are also used as control variables in our 
multiple regression analyses. For economic performance, (natural-logged) 
per capita GDP, rate of GDP growth (annual %), and the Gini index from 
                                                      
4. IDD has a high, significant correlation of 0.88 (p<0.001, N=33) with Lijphart’s first 
dimension (see section 4.5.3). 
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The World Bank (2013) database are employed. The Polity IV index 
(Marshall et al., 2011) is utilized as the measure for the level or quality of 
democracy. For those few countries for which Polity IV does not have the 
democracy score (i.e. Iceland and Malta), the Freedom House (2012) 
scores are translated to Polity IV scales. A dummy variable is defined in 
order to examine the effect of the regime type (zero for parliamentary and 
one for presidential).  
6.6  Results and Discussion 
Figure 6.2 shows the average of SWD between 1990 and 2009 versus 
the birth year of democracy for the 70 electoral democracies. As 
illustrated, democracies established after WWII and before the 1950s are 
considered old democracies. Countries that democratized after this time 
and mostly after the 1970s, over ‘the third wave of democracy’ 
(Huntington, 1991), are called developing democracies. For those 
countries that have experienced some counter-democratic years after their 
first experiences of democracy, if the counter-democratic period lasted 
longer than 5 years (e.g. Greece, Uruguay, Colombia), the most recent 
year of re-democratization is considered as the birth year of democracy.  
6.6.1  Different Levels and Explanations of SWD in 
Old and Developing Democracies 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the obvious differentiation in levels of SWD for 
old and developing democracies. In most old or established democracies, 
more than 50 percent of respondents assert satisfaction with the way 
democracy works in their countries, whereas the figures for most 
developing democracies are lower than 50 percent. This plot 
provisionally corroborates the first sub-hypothesis (hypothesis 1.1), 
which predicted that levels of democratic satisfaction would be different 
for old and developing democracies.  
The region to which each country belongs is also highlighted in Figure 
6.2. It shows that old democracies belong mostly to northwestern Europe 
and Anglophone countries. There are also two South European countries, 
namely France and Italy, and some exceptions from Asia and Latin 
America, namely India, Israel, Japan and Costa Rica. As seen, Colombia 
and Venezuela are close to being old democracies; however, since these 
countries have experienced some counter-democratic incidents over the 
past decades, we find it more realistic to categorize them as developing 
democracies. In our analysis, in contrast to what is conventional in other 
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studies (see Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Anderson 2001), Spain, Greece 
and Portugal are classified as developing, and not old, democracies. We 
assert that this is a more realistic classification, as it is based on the age of 
democracy rather than the western-eastern distinction.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. SWD versus birth year of democracy  
 
It is striking to see that among developing democracies, African and 
Asian electoral democracies have higher levels of SWD, comparable to 
the levels seen in old democracies. All other developing democracies in 
Latin America (except Uruguay) and in Central and Eastern Europe 
(excepting Cyprus) have an average score of SWD lower than 50 percent 
for the recent two decades. Moreover, Italy and Israel are two exceptions 
among the old democracies, as they have a low level of SWD. This figure 
provisionally indicates that wealth and socio-economic factors cannot per 
se explain the level of SWD; otherwise respondents in impoverished 
African countries could not be more satisfied than some wealthier nations 
in Europe, Asia and Latin America.  
In order to systematically examine the first hypothesis and evaluate 
which variables may explain differences in levels of SWD across old and 
developing democracies, we perform a multiple regression analysis. 
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Table 6.1 shows the results of the analysis. Models 1 to 4 show the 
impact of different factors on the whole set of 70 countries. Models 5 and 
6 then examine the explanatory power of variables for old democracies; 
and models 7 and 8 do the same for developing countries. This separation 
is made in order to examine the sub-hypothesis 1-2, which asserts that 
factors explaining the variances in SWD would differ for old and 
developing democracies.   
Model 1 presents the effect of democratic age on the level of SWD. It 
shows that the age of democracy is a positive and significant predictor 
that can explain 37% of variances in SWD for 70 countries (where the 
age of democracy is the number of years between 2010 and the year that 
the country started to practice democracy after WWII). In model 2, the 
effects of variables related to institutional setting, namely regime type 
(presidential vs. parliamentary), the integrative dimension of democracy 
(IDD), and Polity IV score as the indicator of level of democracy, are 
examined. It is observed that besides the strong impact of democratic age, 
IDD also has a negative and significant effect on SWD. This means that 
the consensual model of democracy has a negative impact on the level of 
SWD. However, it gives a modest increase (5%) to the variance already 
explained by the age of democracy. Polity IV score and presidential 
regime have, respectively, a positive and negative non-significant impact 
on SWD.  
In model 3, three economic performance indexes – the (natural-
logged) national per capita GDP (purchasing power parity), the 
percentage of GDP growth and the Gini index of income inequality, all 
averaged for the time range 1990-2009 – are added to the model. As 
theoretically expected, the model shows that GDP growth rate has a 
positive, significant impact on SWD. Income inequality also has a 
negative impact on SWD, at the significance level of 10%. These 
variables increase the explained variance of the model to 47 percent. 
However, adding economic variables to the model does not change the 
impact and significance of the two former predictors, namely age of 
democracy and IDD. Finally, model 4 shows all the independent variables 
that have a more or less significant impact on explaining the variance in 
SWD among a mix of old and developing democracies. The significance 
of coefficients and the explained variance of this model are similar to 
model 3. All in all, the results of all countries imply that the strongest 
predictor of variance in levels of SWD across the 70 countries is the age 
of democracy. This corroborates sub-hypothesis 1-1.  
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Table 6.1. Multiple OLS regressions of SWD (1990-2009) for old and 
developing democracies 
	   all	  electoral	  democracies	   old	  democracies	   developing	  
democracies	  
















	   -­‐	  2.58	  
(4.11)	  
	   	   13.11	  
(11.50)	  

















Polity	  IV	  	  
(1990	  -­‐	  2009)	  
	   1.98	  
(1.41)	  










	   	   1.12	  
(2.52)	  
	   3.93	  
(5.89)	  
	   -­‐4.47	  
(3.72)	  
	  
Gini	  Index	  	  
(1990-­‐2009)	  











GDP	  growth	  rate	  
(%)	  (1990-­‐2009)	  















	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
















F	  statistic	   41.67***	   13.65***	   12.47***	   15.75***	   1.90	   2.87*	   3.58***	   9.00***	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.37	   0.42	   0.47	   0.48	   0.20	   0.21	   0.30	   0.35	  
Number	  of	  
Countries	  
70	   70	   66	   66	   22	   22	   44	   46	  
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. IDD is centered around the mean. Models 3 and 4 include 
66 countries since data on Gini index is not available for four countries (two among old 
democracies and two among developing democracies) 
 
In order to test sub-hypothesis 1-2, countries are divided into two sets: 
old and developing democracies. Model 5 shows the multiple regression 
analysis for old democracies. The age of democracy is excluded from the 
model, as there is no considerable variation in this variable among old 
democracies. As seen in Table 6.1 the F-test indicates that model 5 is not 
significant, although the Gini index and GDP growth rate have significant 
coefficients in the model. This may be due to the multicollinearity among 
the variables. Excluding variables with multicollinearity and the non-
significant ones, we observe that model 6 is only weakly significant at the 
10% level. In this model, Polity IV and the Gini index show a significant 
impact at the 5% level; and GDP growth rate has a positive impact with a 
weaker level of significance at 10%. The model explains 21% of 
variances in SWD among 22 of the old democracies. The results 
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demonstrate that IDD, which was a strong predictor among all countries 
in model 4, has no significant coefficient among old democracies.   
Model 7 examines the effect of variables on SWD among 46 
developing democracies. As seen, the democratic model (i.e. IDD) and 
GDP growth rate significantly explain the variances in SWD. Level of 
democracy (Polity IV) also shows a weaker explanatory power in the 
model. Excluding non-significant variables in model 8, we see that three 
significant variables explain 35% of the variances in SWD among 
developing democracies. Comparing models 6 and 8 reveals that the 
major factors explaining variances in SWD are different for old and 
developing democracies. This corroborates sub-hypothesis 1-2. Indeed, 
the F-test of models 5 and 6 indicates that none of these variables can 
reliably explain variances of SWD among old democracies. Other factors 
should be tested to determine which variable(s) could better explain the 
variances of SWD in old democracies. This is not the mission of our 
study, and rather, we want to focus on factors that can predict the levels 
of SWD in developing democracies.  
6.6.2  Explaining SWD in Developing Democracies 
Among 70 electoral democracies that are included in this study, 46 are 
developing democracies. As discussed earlier, the eventual aim of this 
study is to examine factors that can explain the variance of SWD in 
developing democracies. We have argued and hypothesized that the 
interaction between societal culture and democratic models could be 
determinant in the evaluation of SWD in developing democracies.  
We again perform a multiple regression analysis to examine which 
variables can significantly explain the variance of SWD in developing 
democracies. Considering the findings from model 8, we reexamine the 
effect of three variables – institutional setting (IDD), level of democracy 
(Polity IV) and GDP growth rate – while including the cultural dimension 
of mastery and its interaction with IDD in our model. This time the 
multiple regression analysis is performed for 30 developing democracies 
that have a national score of mastery culture as well as SWD for both the 
1990s and 2000s. Although the number of countries with a cultural score 
is two-thirds of all developing democracies in our study, these countries 
are adequately diverse in societal culture and geographical region, 
making them acceptable representatives of developing democracies. 
Thus, we can propose that the results can be generalized for developing 
democracies.  
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In Table 6.2, two sets of models are shown. The first two models do 
not include the cultural factor. The results of different models, with and 
without the effect of cultural orientation, are presented in order to make it 
possible to compare the impact and strength of different predictors.  
Model 9 shows that the institutional setting (IDD) is negatively 
correlated with SWD across developing democracies. This relation is 
significant, and IDD can explain 25% of the variation in SWD. It implies 
that in developing democracies, people in majoritarian democracies are 
more satisfied than citizens in consensual democracies. This can be due to 
the time-consuming process of coalition making and consensus building, 
which is harder in an integrative model of democracy with many parties. 
People in new democracies may find this process a messy and ineffective 
way of cabinet forming and governance. 
 
Table 6.2. Multiple OLS regressions of SWD (1990-2009) for developing 
democracies 
	   Model	  9	   Model	  10	   Model	  11	   Model	  12	  









(1990	  -­‐	  2009)	  
	   1.71	  
(1.51)	  
	   	  
GDP	  growth	  rate	  
(%)	  (1990-­‐2009)	  











IDD	  (1990-­‐2009)	  x	  
Mastery	  




	   	   	   	   	  








F	  statistic	   10.39***	   5.33***	   7.60***	   7.85***	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.25	   0.31	   0.48	   0.47	  
Number	  of	  
Countries	  
30	   30	   30	   30	  
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. IDD and mastery are centered around the mean. Cyprus is 
excluded as the only outlier with the standardized residual more than 3.  
 
Model 10 shows that GDP growth rate has a positive but weakly 
significant impact on SWD, while the Polity IV score is non-significant. 
Including the GDP growth rate increased the explained variance to 31%. 
It indicates the expected positive effect of economic performance on the 
level of democratic satisfaction in developing democracies.  
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Models 11 and 12 present regressions when the cultural factor of 
mastery orientation is involved. These models reveal the most interesting 
findings of the study. The interaction term between the mastery 
dimension and the integrative (consensual) dimension of democracy 
(IDD) has, as theoretically asserted, a negative and highly significant 
impact on democratic satisfaction. We observe that adding this interaction 
term to the model increases the explained variance of SWD to 47%. 
Moreover, the interaction component has a dominant effect and 
diminishes the explanatory power of GDP growth rate. In model 12, we 
exclude the GDP growth rate and observe almost no change in the 
explained variance of the model. This finding confirms our second 
hypothesis about the effect of the interaction between societal culture and 
democratic models on democratic satisfaction in developing democracies.  
As seen, the interaction component has a negative effect on SWD. 
This is congruent with our conceptual theory that the combination of high 
mastery culture and high integrative dimension of democracy could be 
incompatible, and consequently this incompatibility reduces the level of 
democratic satisfaction. The significance and the strong explanatory 
power of the interaction term corroborate the conceptual relation 
presented in schematic Figure 6.1. Using the predicted values of SWD by 
Model 12 and categorizing the mastery orientation of countries to low 
and high mastery scores, we extract the relation between SWD and IDD, 
as Figure 6.3 illustrates. We observe two different regression lines 
presenting the moderation effect of mastery orientation. As suggested by 
Brambor et al. (2006), the 95% confidence intervals are also shown in the 
figure. Countries with high and low scores of mastery are highlighted 
differently. It is striking that among developing democracies, the level of 
SWD is generally lower for the consensual model of democracy. 
However, as our thesis proposes, the level of SWD in integrative 
(consensual) democracies is higher if societies have lower mastery 
orientations.  
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Figure 6.3. Moderation effect of mastery orientation on the relation between 
SWD and IDD 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the real level of SWD over the IDD. The figure shows a 
three-dimensional bubble chart for 30 countries. The mastery score of 
countries is presented as the third dimension using the size of bubbles. 
Two regression lines (calculated from model 12) represent the relation 
between democratic satisfaction and democratic model for the lower 
mastery (thinner line) and higher mastery (thicker line) scores. The plot, 
in line with the findings from the regressions, illustrates that there is a 
sharp negative relationship between IDD and SWD for countries with 
higher mastery, while there is no remarkable negative relationship 
between IDD and SWD for countries with lower mastery. As our theory 
predicts, among integrative democracies, citizens in countries with higher 
mastery orientation, like Brazil, Ukraine and Colombia, are less satisfied 
than those in countries with lower mastery culture, such as Slovenia, 
Estonia and Chile. Also, it is seen again that in general, developing 
democracies with higher IDD have lower levels of democratic 
satisfaction. This finding challenges the assertion that the integrative 
(consensual) model of democracy might be a better model for any and 
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Figure 6.4. Relation between IDD and SWD in 30 developing democracies 
 
All in all, the regression analysis and Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 
corroborate the second hypothesis of this study. Having verified the 
second hypothesis, we will, in the next section, check the robustness of 
the explanatory power of the interaction term.  
6.6.3  Robustness of the Effect of the Interaction 
Term 
After finding a meaningful connection among societal culture, 
democratic model and satisfaction with democracy in developing 
democracies, the next question is whether or not these findings are robust 
across time. Our analysis so far has been based on data averaged for the 
two decades between 1990 and 2009. In this section we replicate our 
multiple regression analysis using separate aggregated data for the two 
separate decades of the 1990s and 2000s so as to examine how changes in 
the integrative dimension of democracy over the two decades affect 
democratic satisfaction in developing democracies. Considering the 
results of the multiple regression analysis presented in Table 6.2, we 
replicate the analysis involving only IDD, mastery orientation and the 
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interaction term for the two separate decades. Table 6.3 presents the 
results of these multiple regression analyses.  
 
 Table 6.3. Multiple OLS regressions of SWD in 1990s and 2000s for 
developing democracies 
	   1990	  -­‐	  1999	   2000	  -­‐	  2009	  
	   Model	  13	   Model	  14	   Model	  15	   Model	  16	  










	   -­‐	  27.13*	  
(15.21)	  
	   -­‐29.73*	  
(16.93)	  
IDD	  x	  Mastery	   	   -­‐	  309.3**	  
(137.8)	  
	   -­‐	  539.1***	  
(161.2)	  
	   	   	   	   	  








F	  statistic	   11.57***	   7.08***	   6.44**	   6.73***	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.27	   0.39	   0.16	   0.37	  
Number	  of	  
Countries	  
30	   30	   30	   30	  
Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. IDD and mastery are centered around the mean. Cyprus is 
excluded as the only outlier with standard residual more than 3.  
 
The models show that the institutional arrangement (i.e. IDD) and its 
interaction with societal culture are significant predictors in both decades. 
However, the results indicate that democratic satisfaction in the 1990s has 
been more affected by the institutional setting rather than the interaction 
term, while this is completely reversed in the 2000s. 
Models 13 and 15 present the negative impact of IDD on SWD in the 
1990s and 2000s respectively. The former explains 27% and the latter 
explains 16% of the variation in SWD in developing democracies. This 
means that in the 1990s lower SWD was reported from countries with 
higher integrative models of democracy regardless of their societal 
culture. This effect has been reduced in the 2000s. Models 13 and 15 
show again that among 30 of the developing democracies under study, 
countries with higher integrative (consensual) models of democracy enjoy 
low levels of democratic satisfaction over both decades. This finding 
challenges the assertion of those political scientists who strongly suggest 
the consensual model of democracy as a better or best practice for new 
democracies (Lijphart, 1991, 1999). We speculate that in developing 
democracies, since there is less experience of collective decision-making 
and consensus-seeking, the integrative or consensual model of democracy 
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could be less popular, especially in countries showing cultural tendencies 
toward heated competition and the ‘winner takes all’ mentality.  
Models 14 and 16 present the effect of the interaction term on SWD in 
the 1990s and 2000s respectively. In model 14, the interaction term is 
significant at the 5% level and contributes 12% to the explanatory power 
of the model. On the other hand, model 16 presents a very strong, 
significant effect of the interaction term, which in this case contributes 
21% to the explanatory power of the model. This difference implies that 
the compatibility of societal culture and democratic model becomes more 
influential some years after transition to democracy. Among the 
developing democracies under study in the 1990s, there are 21 countries 
that democratized after 1985. The 1990s was, for these countries, a 
transition decade in which they experienced their first free and fair 
elections. Anderson and Guillory (1997, p. 79) argue that enough time 
should pass “to generate a sufficient understanding of the nature of the 
system among the population.” We assert that after experiencing some 
democratic elections and elected governments, the institutional 
arrangement in practice and its compatibility with the societal culture 
would intuitively affect citizens’ evaluation of how democracy works. 
This proposition can explain why, in developing countries, the impact of 
the interaction term on democratic satisfaction is stronger in the 2000s 
than in the 1990s.  
In conclusion, our analysis in this section verifies that the effect of the 
interaction between societal culture and democratic model on SWD in 
developing democracies is robust across the two decades, and not 
contingent.  
6.7  Conclusion  
Focusing on developing democracies, the aim of this study was to 
develop and examine a theoretical mechanism for explaining the relation 
between democratic models and satisfaction with democracy when the 
impact of societal culture is involved. First of all, we have argued why 
the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ question is a proper indicator for 
measuring citizens’ evaluation of democratic models in action, or 
‘constitution in operation,’ as Fuchs (1995) calls it.  
In this study, we firstly asserted that levels of democratic satisfaction 
and the mechanism explaining the variances would differ between old 
and developing democracies. These hypotheses were examined 
empirically and the results of multivariate regression analysis verified 
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that the ‘age of democracy’ is the strongest explanatory factor for 
differentiate levels of democratic satisfaction between old and developing 
democracies. Economic performance, as expected, would be another 
significant predictor of variances in SWD, though with much lower 
explanatory power. The analysis also reveals that variables explaining the 
variance in SWD differ for old and developing democracies.  
Given the distinction between these two clusters of democracies, we 
have focused on developing democracies and argued that the interaction 
between democratic model and societal culture would affect democratic 
satisfaction in developing democracies. This hypothesis has been 
examined and verified empirically for 30 developing democracies 
between 1990 and 2009. The replication of analyses using separate data 
for the two decades of the 1990s and 2000s confirmed the robustness of 
the findings. However, we should emphasize that our findings regarding 
the importance of the interaction term were verified for the set of 30 
developing democracies for which we had comparable scores of mastery 
orientation and SWD. Although the countries involved in our analysis are 
virtually representative of different cultures and regions, this study should 
be replicated for more developing democracies whenever cultural scores 
for more countries are available.  
The final question is what implications this study has for the 
consolidation of democracy in developing democracies and countries in 
transition to democracy. This study shows that the interaction between, or 
compatibility of, institutional setting and societal culture does matter. 
Such compatibility can codetermine the level of democratic legitimacy in 
the eyes of citizens. Finding the significant role of the interaction term on 
SWD, we suggest that researchers and practitioners working on political 
institutions and constitutional engineering consider the compatibility of 
institutional arrangement and cultural orientations in proposing a 
democratic model to new democracies. The mentality of seeking the ‘best 
model’ should be replaced with the mentality of finding the ‘most 
compatible model.’ The debate on the superiority of the aggregative 
(majoritarian) or integrative (consensual) model of democracy should 
change its pivotal question to ‘what model would be able to bring about a 
better functionality and credibility given the context?’ 
To answer this question, we need to involve factors other than the 
ones conventionally used in cross-national studies. Involving cultural 
analysis and utilizing valuable findings from cross-cultural theories in 
comparative politics may reveal some unseen factors with considerable 
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explanatory power. We examined one of them – mastery orientation – in 
this chapter and much more is to be done in further research. 
 
 
Chapter 7  
The Effect of National Culture on 
Practices of Participatory 
Democracy * 
                                                      
*  This chapter is based on Maleki, A., & Bots, P. W. (2013). A Framework for 
Operationalizing the Effect of National Culture on Participatory Policy Analysis. Journal 
of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 15(5), 371-394.  
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7.1  Introduction 
The aim of policy analysis, in general, is to generate and transform 
policy-relevant information to be utilized in decision making for 
resolving policy problems (Dunn, 1994). The classical rational style of 
policy analysis approach developed in the 1960s in the U.S. has been 
criticized for being technocratic and anti-democratic (Enserink et al., 
2013). Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA) claims that it has responses to 
these shortcomings (Mayer, 1997).  The adjective “participatory” refers 
to the greater involvement of those who affect or are affected by a policy 
problem in the policy analysis process (Geurts & Joldersma, 2001). PPA 
expands the range of actors (or stakeholders) involved in the consultation 
and policy-making process in a discursive or deliberative mode. It entails 
a policy-making process that is more horizontal than hierarchical, and 
more democratic in nature, and allows policy and process to bilaterally 
reinforce one another. Although there is a risk that participants may not 
be happy with the outcomes, at least they can be satisfied with the process 
(Deleon, 1990).  
Stakeholder participation in public policy development is expected to 
improve the substantive quality of policy, its legitimacy and 
implementation, as well as the development of social capital for involved 
parties (Beierle & Cayford, 2002; Fiorino, 1990; Laird, 1993; 
Korfmacher, 2001; Webler, 1999). Systematic inquiry into the 
circumstances that make that these benefits actually occur is still much 
needed (Delli Carpini et al., 2004). Many authors agree that participatory 
practices and their outcomes are very sensitive to context, that it is very 
difficult to extrapolate from one case to another, and that participatory 
processes should hence be tailored to the specific context in which they 
are applied (Andre et al., 2006; Barreteau et al., 2010; Geurts & 
Joldersma, 2001; Geva-May, 2002; IAP2, 2009; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; 
Mayer, 1997; Nicholson, 2005;).  
Evidently, if the political and legal systems of a country do not 
provide some minimum level of democracy and political rights (e.g., 
subscores of Freedom House), a participatory approach cannot be 
practiced, or what may be labeled as “participation” will in fact be what 
Arnstein (1969) calls non-participation, or tokenism. Assuming that the 
essential preconditions are met, Von Korff et al. (2010) characterize the 
craft of designing participation processes as “finding a balance between 
pushing for the breadth and depth of participation and respecting 
political, financial, cultural, and psychological realities”.  
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In this chapter, we focus specifically on cultural factors because this 
aspect is widely problematized, but less studied in the literature on policy 
analysis and public participation. Enserink et al. (2007, p. 3) emphasize 
that “Public participation and culture are intertwined; national, local, and 
professional cultures and their formal institutions co-determine the level 
and methods of public participation”. Reed (2008, p. 2424) points out that 
“the amount of time that participants are likely to give up varies between 
cultures, and limited time may constrain the choice of methods”. 
Abraham and Platteau (2004) show the significant role of social and 
cultural fabric in the participatory development approach in sub-Saharan 
Africa. They identify certain cultural norms and values of tribal or 
lineage-based societies, such as highly personalized relationships, other-
regarding norms, strong beliefs in the role of ancestors and supernatural 
powers, and strict respect of status and rank differences, and argue that 
these can complicate a participatory approach to the point of failure in 
achieving its intended outcomes. As Mayer (1997, pp. 241-242) puts it: 
“There is no single method of Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA) 
applicable in all – or most – contexts. […] Studying PPA from a general 
context requires comparative studies using experiments on participation 
in analysis: historically or cross-culturally, such as, do participatory 
procedures developed in Denmark work the same way and are they as 
successful in the United States, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands?”  
Despite the general consensus on the need for context-sensitive design 
and implementation of public participation, there is a dearth of research 
on how to operationalize context-sensitive participatory approaches 
(Sagie & Aycan, 2003). We hope to contribute to research and practice by 
proposing a framework that will assist designers and/or implementers of 
public participation by indicating which contextual factors are sensitive to 
national culture, and may need special attention. 
In the following sections we present our framework step by step. We 
start by identifying those Factors Affecting Participation (FAPs for short) 
that are culturally sensitive. We then explore three different cross-cultural 
theories, and relate selected cultural indicators identified in these theories 
to our FAPs. We show how the relation between the selected indicators 
and our FAPs can be presented in the form of a “slide bar” framework 
that, when filled with country-specific empirical data, will reveal context-
specific caveats. We then test this framework by investigating to what 
extent the caveats it indicates for four countries (Denmark, France, Japan, 
United States) match with observations made about similar participatory 
practices (consensus conferences on the issue of genetically modified 
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food) in these four countries. We conclude with a discussion of the 
validity and usability of the framework in designing participatory 
practices. 
7.2  Culturally Sensitive Factors Affecting 
Participation (FAPs) 
Seeking to clarify the linkage between a participatory approach and 
the cultural context in which it is applied, we conceptualize this linkage 
as a set of FAPs: factors that will influence the occurrence and form of a 
public participation process, while themselves being influenced by 
cultural orientations. Perusing the literature on the design and evaluation 
of participatory approaches (Blackstock et al., 2007; Rowe & Frewer, 
2000, 2004; Van Duijn, 2007), on success factors (OECD, 2001), and on 
risks and challenges of participation, such as the choice of participants 
(Deleon, 1990), the potential of conflict (Kweit & Kweit, 1984), and time 
and consultation fatigue (Innes & Booher, 2004; Nicholson, 2005), we 
have identified nine FAPs. These factors, classified in three categories 
that correspond to stages of public participation, are listed and briefly 
described in Table 7.1. 
The first category of FAPs relates to the inputs of public participation. 
Public demand for participation (FAP1) can be considered as the first 
prerequisite for effective participation. The cultural tendency towards 
involvement in decision-making is a crucial and determinant factor for 
public participation. Without public demand, the ‘Participation Hall’ will 
remain empty even when its gates are wide open. Preferred participants 
(FAP2) reflects the types of people that are preferred and accepted to be 
involved in the participatory practice. In some societies, participatory 
practices involve resourceful stakeholders or experts, and the 
participation of ordinary citizens and laypersons  is not encouraged and 
even seen as useless and meaningless. In other cultures, the presence of 
the powerless is crucial and a sign of inclusiveness. The role and 
intention of participants (FAP3) also matters. People may participate as 
an independent individual who represents his/her points of view, but also 
as a representative of a broader group or community. In some cultures, 
participating for one’s own interest is not commonly accepted, and people 
are expected to seek the collective interest. In other cultures, participants 
are supposed to seek their own personal benefit without special concern 
about others. 
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Table 7.1. Culturally-Sensitive Factors Affecting Participation (FAPs) 
Code	   Name	   Description	  
Category	  1	  –	  Input	  of	  Public	  Participation	  
FAP1	   Public	  Demand	  	   Extent	  to	  which	  people	  want	  to	  participate	  	  
FAP2	   Preferred	  
Participants	  	  
Acceptance	  of	  and/or	  preference	  for	  powerless	  vs.	  
powerful	  participants	  
FAP3	   Role	  and	  Intention	  
of	  Participants	  
Participation	  as	  individual	  vs.	  representative,	  for	  
taking	  care	  of	  self-­‐interest	  vs.	  collective	  interest	  
Category	  2	  –	  Process	  and	  Interactions	  in	  Public	  Participation	  
FAP4	   Process	  Format	  	   Structure,	  style,	  formality,	  and	  arrangement	  of	  the	  
participatory	  process	  
FAP5	   Process	  Scope	   Duration,	  speed,	  and	  number	  of	  participants	  of	  the	  
participatory	  process	  
FAP6	   Inter-­‐party	  Trust	   Trust	  between	  policymakers	  and	  the	  public	  and/or	  
within	  these	  two	  parties	  in	  the	  participatory	  
process	  
FAP7	   Communicativeness	   Extent	  of	  being	  communicative,	  participative,	  
explicit,	  critical,	  and	  reflexive	  in	  interactions,	  and	  
indifferent	  to	  rank	  
Category	  3	  –	  Outcome	  of	  Public	  Participation	  
FAP8	   Outcome	  
Expectation	  
Acceptance	  and/or	  expectance	  of	  optimal	  solution	  
vs.	  satisficing	  consensus	  	  
FAP9	   Conflict	  Resolution	  
Mentality	  
Acceptance	  of	  and/or	  preference	  for	  compromise	  vs.	  
defeat	  in	  conflicts	  
 
The second category of FAPs contains factors that relate to the process 
and interactions in public participation. Process format (FAP4) reveals 
which type of process is compatible with cultural traits of a society. 
Structure, style, arrangement, and regulation of a participatory session 
should be adapted to cultural context. In some cultures, formal meetings 
and strict protocols are preferred, whereas other cultures favor informal 
meetings and flexible procedures. Process scope (FAP5) refers to 
preferences regarding duration and speed of a participatory process. In 
some cultures, a short and fast process is preferable or tolerable, while in 
other cultures, a slow and long process can also be acceptable. Cultures 
may likewise differ with respect to the size of the process (i.e., the 
number of participants and activities). Inter-party trust (FAP6) is crucial 
for fruitful implementation of public participation. Lack of trust can be a 
serious hurdle for public participation. Confidence in government and 
policy makers will make it easier to persuade the public to participate. 
Interpersonal trust among different stakeholder groups will facilitate 
cooperation. Communicativeness (FAP7) determines how participants 
communicate with others when they do not know each other, or when 
they are in different status. In some cultures, people are explicit and self-
expressive in their communication; in other cultures, people are modest 
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and implicit. The degree of respect for rank is important for the proper 
arrangement of participants in a participatory session. In some cultures, 
people with higher rank (social position, ascription, or age) must be 
respected, and confronting and opposing others with higher rank is a 
taboo. In other cultures, it is not important “who you are” and what rank 
you have.  
The third category of FAPs regards the outcome of public 
participation. We reckon that outcome expectation (FAP8) is affected by 
culture. In some cultures, the “best decision” may be the main, and 
probably the only acceptable, outcome of a process. Participants and 
decision makers seek substantive, quantitative outcomes (optimized 
system performance), and find social, qualitative outcomes (e.g., relation-
building and involvement) per se not relevant or desirable. Such societies 
will be reluctant to use participatory policy analysis, preferring a more 
conventional (rational) type of policy analysis. For other societies, this 
may be reversed. The outcome of public participation will also be 
affected by the conflict resolution mentality (FAP9) of the people 
involved. Some cultures value compromise and working towards 
agreement. Other cultures favor a determination to win, or lose without 
giving in.  
Having identified these culturally sensitive FAPs, we need to identify 
what cultural dimensions would explain different attributes of FAPs in 
various national contexts.  
7.3  Indicators of National Culture 
Culture and its operationalization is a controversial issue. Most 
definitions emphasize that culture is the representation of shared values of 
a community (Hofstede, 2001; Kluckhohn, 1951). Hofstede was the first 
to show that “cultural differences between modern nations could be 
meaningfully measured and ordered along a discrete set of dimensions, 
representing different answers to universal problems of human societies” 
(Hofstede, 2006b, p. 883). A cultural dimension is a human construct 
which aims to represent a cluster of interdependent values bound by some 
similarity. Cultural dimensions can only be measured relative to other 
cultures (Hofstede, 2006a), and may be striking but also imperceptible 
(Minkov, 2007). 
Hofstede (1980) inspired other researchers (House et al., 2004; 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Minkov 2007; Schwartz, 1999; Trompenaars & 
Turner, 1997) to identify alternative sets of cultural dimensions using 
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different data sets. Minkov (2007, p. 23) argues that, although cultural 
dimensions “are based on objectively existing phenomena, they are not 
the phenomena themselves but ways of describing them. Therefore, one 
and the same reality can be explained and presented in different ways, 
through different constructs”. 
Although many of the dimensions that have been introduced by 
different theories are strongly correlated and interrelated, and could be 
used interchangeably, each theory features distinctive dimensions that are 
absent in the others. The cultural studies can therefore be utilized in a 
complimentary way, provided that we know the interrelatedness of the 
dimensions from different cultural models. In Chapter 2, we tried to 
systematically cluster different dimensions from various cultural theories. 
Building on that study, we found that four cultural dimensions identified 
by Hofstede, two identified by Minkov, and three from GLOBE were best 
suited for our study in this chapter. We will briefly review these cultural 
dimensions, and then present those values, attitudes and behaviors 
manifested in each cultural dimension that are highly relevant to the 
FAPs introduced in the previous section. 
7.3.1  Cultural Dimensions Identified by Hofstede 
and Minkov 
Using a vast set of survey data from IBM subsidiaries in more than 50 
countries, Hofstede (2001) derived four cultural dimensions: Power 
Distance (related to the problem of inequality distribution of power), 
Uncertainty Avoidance (related to the problem of dealing with the 
unknown and unfamiliar), Individualism-Collectivism (related to the 
problem of interpersonal ties), and Masculinity-Femininity (related to the 
attitudes towards mastery and competition).  
Using data from the World Value Survey (WVS) - the largest 
representative international survey of basic values and beliefs, covering 
97 societies - Minkov (2007) extracted three cultural dimensions. Quite 
recently, Hofstede collaborated with Minkov and adopted two dimensions 
from the latter’s work: Monumentalism versus Self-Effacement (reflects to 
what extent a society emphasizes self-regard, pride, status, religiousness, 
and consistency between feelings and thoughts) and Indulgence versus 
Restraint (reflects to what extent people tend to enjoy free gratification of 
desire and feelings) (Hofstede et al., 2010).  
Each dimension reflects a set of values, attitudes and behaviors of a 
society. In Hofstede et al. (2010), many of these features for each 
dimension are listed. From these lists, we selected those features that we 
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consider to be related to the FAPs. Table 7.2 shows how we tabulated our 
findings for the six dimensions by Hofstede and Minkov. 
 
Table 7.2. FAP-related values, attitudes and behaviors associated with 
Hofstede’s and Minkov’s cultural dimensions  
Large	  Power	  Distance	   Small	  Power	  Distance	   Related	  
FAP	  
Subordinates	  expect	  to	  be	  told	  what	  to	  
do	  
Subordinates	  expect	  to	  be	  consulted	   FAP1	  
Older	  people	  are	  both	  respected	  and	  
feared	  
Older	  people	  are	  neither	  respected	  nor	  
feared	  
FAP7	  
Power-­‐holders	  are	  entitled	  to	  privileges;	  
elitist	  ideas	  about	  society	  
All	  should	  have	  equal	  rights;	  pluralist	  
ideas	  about	  society	  
FAP1,	  
FAP7	  
Collectivism	   Individualism	   	  
Collective	  interest	  prevail	  over	  
individual	  interest	  
Individual	  interest	  prevail	  over	  collective	  
interest	  
FAP3	  
Opinions	  predetermined	  by	  in-­‐groups	  	   Personal	  opinions	  expected	   FAP3	  
High	  public	  self-­‐consciousness	  	   Low	  public	  self-­‐consciousness	   FAP3	  
Openly	  sharing	  with	  a	  person	  one’s	  
feelings	  about	  him	  or	  her	  spoils	  
cooperation	  
Openly	  sharing	  with	  a	  person	  one’s	  
feelings	  about	  him	  or	  her	  may	  be	  
productive	  
FAP7	  
Harmony	  should	  always	  be	  maintained	  
and	  confrontation	  should	  be	  avoided	  
Speaking	  one’s	  mind	  is	  a	  characteristic	  
of	  an	  honest	  person	  and	  
confrontations	  are	  normal	  
FAP7	  
Emphasis	  on	  ascription	   Emphasis	  on	  individual	  achievements	   FAP7	  
Low	  Uncertainty	  Avoidance	   High	  Uncertainty	  Avoidance	   	  
Citizens	  competent	  toward	  authorities	   Citizens	  incompetent	  toward	  authorities	   FAP2	  
Laypersons	  in	  key	  positions	   Experts	  in	  key	  positions	   FAP2	  
Few	  and	  general	  laws	  and	  regulations	   Many	  and	  precise	  laws	  and	  regulations	   FAP4	  
Openness	  to	  change	  and	  innovation,	  
and	  tasks	  with	  uncertain	  outcomes	  
Preference	  for	  tasks	  with	  sure	  
outcomes,	  no	  risks,	  and	  for	  following	  
instructions	  
FAP4	  
Most	  people	  can	  be	  trusted	   One	  can’t	  be	  careful	  enough	  with	  other	  
people,	  not	  even	  with	  family	  
FAP6	  
Acceptance	  of	  foreigners	  as	  managers;	  
tolerance	  of	  diversity	  
Suspicion	  of	  foreigner	  as	  managers;	  
xenophobia	  
FAP6	  
Masculinity	  	   Femininity	   	  
Sympathy	  for	  the	  strong	   Sympathy	  for	  the	  weak	   FAP2	  
Big	  and	  fast	  are	  beautiful	   Small	  and	  slow	  are	  beautiful	   FAP5	  
Achievement	  in	  terms	  of	  ego	  boosting,	  
wealth	  and	  recognition	  
Achievement	  in	  terms	  of	  relationship,	  
quality	  of	  contacts	  and	  environment	  
FAP8	  
Monumentalism	   Self-­‐Effacement	   	  
Personal	  superiority	  and	  interpersonal	  
competitions	  
Cooperation	  and	  equality	   FAP9	  
Immutable	  values	  and	  beliefs;	  absolutist	  
thinking	  
Flexible	  values	  and	  beliefs;	  dialectical	  
thinking	  
FAP9	  
Indulgence	   Restraint	   	  
Higher	  importance	  of	  having	  fun;	  lower	  
priority	  of	  maintaining	  order	  	  
Lower	  importance	  of	  having	  fun;	  higher	  
priority	  of	  maintaining	  order	  
FAP4	  
Source: Hofstede (2001) and Hofstede et al. (2010) 
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7.3.2  Cultural Study of the GLOBE Project 
GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness) is a multi-phase, multi-method project in which a 
worldwide network of researchers is examining the interrelationships 
between societal culture, organizational culture, and organizational 
leadership (House et al., 2001). GLOBE defines culture as ‘shared 
motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of 
significant events that result from common experiences of members of 
collectives’ (House et al., 2002, p. 5). GLOBE has introduced nine 
cultural dimensions, from which we use only those three that are 
distinctive from the six Hofstede-Minkov dimensions, and pertinent to 
our study: Institutional Collectivism (the degree to which people are 
encouraged to practice collective action), Assertiveness (the degree to 
which individuals in societies are assertive, confrontational, and 
aggressive in social relationships), and Future Orientation (the degree to 
which individuals in societies engage in future-oriented behaviors) 
(House et al., 2002).  
 
Table 7.3. FAP-related values, attitudes and behaviors associated with high or 
low scores in each GLOBE’s cultural dimension 
High	  Score	   Low	  Score	   Related	  
FAP	  
Institutional	  Collectivism	   	  
Individuals	  are	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  
group	  activities	  
Individuals	  are	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  
activities	  alone	  	  
FAP1	  
People	  emphasize	  relatedness	  with	  
groups	  
People	  emphasize	  rationality	   FAP3	  
Group	  goals	  take	  precedence	  over	  
individual	  goals	  
Individual	  goals	  take	  precedence	  
over	  group	  goals	  
FAP3	  
Assertiveness	   	  
Value	  direct,	  explicit	  and	  
unambiguous	  communication	  
Value	  indirect	  and	  ambiguous	  
speech	  and	  face-­‐saving	  	  
FAP7	  
Value	  expressiveness	  and	  revealing	  
thoughts	  and	  feelings	  
Value	  detached	  and	  self-­‐
possessed	  conduct	  
FAP7	  
Stress	  competition	  and	  dominance	   Stress	  solidarity	  and	  cooperation	   FAP8	  
Future	  Orientation	   	  
Place	  higher	  priority	  on	  immediate	  
rewards	  
Place	  higher	  priority	  on	  long-­‐term	  
success	  
FAP5	  
Flexible	  and	  adaptive	  way	  of	  
organizing	  
Inflexible	  and	  non-­‐adaptive	  way	  
of	  organizing	  
FAP9	  
Source: House et al. (2004) 
 
Similar to the Hofstede-Minkov dimensions, the three GLOBE 
dimensions are associated with specific values, attitudes and behaviors. 
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These features are numerous and can be found in the GLOBE book 
(House et al., 2001). Again, we selected those features that we consider to 
be related to our FAPs. Table 7.3 shows our findings. 
7.3.3  Interpersonal Trust and Confidence in 
Government Indexes 
The ‘interpersonal trust’ and ‘confidence in government’ are two 
indicators that are normally measured in the main global public surveys. 
In our study, we consider the latter as a proxy for the trust between the 
public and the government, and the former as a proxy for the trust 
between people. We use both as indicators for FAP6 (inter-party trust). 
We extract the scores for these two indicators from the Legatum 
Prosperity Index (2012), which in turn used the Gallup (2012) survey.  
 
All in all, Table 7.4 summarizes which cultural indicators are pertinent to 
which FAP. 
 
Table 7.4. Summary of cultural indicators relevant to FAPs 
FAP	   Factor	  Name	   Relevant	  Indicators	  
Category	  1	  -­‐	  Inputs	  of	  Public	  Participation	  
FAP1	   Public	  Demand	   power	  distance,	  institutional	  collectivism	  
FAP2	   Preferred	  Participants	   uncertainty	  avoidance;	  	  masculinity	  
FAP3	   Role	  and	  Intention	  of	  
Participants	  
individualism/collectivism;	  	  institutional	  
collectivism	  
Category	  2	  -­‐	  Process	  and	  Interactions	  in	  Public	  Participation	  
FAP4	   Process	  Format	   uncertainty	  avoidance;	  	  indulgence/restraint	  
FAP5	   Process	  Scope	   future	  orientation;	  	  masculinity/femininity	  
FAP6	   Inter-­‐party	  Trust	   interpersonal	  trust	  index;	  	  uncertainty	  avoidance;	  	  
confidence	  in	  government	  index	  
FAP7	   Communicativeness	   individualism/collectivism;	  	  assertiveness;	  power	  
distance	  
Category	  3	  -­‐	  Outcome	  of	  Public	  Participation	  
FAP8	   Outcome	  Expectation	   masculinity/femininity;	  assertiveness	  
FAP9	   Conflict	  Resolution	  
Mentality	  
monumentalism;	  future	  orientation	  
7.4  A Framework for Assessing FAPs on the 
Basis of Cultural Indicators 
Scores for the cultural dimensions identified in the previous section 
are publicly available. We expect that presenting these scores in relation 
to FAPs produces an ‘orientation’ for each FAP that may assist 
practitioners in deciding how to develop public participation in a specific 
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country. Figure 7.1 illustrates how the framework is used to obtain 
‘orientations’ for a single FAP for the four countries that we will consider 
in the next section. 
This framework consists of ‘sliders’ indicating the position of cultural 
dimensions related to each particular FAP. As an example, Figure 7.1 
presents the framework for FAP2 (Preferred Participants) which has two 
indicators: uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. The minimum and 
maximum scores of each cultural dimension correspond to the two 
extremes (“poles”) of the qualitative scale for the FAP: acceptance of and 
preference for the powerless on the left, and the powerful on the right. 
The scores of a country determine its inclination toward one of the poles 
and the corresponding attributes.  
This example illustrates how we propose to translate available 
international survey data onto a left pole – right pole scale for each of the 
nine FAPs. Although we summarize the ‘orientations’ in Figure 7.1 as 
arrows positioned somewhere on the “left–right” continuum, they convey 
a richer picture if the underlying details are considered. This will become 
clear as we examine the applicability of the framework in the next section 
by applying it to four case studies. 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Obtaining an ‘Orientation’ of a FAP for each country by positioning 
the scores of related indicators 
Note: This framework (on-line available at http://actoranalysis.com/fap-framework/) 
consists of sets of "slide bars" that for each FAP indicate the position of countries on the 
cultural dimensions related to this FAP. 
(16) (43) (62) (95)
(23) (46) (86)(92)
and denote	  a	  country’s	  “orientation”;	  	  the	  numbers	  (nn) a	  country’s	  score	  on	  the	  dimension
166 | Application of the Framework to a Participatory Practice 
 
7.5  Application of the Framework to a 
Participatory Practice in Four Countries:  
Denmark, France, Japan and the United States 
We tested the framework by filling it with data on four countries and 
then comparing the nine FAP ‘orientations’ with the findings reported by 
scholars on well-documented instances of a Consensus Conference in 
these countries. These conferences were held on the same topic of 
genetically modified (GM) food in France (1998), Denmark (1999), 
Japan (2000), and the U.S. (2002). A consensus conference aims to 
involve ordinarily citizens in a policy analysis issue, e.g., a technology 
assessment. It consists of a three- to four-day public meeting, organized 
by a planning/steering committee, in which a citizen or lay panel and an 
expert panel interact (Andersen & Jæger, 1999). For each country, we 
first placed the country-specific indicator scores in the framework (cf. 
Figure 7.1 and Table A.5 in Appendix A), interpreted the resulting 
‘orientation’ for the FAPs, and then checked whether these concurred 
with what the literature reported on the actual implementation of the 
consensus conference.  To facilitate comparison, we place 2-letter 
country codes (DK for Denmark, FR for France, JP for Japan, and US for 
the U.S.) on the sliders so that its position reflects the indicator score.   
First of all, the high scores of all four countries under study on the 
indicators evaluating the ‘freedom of expression and beliefs’ and 
‘associational and organizational rights’ (Freedom House, 2012) indicate 
that the precondition of legal and political support for public participation 
is met.  
Figure 7.2 shows the results for the first category of FAPs: Inputs of 
Public Participation. The orientation for FAP1 predicts a high public 
demand for participation in Denmark. Indeed, Einsiedel et al. (2001, p. 
85) state that “… since the end of the 19th century, adult education and 
local debate have been an important part of Danish cultural and political 
life. Thus, the consensus conference model, as it has been developed in 
the Danish context, had a specific historical origin in the learning 
processes related to technology controversies in Denmark and a basis in 
Danish political culture”. The orientation for France (relatively high 
power distance and low team-working orientation) suggests that public 
participation will appear in forms of protest and demonstration instead of 
participatory meetings and negotiations. In their case study of 
participatory river basin management, Patel and Stel (2004) found that 
Chapter 7 | 167  
 
discussions and negotiations were hindered by public participation in the 
form of public demonstrations: the public struggle was conducted outside 
the institutional framework, usually on the streets. The orientation for 
Japan (high scores on team-working orientation combined with moderate 
power distance) suggests a tendency of citizens to participate, and indeed 
Nishizawa (2005, p. 486) reported that “… the Japanese Government 
changed its original position and transferred the debate on GM food from 
the scientific to the public arena because there was a strong popular 
movement towards more transparent policy decisions and political 
change. Since the 1980s, the public administration has suffered severe 
critical attacks on its secrecy and lack of transparency”. 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Application of the framework for Category 1(Inputs of Public 
Participation) to Denmark (DK), France (FR), Japan (JP) and the United States 
(US) 
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For preferred participants (FAP2), the framework predicts that 
Denmark will strive to give voice to the powerless, and the literature 
concurs: “the consensus conference model is consistent with the 
dominant Danish egalitarian and participatory ethos” (Dryzek & Tucker, 
2008, p. 867). The orientations for the other countries globally suggest a 
lower acceptance of powerless participants (U.S.), and even a predilection 
for the powerful (France and Japan). The empirical evidence supports 
this. In Japan, up to 1998, there were almost no public forums in which 
ordinary citizens consider issues in science and technology to come to a 
decision by themselves. It is often believed that these issues are difficult 
to understand, and that one should rely on expert judgment (Wakamatsu, 
1999). It is indicative that, while the standard Danish model of consensus 
conference prescribes that the lay panel decides which experts are to be 
invited, it was the steering committee, not the lay panel, that nominated 
the members of the expert panel in the Japanese case (Nishizawa, 2005). 
At the consensus conference in France, “… some deputies argued that 
citizens should not have any role beyond voting in elections. 
Parliamentarians were not keen on any of their authority being delegated 
to another body. Some thought lay citizens would not be able to 
understand complex technological issues” (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 
869). When a film of the consensus conference was shown in the national 
assembly in France, the reaction was silence and amazement at the ability 
of ordinary citizens to deliberate complex issues. Moreover, the press 
coverage revealed a degree of skepticism concerning the wisdom of 
entrusting key roles to ordinary citizens (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). In the 
U.S., power-holders support public participation via organized 
stakeholder groups, not ordinary people (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 870). 
The state legislature paid little attention to the U.S. consensus conference 
“… though one legislator wrote to the president of the University of New 
Hampshire complaining about the university’s involvement in what 
looked like policy making, involving citizens who could not possibly 
have the requisite expertise” (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 871). Moreover, 
a columnist in the conservative Washington Times ridiculed the idea of 
letting citizens “vote” about scientific issues (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).  
The indicators for the role and intention of participants (FAP3) in 
Figure 7.2 show that all western countries are individualistic, but scores 
differ in their institutional collectivism. The scores of Denmark and Japan 
on institutional collectivism indicate a priority of group goals over 
individual goals. France has the lowest scores, while the U.S. scores also 
indicate that they are not zealous of collective benefits and social interest. 
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The data on consensus conferences provides only weak evidence 
concerning FAP3. Although the Danish model prescribes random 
selection of participants as a (weak) guard against self-interest, the U.S. 
consensus conference organizers used advertisement to recruit 
participants. This entails more participant self-selection: potentially those 
most interested in the issue were most likely to volunteer (Dryzek & 
Tucker, 2008, p. 871).  
Figure 7.3 shows the results for the second category of FAPs:  Process 
and Interactions in Public Participation. The scores for FAP4 (Process 
Format) predict that Denmark and the U.S. will favor innovative and 
flexible processes with informal and friendly atmosphere, while France 
and Japan will prefer conventional and established processes, being 
formal and serious. Indeed, Denmark and the U.S. were the main 
developers of many innovative participatory methods: the “consensus 
conference” and “scenario workshop” originate from Denmark, and the 
“citizens’ jury” and “deliberative polling” have been invented in the U.S. 
The Danish Board of Technology (DBT) actively championed 
participatory practice. By contrast, the French counterpart of the DBT, 
the Office in Parliament for Evaluation of Science and Technology 
(OPECST) was against sponsoring participatory technology assessment. 
The initiative for the consensus conference on GM food in France “… 
came from the office of newly appointed Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, 
who wanted to appear innovative in response to a knotty issue” (Dryzek 
& Tucker, 2008, p. 868). In the case of Japan, Nishizawa  (2005, p. 486) 
indicates that although “… the deliberation process was radical and 
structurally and organizationally very different from conventional 
conflict-resolution methods in Japan, nevertheless, the content of the 
deliberation was nothing like as radical. Rather, it mirrored the 
conventional policy style of consensual and technocratic decision-making 
and the conformist attitude in Japan”.  
The scores for FAP5 (Process Scope) indicate that in Denmark and 
Japan a slow and long process with small group of participants is 
accepted, while in the U.S. and France the reverse is preferred. The high 
future orientation scores for Japan and Denmark are important indicators 
of this prediction. Indeed, for the consensus conference in France, a short 
timescale was enforced (Lieberman & Taylor, 2005). It is likewise 
indicative that “the Danish conference was held over four days to allow 
the lay panel more time to write its report” while “the Canadian final 
public conferences were done over a three-day period, with the lay panels 
producing their reports in a marathon overnight session that lasted well 
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into the early morning hours” (Einsiedel et al., 2001, p. 89). As for size, it 
is revealing that the participatory methods developed by Denmark 
(consensus conference and scenario workshop) involve from 15 to 25 
people, whereas those developed in the U.S. (citizens’ jury and 
deliberative polling) involve from 50 to 500+ people (Fishkin et al., 
2000). Moreover, “… the America-Speaks Foundation organizes 
deliberative 21st Century Town Meetings that involve hundreds of 
participants meeting for a relatively short time – partly on the grounds 
that politicians and the media find it harder to ignore such numbers than 
the 15 or so that a consensus conference involves” (Dryzek & Tucker, 
2008, p. 872). We should not ignore, though, that a country’s population 
size might co-determine the preferred number of participants.  
For FAP6 (Inter-party Trust), the framework shows that, except for 
Denmark, confidence in government is low. Moreover, interpersonal trust 
is low in France. Here, too, the reports on consensus conferences 
corroborate the orientations obtained with the framework. In spite of 
efforts of the steering committee to assure the lay panelists of the 
trustworthiness and benevolence of the French government, there 
remained mistrust on the part of the lay participants because the 
government seemed already to have decided on growing GM maize 
(Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). In Japan, the questionnaire filled by lay 
members prior to the first consensus conference revealed that “… most of 
them (15 out of 19) have little faith in the current politicians” 
(Wakamatsu, 1999, p. 29). In a U.S. process, where “… inputs normally 
take the form of advocacy, it is hard to get partisans to accept that the 
forum is not going to be biased somehow against their interests” (Dryzek 
& Tucker, 2008, p. 871). The remarkable Danish public confidence may 
be inspired by the emphasis government places on transparency. One 
Member of Parliament in Denmark stated that reports of consensus 
conferences “… are better than opinion polls because they are less biased, 
there is no hidden agenda and the methodology is explicit and clear. With 
opinion polls in the newspapers you never know who is behind them and 
what is the agenda” (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 867).  
Concerning FAP7 (Communicativeness), the indicators for Denmark, 
France and the U.S. show that these countries are self-expressive and 
explicit in their communication, while Japanese culture is implicit and 
self-censoring in communication with others.  
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Figure 7.3. Application of the framework for Category 2 (Process and 
Interactions in Public Participation) to Denmark (DK), France (FR), Japan (JP) 
and the United States (US) 
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Moreover, Japan and to a lesser degree France tend towards higher 
respect for authorities. This is reflected by the observation that after the 
consensus conference in Japan “… a panel member explained the 
unspoken, subtle strategy taken by the lay panel to bring the state-
involved deliberation to a successful conclusion without jeopardizing 
their future participation” (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 483). In the French 
consensus conference, “… the lay citizens proved more critical and less 
compliant than expected by the sponsors, even though their final report 
was not radically at variance with existing government policy” (Dryzek & 
Tucker, 2008, p. 869).  
Interviews with lay panelists in Japan revealed that the involvement of 
governmental authorities had influenced the discussion at the deliberative 
session: “… several other panel members also said that they refrained 
from suggesting extreme opinions such as a total ban on GMOs. This 
self-restrained reaction seen in the statements by several lay panelists 
corresponds to the ‘conflict avoidance behavior’ that has been described 
as an important behavioral norm of the Japanese” (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 
483). 
Figure 7.4 shows the results for the third category of FAPs: Outcome 
of Public Participation. Regarding outcome expectation (FAP8), the 
framework predicts that the U.S. highly values success, performance and 
optimized outcome (right pole), while Denmark highly values 
relationships and a satisficing outcome (left pole). The scores for France 
and Japan indicate a right-pole inclination. Indeed, Dryzek and Tucker 
(2008, p. 870) report that “… the GM food issue plays out somewhat 
differently in the United States than in Denmark and France. GM 
agriculture is very big business in the United States, GM crops having 
made great inroads with a minimum of public fuss. The level of public 
anxiety on this issue is lower than in Europe”.  In Japan, the authorities 
disclosed that their expectation from the public participation was to see 
acceptance of the current achievement in GM foods, because the Japanese 
government has invested too much in advancing industrial development 
of biotechnology (Nishizawa, 2005). It meant that a consensus on 
reduction or restriction policy of GM food might not be accepted and 
adopted. Indeed, “… the plan thus emphasized the importance of 
maintaining Japan’s current competitive advantage in the analysis of rice 
genomes and, at the same time, the general public acceptance of 
biotechnology that was considered to reinforce Japan’s competitive 
advantage in this field” (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 485). Indeed, the decision 
makers finally did not accept to integrate the outcome of the consensus 
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conference into the management decision, and this created a tension 
between them and the lay panel members (Nishizawa, 2005). In France, 
despite the claim that the goal was to “… assure both higher economic 
growth and social acceptance”, the French authorities believed that 
uninformed public opinion is an obstacle to progress and needs to be 
overcome by education (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). Interestingly, in France 
the term “consensus conference” was changed into “citizen conference” 
with the argument that “consensus” would be interpreted as “halfhearted 
consensus” based on some ambiguous compromise (Lieberman & Taylor, 
2005). However, contrary to the Americans, the French citizens in the lay 
panel did not accept the economic benefit of biotechnology at expense of 
people’s health (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 869). In Denmark, in 
response to the 1996 Eurobarometer survey statement “we have to accept 
some degree of risk from modern biotechnology if it enhances the 
country’s economic competitiveness”, only 30 percent of Danes agreed 
(Einsiedel et al., 2001), which indicates that the Danish are loath to 
sacrifice their qualitative concerns to the economic achievement. 
Moreover, the output of Danish consensus conferences, for or against the 
GM food, should be taken seriously to the extent that it can lead to 
parliamentary questions to ministers, asking why they do not follow the 
citizens’ recommendations (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Application of the framework for Category 3 (Outcome of Public 
Participation) to Denmark (DK), France (FR), Japan (JP) and the United States 
(US)
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Finally, the scores for conflict resolution mentality (FAP9) put the 
U.S. on the left pole, and Denmark and Japan on the opposite side. In the 
United States, whenever different parties think that there could be a 
possibility of bias and conflicts, instead of negotiation and compromise, 
they withdraw from the session (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). Stakeholders 
play to win, or they do not participate. In the Danish GM consensus 
conference, all the relevant actors with opposing views participated, 
played their roles, and followed the proceedings under the neutral 
direction of the Danish Board of Technology (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). 
In Japan, compromise is more accepted than confrontation in dealing with 
conflicts. Their high flexibility and future orientation indicates that they 
value the compromise and consensus, and may try to prevent conflicts in 
advance. Indeed, Nishizawa (2005, p. 484) observed strategic behavior of 
lay panelists in confrontation with authorities during the consensus 
conference, and quoted a scientist who said that “… this behavioral 
pattern is the ‘essence’ of the Japanese style of conflict management. It is 
neither self-sacrifice nor spontaneous consensus, but rather a strong 
desire to avoid direct conflict, particularly with government authority”. 
The orientation for France reflects a middle position between 
compromise and defeat in conflicts. The fact that, despite critical and 
negative opinions of French citizens during the consensus conference, 
their final report did not radically oppose government policy shows a 
sense of compromise. However, French authorities would in some cases 
not compromise, but try to impose their interests (Dryzek & Tucker, 
2008).  
In sum, the ‘orientations’ obtained by applying the sliders-framework 
show good correspondence with the empirical data that we found on 
participatory practice of consensus conferences in Denmark, France, 
Japan, and the U.S. The fact that it does so for four countries with distinct 
cultures shows the robustness of the framework, and also its potential as a 
diagnostic tool for policy analysts and practitioners who wish to tailor a 
participatory approach to the cultural context of a particular country. 
7.6  Discussions and Conclusion 
This research originated from the observation that context and, more 
specifically, national culture, play a significant role in public 
participation. By means of conceptual analysis of well-established cross-
cultural theories, we operationalized this relation in the form of a 
framework that permits analysts to assess the effect of cultural factors on 
Chapter 7 | 175  
 
the process, interactions, and expectations of participatory practices. 
Based on quantitative scores publicly available for numerous countries, 
our framework produces ‘orientations’ for nine factors affecting 
participation (FAPs). The secondary case studies in four countries 
showed that these ‘orientations’ correspond well with the way the 
consensus conferences proceeded in these countries. We found it helpful 
in understanding why a consensus conference is successful and effective 
in Denmark, but not much favored and less fruitful in other contexts like 
France, the U.S., and Japan. This suggests that our framework can be 
instrumental in the selection and/or design of appropriate participatory 
methods and processes for a given country having specific cultural 
orientations.  
In general, the orientations produced by the framework for a particular 
country can guide researchers and practitioners in their thinking about the 
following four aspects of participation: 
(1) What to aim for: If there is a weak demand and supply from the 
public and power-holders respectively (right pole of FAP1), then we 
cannot expect to attain the higher rungs of the “ladder of participation” 
defined by Arnstein (1969). Meanwhile, high public demand for 
participation can lead to request for higher levels of participation. When 
the outcome expectation (FAP8) indicates optimized performance (right 
pole), the compatible purpose of public participation would be 
consultation. If public satisfaction and consensus are sought (left-pole), 
higher levels of participation (e.g., co-decision, delegation) may be more 
appropriate. 
(2) Whom to involve: Context will co-determine which type of 
participants will be preferred or discouraged in forms of public 
participation. FAP2 (preferred participants) indicates whether this will be 
lay people or organized and strong stakeholders. FAP3 (role and intention 
of participants) may suggest participation of stakeholder representatives, 
or rather of individual citizens. FAP4 (process format) will also bear on 
the choice of type of participants: a preference for formal and serious 
processes (right pole) may imply involvement of authorities and 
influential individuals, whereas a preference for informal and friendly 
sessions (left pole) may suggest involving ordinary citizens as well. FAP6 
(inter-party trust) may indicate that participants should be “in-group” 
(right pole) or that “out-group” individuals such as foreign mediators are 
welcome as well (left pole). 
(3) Which methods to use: All FAPs of the second category (Process 
and Interactions in Public Participation), have implications for designing 
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or selecting appropriate participatory methods and techniques. Each such 
method has particular features (see Fishkin et al., 2000; OECD, 2001; 
Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005; Van Asselt Marjolein & Rijkens-Klomp, 
2002) which should be taken into account when seeking methods that are 
compatible with the specific context. For example, the state of FAP4 
indicates whether a flexible format of a process is preferred, or a 
structured format. Likewise, FAP5 bears on the duration and number of 
participants of the method. Right-pole of FAP6 and FAP7 (i.e., a lack of 
trust between and within participants, culturally modest and non-
communicative participants, or the likelihood that the attendance of 
highly ranked persons may overshadow the participatory session) indicate 
that an impartial facilitator should be engaged. The same FAPs also affect 
a characteristic feature of participatory methods, namely what 
participatory setting, such as Face-to-Face (FTF) meetings, anonymous 
questionnaires, or ICT-mediated interaction, is compatible. A leaning 
towards the right-pole of inter-party trust also implies a higher need for a 
transparent process. Finally, if FAP9 (conflict resolution mentality) 
indicates that stakeholders are not inclined to compromise in conflicts, 
non-FTF methods might be more effective. 
(4) What risks to manage: Some FAPs entail risks and challenges of 
participation. The right-pole of FAP1 suggests a need for incentives to 
encourage people (e.g., compensations, subsidies, or educational 
programs, all of which will increase cost). When FAP5 indicates a 
preference for slow and long processes, this also implies a risk of 
consultation fatigue. Note that, although in essence beneficial for 
participation, being explicit, speaking one’s mind, and criticizing overtly 
(left poles of FAP7) can also engender a risk of conflict. Such conflicts 
may escalate when people do not easily compromise (right pole of 
FAP9).  
The framework may prove to be even more helpful when considering 
the transplantation of participatory practices from a reference country to a 
target country. By checking for each FAP whether the orientations for the 
target country differ significantly from those for the reference country, 
practitioners may discover a need for adaptation of particular aspects of 
these practices.  
We should also point out potential weaknesses of this study. First of 
all, we are aware that the cross-cultural theories or, more generally, the 
dimensionalization of culture that underpin our framework, are subject to 
debate. In line with Williamson (2002), we caution against the 
assumption that all members of a culture homogeneously carry all 
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attributes of that culture, or that behavior is mainly determined by cultural 
background. However, our framework does not build on these 
assumptions; it translates scores for cultural dimensions – global as they 
may be – into caveats for practitioners. As do Hofstede (2001) and 
Minkov (2007), we emphasize that cultural indicators should not be used 
at the level of individual. Our framework is likely to produce actionable 
results only for participatory practices that will involve sufficient 
numbers from a variety of societal groups. 
Secondly, the available cultural dimensions have not been developed 
for our specific purpose. Although we tried to select only those that can 
explain something about factors affecting participation, these cultural 
indicators entail many values and attributes which could not be separated 
for specific use. As a result, some cultural dimensions are used as 
indicators for several FAPs. However, using several cross-cultural 
theories through the complementary application of their dimensions 
would also seem to make our framework more plausible and reliable.  
Thirdly, we have tested our framework not by first-hand experience, 
but by using observations from case studies reported in the literature. 
Inevitably, the research focus of the original researchers will have filtered 
the data, and this may have restricted our view. Moreover, we have used 
the framework for a specific method (consensus conference) and topic 
(genetically modified food). It should be tested for other cases in other 
countries to examine how robust and helpful it is. 
Our framework is not a generic manual for policy analysts, prescribing 
“do’s” or “don’ts” for successful participatory practice in different 
cultural contexts. What we aimed to do was to find the relation between 
FAPs and indicators to make a framework which can be used as a 
flashlight to reveal hidden and unknown points of a context to researchers 
and practitioners of public participation. We see the product of our 
research as a guiding tool that says something important about cultural 
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8.1  Introduction 
The previous chapters have theorized and examined the relation 
between cultural orientations and dimensions of democracy. The results 
have provided a general picture of how culture and democracy walk hand 
in hand. However, much more should be done to elucidate more details of 
this striking, mysterious picture.  
In Chapter 2, nine clusters of cultural dimensions were identified. In 
Chapter 4 the two dimensions of democracy were operationalized. Then, 
in Chapter 5, the relation between cultural orientations and the two 
dimensions of democracy (i.e. Integrative Dimension of Democracy 
(IDD) and Participative Dimension of Democracy (PDD)) have been 
presented and discussed. However, as presented in Chapter 4, each 
dimension of democracy in turn consists of three components, each of 
which is an indicator for measuring one modality of the concept of 
contestation and participation. Each component in turn is affected by 
some institutional choices. Thus, for having a better understanding of 
interrelations between the dimensions of culture and democracy, the 
effect of cultural orientations on the components of IDD and PDD, and 
on the institutional choices forming the components should be studied.  
These components are manifestations of the political preferences of 
people in each society. They can be considered outcomes of the 
interaction between a constellation of cultural orientations and an 
arrangement of institutional choices; the institutional arrangement 
determines the possibilities and constraints of political options, and 
societal culture codetermines people’s preferences and choices of those 
options. While cultural orientations are durable and hard to change, 
institutional setting can be reformed and manipulated.  
In this chapter, we want to zoom in on the interrelations between 
cultural orientations and some underlying institutional elements 
generating dimensions of democracy. Table 8.1 shows the list of different 
institutional choices/elements that can be selected and tailored in 
constitutional and institutional design. These elements will directly or 
indirectly affect the democratic model of a country. The preference for 
and superiority of one institutional option over another is a challenging, 
crucial and endless debate among political scientists. This study tries to 
demonstrate the importance of involving the role of cultural orientations 
in the selection and adoption of constitutional/institutional choices. This 
issue should, in my estimation, be a part of the debate agenda on models 
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of democracy. Indeed, the involvement of culture would change the 
starting point of the debate; from ‘what is the best model/institutional 
choice?’ to ‘what is the most compatible model/institutional choice?’.  
 




Type	  of	  regime	   presidential/semi-­‐presidential/semi-­‐parliamentary/	  
parliamentary	  
Electoral	  system	   PR/mixed/majority	  
Electoral	  threshold	   legal	  threshold;	  district	  magnitude;	  legislative	  size	  
Compulsory	  voting	   compulsory/non-­‐compulsory	  
Referendum	  provision	   top-­‐down/bottom-­‐up;	  binding/advisory;	  national/local	  
 
Figure 8.1, a spaghetti-like diagram, depicts the associational relations 
between the cultural dimensions, institutional elements and components 
of IDD and PDD. The cultural orientations are positioned in the middle. 
The right and the left sides present the components of IDD and PDD, 
respectively, as well as the corresponding institutional elements of each 
dimension. The seven cultural orientations demonstrate either weak or 
strong associations with the components of democratic models. The plus 
and minus signs above each relational vector demonstrate a positive or 
negative association between the two variables, respectively.  
In the following sections, we elaborate each of the interrelations 
presented in Figure 8.1 and discuss the conceptual and empirical links 
between the cultural orientations and institutional choices. In presenting 
these interrelations, we will discuss, in the concluding chapter that 
follows, the importance of involving culture in designing, tailoring and 
reforming democratic models by introducing the Cultural Compatibility 
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8.2  Institutions Forming the Integrative 
Dimension of Democracy (IDD) 
8.2.1  Regime Type: (semi) Presidential vs. (semi) 
Parliamentary  
In Chapter 4, regime type has been indirectly involved in the 
operationalization of democratic models. Regime type affects the IDD 
through the presidential disproportionality measure. For presidential 
democracies, we consider the presidential disproportionality in addition 
to parliamentary disproportionality, basing this on the Lijphartian 
approach. Presidential disproportionality decreases the total electoral 
proportionality (TEP) and accordingly lowers the IDD score.  For now, 
however, the question is why different countries opt for different regime 
types. 
I assert that different cultural orientations codetermine the preference 
of a society for a specific regime type. In a presidential system, a 
person/party would be delegated, in a direct vote, to take the significant 
part of political power, while in the parliamentary system the power could 
be much more fragmented. And in a presidential system, the 
concentration of power can be larger than in the parliamentary one. 
Therefore, I speculate that the cultural orientation of power distance can 
play a role in this institutional choice. I assert that societies with higher 
power distance would incline more toward accepting and adopting the 
presidential system. In order to examine this notion, the cultural 
orientation of hierarchy measured by Schwartz and the classification of 
regime types developed in Appendix C are used.  
Figure 8.2 shows the relation between the two variables. We observe 
that countries with a presidential system have a higher hierarchy score. 
There are two outliers, namely India and Turkey, without which the 
Spearman’s correlation between presidentialism and hierarchy is 0.41 
(N= 42, p<0.01). Among outliers, Turkey has recently started to move 
toward a semi-presidential system, with the first direct presidential 
election took place in August 2014. All in all, we can see the footprint of 
the cultural orientation of hierarchy on the choice of regime type. We can 
assume the direction of causality from societal culture to political 
institutions since the former is antecedent to the latter.  
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Figure 8.2. The relation between hierarchy and regime types 
Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential 
 
Another cultural orientation that could affect the regime choice is 
individualism vs. collectivism. As discussed in Chapter 2, the two 
cultural dimensions of individualism and power distance are not perfectly 
orthogonal, but rather interrelated. However, beyond that interrelation, 
one can theoretically argue that individualism bears an affinity with 
parliamentarism because this type of regime can better satisfy the 
attribute of ‘representation’ in a democratic system. Indeed, people in an 
individualist culture prefer more autonomy and less embeddedness; and 
smaller communities and minorities are stronger in individualist cultures, 
and there is greater concern over their representation. Although the 
choice of an electoral system is the main determinant of representation, it 
is widely believed that parliamentarism is better matched with the 
inclusive electoral system (Lijphart, 1999). Thus, I assert that 
individualist societies are more inclined to adopt parliamentarism, 
whereas presidentialism would be more accepted in collectivist nations.  
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Figure 8.3. The relation between collectivism and regime types  
Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential 
 
Figure 8.3 presents the relation between GLOBE’s in-group 
collectivism and the regime type. Excluding the USA and Namibia as 
outliers, the Spearman’s correlation between them is 0.46 (N=44, 
p<0.005). Other cultural dimensions that measure 
individualism/collectivism, namely Hofstede’s individualism and 
Schwartz’s bipolar dimension of embeddedness/autonomy, also have the 
significant correlations of -0.72 (N=50, p<0.001) and 0.52 (N=43, 
p<0.001) with the regime type, respectively (excluding the USA).  
Traditionalism/monumentalism is another cultural orientation that is 
conceptually associated with presidentialism. This cultural trait relates to 
pride and conviction. It was argued in Chapter 5 that in the 
monumentalist culture, charismatic characteristics are praised and 
encouraged; and hence, people would like to see charismatic leaders in 
power. Thus having a powerful president is more expected in those 
societies. Figure 8.4 presents the correlational pattern between Inglehart’s 
traditionalism and regime types. The Spearman’s correlation between the 
two variables is -0.50 (N=65, p<0.001).  




Figure 8.4. The relation between traditionalism and regime types 
Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential 
 
Finally, I argue that those societies with higher uncertainty avoidance 
would show a stronger inclination toward a presidential system than a 
parliamentary one. In a presidential system, the ministers and ruler of the 
government are appointed shortly after the elections, while in the 
parliamentary system, negotiations for making coalitions are started the 
day after the election, and cabinet formation may take months. This 
means that the uncertainty in a parliamentary system is higher than a 
presidential system and explains why presidentialism might be more 
popular in uncertainty-avoidant cultures. Given this argument and bearing 
in mind the relation between uncertainty avoidance and future orientation 
discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3), I assert that future orientation 
should have a negative association with presidentialism. It is assumed 
that in future-oriented cultures people accept the long and slow process of 
decision-making, while in a short-term-oriented culture people prefer to 
see that decisions are made fast. Therefore, I assert that the parliamentary 
system bears a stronger affinity with high future-oriented and low 
uncertainty-avoidant cultures. Figure 8.5 corroborates this assertion. 
Presidentialism has the Spearman’s correlations of 0.30 (N=51, p<0.05) 
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and -0.35 (N=46, p<0.05) with Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance and 
GLOBE’s future orientation, respectively. As the figure shows, almost all 
the countries with a presidential system have a low score for future 
orientation. The direction of causality can be a debatable question, but 
considering the fact that most of these countries are new and young 
democracies, we can argue that the cultural orientation codetermines this 
institutional choice, although undoubtedly there is an interaction between 
the institutional setting and societal culture. 
 
 
Figure 8.5. The relation between future-orientation and regime types 
Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential 
 
There is a common conviction among political scholars that 
parliamentary and presidential systems bear an affinity with consensual 
(integrative) and majoritarian (aggregative) models of democracy, 
respectively. However, there is only a weak Spearman’s correlation (-
0.24, N=80, p<0.05) between the regime type and the integrative (vs. 
aggregative) dimension of democracy. Normally, in a multi-party 
parliamentary system, consensus building is crucial in forming the 
cabinet, while this is less needed in a presidential system, in which the 
winner president/party is under less pressure to collaborate. Thus, I assert 
that societies with a weaker teamwork spirit (lower collaborativeness) 
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might have more inclination towards the presidential system. Figure 8.6 
shows the association between the regime type and GLOBE’s 
institutional collectivism. Excluding South Korea as an outlier, we 
observe a significant Spearman’s correlation of -0.32 (N=45, p<0.05) 
between the two variables, which gives support to this assertion.  
 
 
Figure 8.6. The relation between collaborativeness and regime types 
Note: 0: parliamentary, 1: semi-parliamentary, 2: semi-presidential, 3: presidential 
8.2.2  Electoral System: Majority vs. Mixed vs. PR 
The electoral system is an important institutional element in forming 
the democratic model of a country. The electoral system affects both the 
parliamentary electoral disproportionality as well as the effective number 
of parties in the parliament (ENPP). However, the electoral system per se 
is not the only determinant of the outcomes. This means that we may see 
democracies with a majoritarian electoral system that have higher ENPP 
than democracies with a PR system. This is sometimes also the case for 
parliamentary disproportionality. This implies that people’s political 
behavior is not regulated merely by the institutional setting. Societal 
culture, in my estimation, is another important factor that affects political 
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preferences. Therefore, I argue that each society inclines to adopt a kind 
of electoral system that is more compatible with its societal culture. 
In Chapter 5, the notion that countries with higher mastery orientation 
are more inclined to adopt the aggregative (majoritarian) model of 
democracy has been discussed. Considering the connection between 
components of IDD and the institutional elements, I argue that mastery-
oriented cultures accept, and even prefer, the majority/plurality electoral 
system, whereas the PR system is more popular in low mastery cultures. 
Figure 8.7 confirms this speculation. The Spearman’s correlation between 




Figure 8.7. The relation between mastery and electoral system  
Note: 0: majority, 1: mixed, 2 :PR 
 
PR would be considered a more egalitarian system of representation. 
The distribution of power in a PR system decreases the hierarchical 
dominance of a party or a coalition of parties. Therefore, we can 
speculate that the PR system is more likely to be adopted in societies with 
a low power distance culture. On the other hand, the electoral systems 
that use majority/plurality rule - even partly as in mixed systems - would 
be accepted more in societies with higher hierarchy orientation. Figure 
190 | Institutions Forming the Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD) 
 
8.8 shows the significant correlation of -0.35 (N=44, p<0.05) between the 




Figure 8.8. The relation between hierarchy and electoral system  
Note: 0: majority, 1: mixed, 2 :PR 
 
Choosing electoral systems is a matter of importance in designing the 
democratic model of a country. I posit that the selection of the electoral 
system is affected by cultural orientations and that the affinity between 
societal culture and electoral system would matter for a credible and 
workable model of democracy.  
8.2.3  Electoral Threshold 
The electoral threshold is defined as the minimum percentage of the 
vote that a party needs in order to obtain any seats in the parliament. The 
‘legal threshold’ is a rule in PR systems that restricts small parties in 
gaining parliamentary seats if they cannot receive a minimum share of the 
vote (e.g. 5%), whether nationally or within a particular district. It is 
argued that besides the legal (or explicit) threshold, we should consider 
the ‘implicit threshold’ (or natural threshold), which is determined by the 
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number of constituencies and the legislative size (i.e. number of seats in 
the parliament). The ‘effective threshold’ is normally considered the 
largest one between implicit (natural) and explicit (legal) thresholds, 
although some scholars consider a different formula for measuring the 
effective threshold (Taagepera, 1998). Lijphart (1999, p. 153) proposes 
the following formula for calculating the implicit threshold (T), in which 
S is the number of seats and E is the number of constituencies (S over E 
is known as average district magnitude): 
 
T = 75 % / (S/E + 1) 
 
By using this formula, the implicit threshold of countries with 
different electoral systems can be calculated. In plurality/majority system 
with a single-member constituency (i.e. E equalizes S), the effective 
threshold would be 37.5 % in each constituency. That is, in the 
majority/plurality single-member district system, the effective threshold 
is fixed and predetermined and cannot be considered an independent 
element in designing the electoral system. 
Implicit threshold and its constituent element (i.e. E and S) are 
important design choices that can yield a variety of proportional electoral 
systems. In Austria, for instance, there are nine constituencies (from 7 to 
36 seats each) and the legislative size (S) is 183. Thus, the average 
district magnitude is 20.3, and the implicit threshold would be 3.5%; 
however since there is a legal threshold of 4%, the ‘effective threshold’ 
would be the largest one, i.e. 4 percent. Effective threshold can make a 
spectrum of different PR systems in practice. The Netherlands, Spain, 
Ireland, and Chile have PR electoral systems, but the effective thresholds 
of the four countries are 1%, 9.7%, 15% and 25%, respectively. This 
shows how the effective threshold can differentiate the electoral 
outcomes of a similar electoral system. It is needless to say that the 
effective threshold, like the electoral system, affects parliamentary 
disproportionality and the ENPP. 
Electoral threshold is an important institutional choice in designing the 
democratic model. Regarding the selection of a legal threshold or the 
institutional elements that form the implicit threshold (i.e. number of 
seats and district magnitude), I argue again that societal culture matters. 
Theoretically, one can expect a negative association between teamwork 
spirit and the effective threshold. A higher threshold decreases the 
number of small parties in the parliament and makes coalition forming 
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easier. It is expected that societies showing a strong culture of 
collaborativeness will be more open to work with many political parties.  
To examine this assertion, I utilize the empirical data for measuring 
electoral thresholds in countries having PR or mixed systems. Using the 
electoral system database by Johnson & Wallack (2012) and the database 
of political institution (Beck et al., 2001), I gathered countries’ average 
district magnitude and calculated the effective threshold for 80 electoral 
democracies in 2005. In responding to skewness of large values, I use the 
logarithmic scale of the electoral threshold.  
As seen in Figure 8.9, after excluding Namibia as an outlier, there is a 
significant correlation of -0.40 (N=37, p<0.05) between the logged 
effective threshold and GLOBE’s institutional collectivism. Considering 
only countries with PR systems, this correlation would be much stronger 
(-0.56, N=25, p<0.005).  
 
 
Figure 8.9. The relation between collaborativeness and effective threshold 
 
We can also theoretically argue that future orientation is another 
cultural dimension that may affect the electoral threshold. Lower 
threshold leads to a higher number of parties in parliament. In a 
parliamentary system, a higher number of parties prolongs the process of 
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cabinet forming and makes building consensus slower and longer. Thus, 
it is plausible that short-term-oriented societies (i.e. low future-oriented 
cultures) prefer to control increases in the number of parties by increasing 
the electoral threshold.  
On the other hand, a high threshold may lead to exclusion of some 
minority groups who cannot have a representative in the parliament. This 
can be detrimental to democratic consolidation in the long run and makes 
some group of people apathetic to the political system. A lower threshold 
that can effectively guarantee the representation of different groups and 
minorities may weaken the power of large parties in the short run, but it 
makes a political system more inclusive. A future-oriented mentality, for 
its part, prefers the advantage of the latter to the disadvantage of the 
former. Therefore, we can predict that future orientation and electoral 
threshold will be negatively associated. Empirical evidence supports this 
assertion. As seen in Figure 8.10, the effective threshold and GLOBE’s 
future orientation have a significant correlation of -0.55 (N=37, p<0.001) 
for all cases and -0.59 (N=25, p<0.005) for countries with the PR system 
(again excluding Namibia as an outlier).  
 
 
Figure 8.10. The relation between future orientation and effective threshold 
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8.2.4  Effective Number of Parties in Parliament 
and Government 
Cultural orientations indirectly affect the components of IDD (i.e. 
ENPP, NPG and TEP) through the association they have with 
institutional elements (see Figure 8.1). Societal culture, however, also has 
a direct influence on the effective number of parties and on cabinet 
inclusiveness.  
Above, we observed the indirect impact of mastery orientation on 
parliamentary disproportionality through its influence on the electoral 
system. Here, I assert that mastery orientation would affect the effective 
number of parties as well. As argued before in Chapter 5, in a mastery 
culture, people primarily prefer to vote for parties that have a high chance 
of victory: they are obsessed with being a winner. As a result, smaller 
parties can hardly procure enough votes and survive. This implies that the 
effective number of parties would be negatively associated with mastery 
orientation. Figure 8.11 shows the relation between Schwartz’s mastery 
and the logarithm of the effective number of parliamentary parties 
(LENP). Excluding three outliers (India, Israel and Brazil), there is a 
strong, significant correlation of 0.69 (N=41, p<0.001), which 
corroborates our assertion1.   
The integrative (consensual) model of democracy aims to integrate 
different political attitudes in the process of national governance. When 
there are a variety of political tastes, reaching a satisfying consensus is 
not an easy task unless all actors are open to compromise and patient 
when working in coalitions. Cultural values codetermine the teamwork 
mentality. The cultural dimension of ‘collaborativeness’ represents the 
precedence of group loyalty, group interest and group acceptance beyond 
individual goals. We can also assert that those who are concerned about 
the future will be more open to collaborate with others, which explains 
why the two dimensions of institutional collectivism and future 
orientation are positively and significantly correlated (see Table 2.3 in 
Chapter 2).  
 
                                                      
1. There are two measures for effective number of parties: one is the effective number of 
elective parties (ENEP) which is calculated on the basis of the vote distribution and 
second, effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) which is calculated based on 
the seat distribution (Gallagher & Mitchell, 2005). The electoral disproportionality causes 
a difference between these two. In fact, the ENPP incorporates both ENEP and 
disproportionality in one measure. As it is argued that ENEP and ENPP have a high 
correlation (Lijphart, 1994), I assert that the correlation between mastery and ENPP 
implicitly indicates the association between mastery and ENEP as well. 
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Figure 8.11. The relation between mastery and effective number of 
parliamentary parties 
 
The importance of the consensual culture is felt more in those 
countries that have adopted the PR electoral system. In a ‘winner takes 
all’ system, there is less need for consensus because usually the winner 
alone can form the government. In the PR system, when parties have to 
make a multi-party cabinet, the teamwork spirit will be crucial. Thus, I 
hypothesize that societies with higher collaborativeness (teamwork 
orientation) or higher future orientation will show a stronger inclination 
towards more inclusive cabinets.  
Figure 8.12 demonstrates the relation between GLOBE’s institutional 
collectivism and the LNPG (Logarithm of Number of Parties in 
Government) for 26 countries having a PR system. The general pattern 
confirms the hypothesis. Brazil is the notable outlier. The number of 
parties in its government is much higher than expected in connection to 
relatively low institutional collectivism. However, excluding Brazil, the 
correlation between LNPG and institutional collectivism is 0.48 (N=25, 
p<0.05). On the other side, Denmark and Sweden present high levels of 
teamwork spirit, which is connected to lower than expected cabinet 
inclusiveness. This may be explained by the tradition of having minority 
196 | Institutions Forming the Integrative Dimension of Democracy (IDD) 
 
cabinets, which are more inclusive in practice than formal 
institutionalization suggests.  
 
 
Figure 8.12. The relation between collaborativeness and cabinet inclusiveness 
 
Moreover, The pattern depicted in Figure 8.13 confirms the 
expectation that cultures with higher future orientation lean toward more 
inclusive cabinets. This time, Brazil emerges as a semi-outlier. With and 
without Brazil, the correlation between the two variables is 0.48 (N=26, 
p<0.05) and 0.52 (N=25, p<0.01), respectively. 
In these figures the countries’ regime type is also illustrated. It is 
commonly accepted that in presidential regimes, cabinet formation is less 
dependent on negotiation and accommodation. The situation is different, 
however, in countries like Indonesia, Colombia and Brazil, where 
presidentialism is combined with a PR system. In such countries, multi-
party cabinets are often unavoidable.  
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Figure 8.13. The relation between future orientation and cabinet inclusiveness 
8.3  Institutions Forming the Participative 
Dimension of Democracy (PDD) 
8.3.1  Compulsory Voting 
There are few institutional elements that can affect the participative 
dimension of democracy. Compulsory voting is one of them, as it can 
promote the level of electoral participation. This rule defines voting as an 
obligation of citizens so that they have to participate in the democratic 
process. Compulsory voting decreases the uncertainty of electoral 
participation by forcing people to vote. Thus, we can hypothesize that 
compulsory voting would be more expected and accepted in societies 
with higher uncertainty avoidant culture. Figure 8.14 gives support to this 
assertion and presents the association between Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance and the dummy variable of compulsory voting. The 
Spearman’s correlation between two variables is 0.42 (N=51, p< 0.005). 
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Figure 8.14. The relation between uncertainty avoidance and compulsory voting 
 
 
Figure 8.15. The relation between collaborativeness and compulsory voting 
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On the other hand, we can theorize that compulsory voting would be 
more employed in countries with a lower teamwork orientation. As I will 
discuss later, societies with lower collaborativeness have a weaker 
inclination for electoral and non-electoral participation. Therefore, people 
in these societies need more of a push to participate. Figure 8.15 
corroborates this claim. The Spearman’s correlation between GLOBE’s 
institutional collectivism and the dummy variable of compulsory voting is 
-0.50 (N=46, p<0.001). 
8.3.2  Referendum Provision 
The provision of referendums is an important institutional 
arrangement for promoting direct democracy in a society. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, there are different types of referendums, on different levels 
and with different effectiveness. The provision of this variety of 
referendums varies across different electoral democracies. The 
referendum is known as the crucial element of self-determination in a 
‘voter democracy’. Hendriks (2010, p. 28) notes that “the strength of 
voter democracy lies in citizens’ non-dependence on others for having 
their voices heard and their preferences in public matters counted.” He 
argues that this model of democracy has an affinity with Douglas’s 
cultural type of Individualism. (Douglas’s Individualism indicates the 
combination of low Grid and low Group dimensions and is different from 
the individualism that is used as a cultural dimension. See Chapter 3 for 
more on this). Therefore, I assert that the provision of referendum would 
be higher in societies with strong individualistic and weak power distant 
cultures.  
To examine these assertions, I use the Direct Democracy Index (DDI) 
measured by Fiorino & Ricciuti (2007), which categorizes countries 
based on their institutional and practical possibilities for referendums. 
The Spearman’s correlation between GLOBE’s in-group collectivism and 
DDI, as presented in Figure 8.16, is -0.52 (N=40, p<0.001). Hofstede’s 
individualism also has a strong significant correlation of 0.69 (N=44, 
p<0.001) with DDI. Moreover, Figure 8.17 shows the association 
between DDI and Schwartz’s hierarchy orientation. As seen, there is a 
significant, negative correlation of - 0.41 (N=39, p<0.01) between the 
two variables.  
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Figure 8.16. The relation between collectivism and the referendum provision 
 
 
Figure 8.17. The relation between hierarchy and the referendum provision 
Chapter 8 | 201  
 
8.3.3  Turnout in General Elections 
As argued before, general elections are still the most important locus 
of public participation. There are many factors that explain the variance 
in the level of electoral turnout; and I assert that societal culture could be 
one of them. Indeed, I theorize that individualism is one of the cultural 
orientations that fosters electoral participation, as this cultural element 
incorporates the values of self-reliance, self-expression and self-
determination. These traits encourage individuals to participate in 
elections so that they can have their voices heard.  
Figure 8.18 presents the association between GLOBE’s in-group 
collectivism2 and the average of GEP for 1990-2009. Excluding two 
outliers, namely USA and Switzerland, there is a significant correlation of 
- 0.52 (N=44, p<0.001) between the two variables. Switzerland has a high 
frequency of referendums, which can explain its low level of participation 
in general elections. The United States also has a high number of 
referendums on the local level, which may partly explain the low and 
declining turnout in its legislative elections. As seen in the figure, most of 
the individualistic countries have a higher level of electoral participation 
(more than 60% turnout in average).   
Another cultural trait that may encourage higher participation is future 
orientation, as discussed in Chapter 5. Indeed, as democracy is 
consolidated gradually and in the long run, we can speculate that future-
oriented people are likely to be more convinced that their vote in a 
democratic system will influence the decisions that will be made in the 
future. Therefore, we expect a positive association between future 
orientation and electoral participation.  
Figure 8.19 gives support to this speculation. Excluding Switzerland 
and USA, the correlation between GLOBE’s future orientation and GEP 
is 0.40 (N=44, p<0.01).  
                                                      
2. As argued in Chapter 2, this dimension and Hofstded’s individualism are alternatives 
and virtually exchangeable (with reverse direction). I utilized the GLOBE’s dimension in 
this section since it has been measured more recently.   
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Figure 8.18. The relation between collectivism and electoral turnouts 
 
 
Figure 8.19. The relation between future orientation and electoral turnouts 
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8.3.4  Protest Participation 
Societal culture codetermines the variance in the acceptance and 
popularity of non-electoral (or protest) participation across societies. This 
form of participation is more active, i.e. requires more involvement, than 
electoral participation. However, we can theorize that those cultural 
orientations that encourage people to participate in elections, i.e. 
individualism and future orientation, could also inspire non-electoral 
participation. Figure 8.20 presents the high and significant correlation of -
0.82 (N=46, p<0.001) between NEP and GLOBE’s in-group collectivism.  
 
 
Figure 8.20. The relation between collectivism and non-electoral participation 
 
Excluding two outliers – Malaysia and New Zealand – there is a 
significant correlation of 0.69 (N=44, p<0.001) between NEP and 
GLOBE’s future orientation, as seen in Figure 8.21.  
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Figure 8.22. The relation between hierarchy and non-electoral participation 
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Furthermore, it can be argued that societies with higher power 
distance would be less inclined to challenge authorities through protest 
participation. Indeed, as in these societies the existence of hierarchy is 
perceived as a mechanism for maintaining the order of society, the 
majority might be less involved in protest participation. Thus, we expect 
more non-electoral participation in societies with lower power distance. 
Figure 8.22 gives support to this assertion. The correlation between 
Schwartz’s hierarchy and NEP is -0.42 (N=44, p<0.005). 
8.4  Conclusion 
To sum up, we have observed that there are significant correlations 
between dimensions of societal culture and political institutions of 
democracy. But what do these correlations imply? Why are some 
correlations not strong? How does each institutional element have a 
correlation with several dimensions? These are questions that may arise 
from the associations observed above.  
There are some plausible answers to these questions. First of all, the 
correlations imply that cultural dimensions and institutional choices are 
compatible in a majority of countries, as otherwise no significant 
correlations would emerge. This compatibility could be formed 
organically through the influence of societal culture on the decisions of 
political actors who design the institutional arrangement of a country. 
A weak correlation between an institutional element and cultural 
orientation can be explained in two ways. Firstly, there are also other 
cultural orientation(s) that codetermine that institutional choice. That is, a 
constellation of cultural dimensions, and not a sole dimension, 
codetermines the inclination of a society toward one institutional choice 
or another. Cultural dimensions interact with each other, and their 
integration shapes the political preference of a society. This is why 
several cultural orientations are associated with each institutional 
element. The second explanation is that the institutional choices of some 
countries are not as compatible with their societal culture as they should 
be. This means that some countries might suffer from cultural 
incompatibility; and they are indeed out-of-pattern cases. Given these two 
reasons, it is plausible and expected that in practice some weak 
correlations between cultural orientations and institutional elements 
would be seen.  
Considering these interrelations, and integrating the influence of 
different cultural dimensions on institutional choices, in the next 
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concluding chapter a thesis on the importance of cultural compatibility 
for institutional design will be proposed. 
 
 
Chapter 9  
The Cultural Compatibility Thesis 
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9.1  Introduction 
Culture is a concept attributed to a group of people. It is rightfully 
called the “collective programming of mind” (Hofstede, 2001). It is 
argued that human behavior is regulated by different drives, among which 
personal characteristics and cultural values are two important ones. 
Rational choice theory is usually considered a rival of the cultural theory 
of social behavior; however, in reality these two are not contradictory, but 
complementary. Hofstede’s proposition that ‘nationality defines (or 
constraints) rationality’ (Hofstede et al., 2010, p.340) and Douglas’s 
argument that we have several ‘rational beings, with [several] kinds of 
values’ (Douglas & Ney, 1998, p. 174) refer to the influence of culture on 
rational choice.  
Cultural values codetermine the way people, think, decide and act. 
Collective actions are affected by collective values. We can argue that the 
preferences and behaviors of political actors, both power-holders and 
citizens, are partly regulated by societal culture. Accordingly, the main 
proposition of this study is that the preference for different institutional 
settings in different countries can be explained by the diversity of cultural 
orientations. This assertion has been examined throughout this book. 
Empirical examination of the presence and importance of this 
interrelation is not an easy task that can be accomplished fully in a few 
chapters. What this study tried to do, however, is problematize this 
interrelation and involve the dimensions of culture into the discussion on 
democracy, political institutions and comparative politics. This book 
started the study of this interrelation at the national level, as this is the 
main locus of representative democracy in practice and real politics.  
In the previous chapters, we tried first to identify the dimensions of 
national culture through a critical assessment and systematic comparison 
and clustering of different theories and measurements of culture 
(Chapters 2 and 3). Then, we operationalized the two dimensions of 
democracy – contestation and participation – using indicators pertinent to 
each dimension (Chapter 4). Next, the relation between dimensions of 
culture and democracy was examined (Chapter 5). The importance and 
implication of the interaction between cultural values and democratic 
models were presented in the chapters that followed. This was done by 
examining the moderation effect of societal culture on the relation 
between models of democracy and democratic satisfaction in developing 
democracies (Chapter 6). The effect of national culture on the practice of 
participatory democracy has been studied by using the framework 
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developed in Chapter 7. Finally, we discussed the relation between 
cultural orientations and institutional elements, which shape the 
components and dimensions of democratic models (Chapter 8).  
In this concluding chapter, I make an effort to develop a framework to 
describe how different cultural dimensions connect to political 
institutions. In a prescriptive application, the framework can advise which 
institutional elements should be adopted or adapted when designing a 
democratic model for a specific context. The framework will lead us to 
establish the Cultural Compatibility Thesis, which explains why different 
countries opt for different democratic political institutions and how the 
compatibility between formal institutions and informal institutions (i.e. 
societal culture) would matter for the workability of democracy.  
To this aim, four major institutional choices that are crucial in shaping 
the dimensions and models of democracy in action are examined. The 
affinities between the cultural orientations and each of these institutional 
choices, as demonstrated and discussed in the previous chapter, are listed 
in Table 9.1.  
 
Table 9.1. Institutional choices and corresponding compatible cultural 
orientations 
Presidential	   Regime	  Type	   Parliamentary	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Individualism	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	  
High	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Traditionalism(Monumentalism)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Low	  
High	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Power	  distance(Hierarchy)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Low	  
High	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Uncertainty	  avoidance	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Low	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Future	  orientation	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Collaborativeness	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	  
Majority/plurality	   Electoral	  System	   PR	  
High	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Mastery	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Low	  
High	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Power	  distance(Hierarchy)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Low	  
High	  threshold	   Electoral	  Threshold	   Low	  threshold	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Collaborativeness	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Future	  orientation	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	  
Compulsory	   Compulsory	  Voting	   Non-­‐compulsory	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Collaborativeness	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	  
High	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Uncertainty	  avoidance	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Low	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Individualism	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	  
Low	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  Future	  orientation	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  High	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9.2  Towards the Cultural Compatibility Thesis 
of Democracy 
Cultural Compatibility Thesis (CCT) asserts that the cultural 
orientations of a society codetermine the opting, adopting and adapting 
political institutions. This thesis suggests that the compatibility of cultural 
orientations with institutional choices matters. As demonstrated in Table 
9.1, each institutional element is associated with several cultural 
orientations. I hypothesize that the integration and interaction of these 
cultural orientations can present a viable range of institutional choices for 
each country. Accordingly, I problematize whether or not the institutional 
choices adopted in a democratic country are culturally compatible with 
that society, and if not, what the consequences of these incompatibilities 
would be. Moreover, we can also investigate the changes in institutional 
elements across democratic countries and evaluate to what extent these 
changes have been congruent with the expected direction suggested by 
the cultural compatibility thesis.  
CCT theorizes that countries having many culturally incompatible 
institutional elements should exhibit some credibility or functionality 
challenges with their model of democracy. Also, it is expected that these 
countries have reformed or shown a tendency to reform their institutional 
elements over the past years. In the following, I will examine the CCT for 
the four abovementioned institutional choices, namely regime type, 
electoral system, electoral threshold and compulsory voting. 
Aggregating the scores of relevant cultural orientations presented in 
Table 9.1, I extract a “Culturally Compatible Score” for each institutional 
element of democracy. The scores of all the cultural orientations (as given 
in Table E.1 in Appendix E) are rescaled to the corresponding range of 
each institutional element. For instance, the six cultural orientations 
associated with regime type are rescaled to the range between zero and 
four to make their cultural scores comparable with the four ordinal types 
of regimes (from full parliamentary to full presidential). The scores of the 
cultural dimensions are also reversed whenever required. Then, the 
rescaled scores of the cultural orientations are averaged, and the 
Culturally Compatible Score (CCS) extracted. The CCS is only calculated 
for countries that have cultural scores for the adequate number of 
dimensions, as otherwise the CCS is not sufficiently reliable. Having the 
calculated CCS and the real score of the institutional element for the 
corresponding countries, the cultural compatibility plot is drawn for each 
institutional element, as elaborated below.  
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9.2.1  Culturally Compatible Score for Regime Type 
Rescaling (to a range of 0 to 4), reversing (as needed for the cultural 
dimensions of traditionalism, hierarchy and uncertainty avoidance) and 
averaging the scores of the six relevant cultural orientations (as indicated 
in Table 9.1), the Culturally Compatible Score of regime type (hereafter 
CCSr) is calculated for 49 electoral democracies, as demonstrated in 
Figure 9.1. GLOBE’s in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism and 
future orientation; Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance; Schwartz’s 
hierarchy and Inglehart’s secular-rational dimensions are used to 
calculate the CCSr. The CCSr is calculated only for the countries that 
have the scores for at least three abovementioned cultural dimensions. 
The gray up-down bars show the difference between the countries’ real 
score of regime type and the plausible, culturally-compatible score for the 
regime type. Assuming that a bar shorter than 0.75 is in an acceptable 
offset range, we can judge to what extent the current regime type of each 
country is congruent with the one predicted by societal culture.  
Figure 9.1 shows that many democratic countries –Switzerland, 
Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, Ireland, Austria, 
Finland, Georgia, Taiwan, France, Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Bolivia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela –have a 
more or less culturally compatible regime type (as their bar size is shorter 
than or around 0.75). Among them, Finland has experienced an 
institutional reform from semi-presidentialism to semi-parliamentarism. 
This change is in accordance with the cultural compatibility thesis.  
On the left side of the figure, we observe some countries with 
parliamentary systems whose societal culture shows tendencies towards 
semi-presidentialism. Two conspicuous cases are Turkey and Thailand. 
This is striking in that Turkey recently held its first direct presidential 
election and already transformed to semi-parliamentary system after the 
constitutional reform in 2012. The elected president, Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, had announced before the election that he would try to reform 
the constitution to a (semi) presidential system if he is victorious (Chugh 
& Krueger, 2013). Erdogan’s recent victory can be seen as a public 
referendum that supports the turn to a semi-presidential system. This 
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Thailand is known as a country of coups. Thai democracy has been 
vulnerable and problematic over the past decades. Thailand’s scores of 
collaborativeness and future orientation are low. There is a lasting 
conflict between different parties, including forces supported by the 
monarch (Ebbinghausen, 2013). The cultural compatibility thesis 
suggests that the country should adopt a semi-presidential system that 
could render democracy in the country more stable. In principle, a 
monarchy and a presidential system are mutually exclusive; however 
having an elected prime minister, similar to what was formerly 
experienced in Israel, is an option that resembles the semi-presidential 
system.  
Greece, Hungary, India, Spain, Albania, Italy and Israel are other 
parliamentary states that are culturally inclined to the semi-presidential 
system. Israel experienced a semi-presidential system when it had direct 
elections for the prime minister between 1992 and 2003. This system 
aimed – and practically failed – to make a strong and stable government 
in Israel; and it was debated over by political scholars (Hazan, 1996). 
India and Malaysia have a parliamentary system in theory; but the 
combination of parliamentarism and a majority electoral system, known 
as Westminster model, shapes a political regime shares some common 
features with the presidential system. As seen in the figure, all 
Westminster countries – namely Australia, the UK, New Zealand and 
Canada – are, more or less, culturally deviant from the full parliamentary 
system.   
Southern European parliamentary states – namely Albania, Greece, 
Italy and Spain – have a cultural inclination towards semi-
presidentialism. As demonstrated in the global map of democracy (Figure 
4.4 in Chapter 4), the democratic models of these countries are closer to 
the clusters of countries with a presidential or Westminster model (near 
the upper-left cluster). Moreover, most of these countries have suffered 
from weak and unstable governments over the past years. It can be argued 
that a full parliamentary system, which is less compatible with their 
societal culture, contributes to their political malfunction. Among them, 
Italy has seen public debate over adopting semi-presidentialism. The 
Italian Senate has recently approved a constitutional amendment to 
introduce direct elections of the president (Elgie, 2012b). There is also an 
ongoing debate on the constitutional change to a semi-presidential system 
in Hungary (Balogh, 2014). 
Portugal and Poland reduced the power of the president in 1982 and 
1997, respectively, although they still have a directly-elected president. 
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Thus, according to our criteria, these two are classified as semi-
parliamentary systems although they are still known as semi-presidential 
in the literature. The former utilization of a semi-presidential system in 
these countries lends support to the cultural compatibility thesis. It will be 
interesting to examine how this change and departure from culturally 
compatible regime types in Poland and Portugal has affected their 
political performance and legitimacy.  
On the right side of the figure, the USA and South Korea show a 
strong cultural tendency towards the semi-presidential system. Indonesia, 
Chile, Namibia, Philippines, Zambia and Brazil also show a cultural 
tendency to deviate from absolute presidentialism. The political system of 
the United States is known as a typical model of full presidentialism. 
There are many criticisms about different aspects of this model and its 
democratic deficit (Linz, 1990; Nelson, 2008), as well as its political 
decay (Fukuyama, 2014). On the other hand, American democracy is 
famous for its stability and functionality. This combination makes the US 
political system A Different Democracy (Taylor et al., 2014). 
South Korea is considered as an instance of semi-presidentialism by 
some scholars; as Robert Elgie (2010) argues, “South Korea, 
constitutionally, is on the cusp of semi-presidentialism.” Elgie indicates 
that the debate on the constitutional reform and adopting semi-
presidentialism has been on the Korean political agenda.  
Similar to the way that Westminster parliamentarism bears a 
resemblance to the presidential model, the multiparty presidentialism 
exhibits the feature of cohabitating with the legislature. Brazil, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Chile are presidential states in which multiparty cabinets 
have been formed between 1990 and 2009. That is, the political systems 
of these countries have operated like a semi-presidential system in 
practice. In Chile, two parties, with one being the government, recently 
suggested a proposal for introducing semi-presidentialism (Elgie, 2012a). 
Finally, Figure 9.1 predicts that Namibia, Zambia, and to a lesser 
extent, Ghana, are three African presidential states that show a cultural 
tendency to adopt semi-presidentialism, probably when their new 
democracies are more consolidated. As we will see in the next section, 
Namibia is already using a full PR electoral system that has the capacity 
to develop a multiparty parliament.  
All in all, we can see that there is a match between the regime type in 
operation, or in demand, and the culturally compatible one in many 
countries. This substantiates the cultural compatibility thesis.  
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9.2.2  Culturally Compatible Score for Electoral 
System 
As listed in Table 9.1, two cultural orientations are associated with the 
institutional element of the electoral system. The national scores of 
Schwartz’s mastery and hierarchy are used to calculate the Culturally 
Compatible Score for electoral system (hereafter CCSe). For those 
countries that have scores for both dimensions, the cultural scores are 
rescaled to a range of 0 to 3 and are then reversed and averaged. The 
result is the CCSe for 44 electoral democracies, as seen in Figure 9.2. 
Up-down bars demonstrate the difference between the countries’ 
current electoral system and the culturally compatible one. Assuming that 
a difference more than 0.75 indicates a considerable incompatibility, we 
learn that some countries on each side of the graph have electoral systems 
that are less compatible with their societal culture. The electoral systems 
of 28 democracies are compatible with what the cultural orientations 
predict. Interestingly, we see that over the past two decades, the direction 
of electoral reforms in six countries (Venezuela, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Bolivia, Japan and Italy) have been towards the CCSe.  
On the right side of the graph, we see that among countries having a 
PR system, Namibia, Turkey, Brazil, Israel and Greece, and to a lesser 
extent Bulgaria, Indonesia, Portugal and Poland are culturally compatible 
with the mixed system. Turkey utilized a mixed system before 1995 and 
its electoral change to PR is in contradiction with the compatibility thesis. 
However, Turkey’s high electoral threshold of 10% makes its PR system 
similar to the mixed system. In the case of Namibia, the PR system has 
been transplanted from the South African model. Using the PR model 
does not result in a real multiparty system in Namibia, although this 
allows for small parties to have few and ineffective representatives in the 
parliament. Referring to the cultural incompatibility of the regime type in 
Namibia that was discussed in the previous section, we can argue that 
adopting the PR system has a compensatory effect for the full presidential 
system of the country. This is also applied to Indonesia and Brazil.   
Full PR systems in Brazil and Israel lead to a large number of 
effective parties in parliament. Between 1990 and 2009, the effective 
number of parliamentary parties in Brazil and Israel has been more than 
eight and six, respectively. In Brazil, many parties have to form coalitions 
in order to win the presidential elections as well. Accordingly, oftentimes 
a grand coalition cabinet has to be formed in both countries. It is argued 
that the presence of too many parties in government is detrimental for 
political accountability and stability.   
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Increasing the electoral threshold is another strategy to make the PR 
model more effective and more similar to the mixed system. This will be 
discussed in the next section. The cultural thesis predicts that people in 
societies with a high level of mastery and hierarchy orientations, like 
Brazil and Israel, prefer to have a stronger and decisive government. The 
cultural compatibility thesis predicts that the mixed system might be more 
compatible with the Brazilian and Israeli societies.   
The proportional electoral system of Greece is a complicated one 
which is not a full proportional system. In this system, 50 seats out of 300 
automatically go to the party that receives the plurality of votes. Although 
this system cannot be called a mixed system, it is a system between a PR 
and a majoritarian system (Shugart, 2013). Bulgaria, Portugal and Poland 
have also shown a cultural tendency towards the mixed system. We will 
see in the next section that this inclination is realized in practice through 
implementing a higher level of effective threshold.  
On the left side of the graph, France is a conspicuous case whose 
electoral system is very different from the one predicted by its societal 
culture. There is a long-lasting debate on the electoral system in France. 
The French electoral system was changed five times between 1945 and 
1988. It changed once to a PR system in 1986 by president Mitterrand 
(Criddle, 1992). Moreover, France uses mixed systems in the Senate and 
municipal elections (Massicotte & Blais, 1999). The cultural 
compatibility thesis theorizes that a mixed system, like the German 
model, could be a better match for the electoral system in France, which 
provides room for smaller parties to be accommodated in the parliament.  
As indicated before, countries with a Westminster model combine the 
parliamentary regime with majoritarian electoral system. Culturally 
speaking, these two institutional choices belong to two opposite 
perspectives of democratic governance: while the parliamentary system 
provides room for accommodation and representation, the majority 
electoral system is more favorable to governability and accountability. It 
seems that the combination of these two is compensatory to some extent. 
This can partially explain the cultural incompatibilities of the electoral 
systems in Canada, Australia, Malaysia and the UK, shown in Figure 9.2, 
which are in reverse direction of the cultural incompatibility of their 
regime type, illustrated in Figure 9.1. However, the cultural compatibility 
thesis predicts that these countries may adopt a mixed electoral system in 
future, similar to the electoral reform that New Zealand conducted in 
1996.  
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The cultural compatibility thesis also predicts that the USA, with a 
low power distance culture, has more inclination for a mixed system 
rather than a majority one. A mixed system can expand the highly 
criticized two-party system in the US and allow different and new voices 
to be represented in the congress. The social movements that have 
emerged in recent years in the country (i.e. the Tea Party and Occupy 
movements) have shown that some different voices, beyond the two 
dominant parties, already exist in society. A mixed electoral system may 
accommodate them into the political structure and make the American 
democracy more viable and vibrant. As Lipset (1990, p. 82) argues, “the 
need for disciplined parliamentary parties encourages the transformation 
of political protest, of social movements, of discontent with the dominant 
party in one's region or other aspects of life, into third, fourth, or fifth 
parties.” Moreover, the existing electoral system of the US is also 
highlighted as a cause of the low electoral turnout for legislative 
elections. The issue of electoral reform and adopting a more proportional 
system has been a topic of debate in the recent years (Heuvel, 2008).  
9.2.3  Culturally Compatible Score for Threshold 
The two cultural orientations of collaborativeness and future 
orientation are associated with the effective threshold as presented in 
Table 9.1. Since electoral threshold is intertwined with the electoral 
system of a country, the two cultural dimensions of mastery and hierarchy 
orientations, which affect the choice of electoral system (i.e. mixed or PR 
system), should also be involved in estimating the Culturally Compatible 
Score for threshold (hereafter CCSt). Using cultural scores of GLOBE’s 
institutional collectivism and future orientation and Schwartz’s hierarchy 
and mastery, we apply the same approach of rescaling (to range of 0 to 4), 
reversing (for all four cultural dimensions) and averaging the scores of 
the national dimensions to extract the CCSt. The CCSt is calculated for 
38 electoral democracies with PR or mixed electoral systems that have 
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Figure 9.3 shows the difference between the CCSt and the effective 
threshold of countries. Countries are ordered in the figure based on the 
level of effective threshold in action in 2005. Similar to Figure 9.1 and 
Figure 9.2, here, again, the countries with a larger incompatibility have a 
larger bar. Considering the argument made in section 8.1.3, I use a 
logarithmic scale for the effective threshold. Also, the figure shows the 
former effective threshold of countries with electoral reform and the year 
of change. 
Among countries having a low threshold level, Namibia has the most 
culturally incompatible threshold of 1%. Low collaborativeness, low 
future orientation and high mastery culture can make consensus hard for a 
country with a full PR system if the number of parliamentary parties is 
high. Namibia has not experienced this problem, as its effective number 
of parliamentary parties (ENPP) has been less than two over the past two 
decades. However, the cultural compatibility thesis predicts that Namibia 
should increase the effective threshold if its ENPP increases over time. 
Israel also shows a big gap between its CCSt and the threshold active in 
2005. This gap has been reduced over the past years by increasing the 
threshold. Recently, the new threshold was set to 3.25% (Lis, 2014). The 
Netherlands also has the potential to raise its electoral threshold, but not 
too much. There has been an ongoing debate in Dutch politics on 
electoral reform (Leenknegt & Van der Schyff, 2007); however, societal 
culture in the Netherlands is in favor of inclusiveness and 
accommodation, insofar as a very small party for the animals exists. On 
the other hand, Finland and Sweden have a moderate threshold, but their 
cultural orientations would be matched even with a lower threshold.    
South Korea, Switzerland and Japan have a high electoral threshold, 
but their societal cultures would call for a moderate one. While, in 
accordance with the cultural compatibility prediction, Japan’s electoral 
reform in 1996 decreased the effective threshold, South Korea increased 
its effective threshold after its electoral reform. It is striking that among 
the 16 countries that have experienced a change in their effective 
threshold after 1990, changes in only three of the countries (i.e. 
Venezuela, Philippines and South Korea) have not been in accordance 
with the cultural compatibility thesis. That is, in other countries the 
direction of change has been towards the CCSt.  
There are some countries on the left side of the graph with a very high 
threshold whose cultural orientations demand a lower threshold level. 
Ireland, the Philippines, Italy and Venezuela had very high effective 
thresholds in 2005 – much higher than their societal cultures would 
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suggests. As shown in Figure 9.3, the effective thresholds in Venezuela, 
Italy and the Philippines were more compatible with their cultural 
orientations before they made the changes. Italy changed back to its 
former threshold again in 2006, thus satisfying the cultural compatibility 
thesis. In the case of Venezuela, the remarkable increase in the electoral 
threshold over the past years has pushed the country’s electoral system to 
a semi-majoritarian one. It has been claimed that the political leaders of 
Venezuela have manipulated the electoral system to exclude their 
opponents from power (Carroll, 2010).  
All in all, the cultural compatibility thesis can satisfactorily explain 
the adoption and adaptation of the effective threshold in a number of 
electoral democracies studied here. The thesis can also raise alarm about 
institutional incompatibility seen in some countries and propose a 
plausible institutional reform regarding the effective threshold.  
9.2.4  Culturally Compatible Score for Compulsory 
Voting  
As summarized in Table 9.1, four cultural orientations affect the 
participatory behavior of people in elections. Aggregating the interaction 
of these cultural orientations would generate the Culturally Compatible 
Score for compulsory voting (hereafter CCSc). The CCSc predicts which 
countries may (or not) need to adopt compulsory voting in order to 
promote public participation.   
Assuming zero for non-compulsory and one for compulsory voting, I 
rescale scores of four cultural dimensions – namely GLOBE’s in-group 
collectivism, institutional collectivism (reversed), future orientation 
(reversed) and Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance – to the range of zero to 
one. The average of the rescaled scores generates the CCSc as 
demonstrated in Figure 9.4. The CCSc is calculated for 46 electoral 
democracies that have cultural scores for at least three of the 
abovementioned dimensions. The cultural compatibility thesis asserts that 
the country’s CCSc position on each part of the graph (up or down) 
indicates whether compulsory or non-compulsory voting would be more 
compatible with the societal culture of the country. That is, countries 
having the CCSc on the upper side (higher than 0.5) might need to adopt 
compulsory voting to enhance their electoral participation, while 
countries with the CCSc positioned on the lower side (less than 0.5) need 
not adopt compulsory voting. To examine the credibility of this assertion, 
the average of electoral turnouts between 1990 and 2009 of each country 
is presented on the graph (black triangles).  
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It is very interesting that all countries using compulsory voting except 
Australia, shown on the left side of the graph, are culturally compatible 
with compulsory voting. Considering 60% as the cutoff for acceptable 
level of electoral participation, we see that all countries with compulsory 
voting, except Mexico, have a satisfactory level of participation. For the 
case of Mexico, it is argued that the country does not enforce compulsory 
voting in practice and voting is only required as a civil duty 
(Panagopoulos, 2008). 
Among countries without compulsory voting and with a low CCSc, 
Switzerland, USA and Canada have electoral turnouts lower than 60%. 
Switzerland is an exception because of its referendum tradition; and 
Canada has an average turnout close to the threshold. The low level of 
turnouts in the U.S., however, is considerable. As I mentioned before, the 
institutional context including its majority electoral rule, which leads to a 
two-party system, is seen as a reason for the low participation in the U.S. 
(Powell, 1986).  
Malaysia has an average turnout of 56%, and its CCSc is only a bit 
lower from the border. India is also on the brink, with an average turnout 
of 58%. Considering the population and the level of education in India, 
this level of participation is satisfactory.  
Among countries whose CCSc indicates an inclination for compulsory 
voting, Indonesia, Taiwan, Albania, Namibia, Slovenia and Spain have 
high average turnouts. High turnout in Indonesia could be related to the 
popularity of initial elections during the transition to democracy, and this 
might decrease over time. This phenomenon was seen in some post-
communist democracies, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania 
and Slovenia. In Albania and Slovenia, after high participation (more than 
80%) in the first elections in the 1990s, in the 2000s, the average electoral 
turnout of the two countries dropped to 51% and 61%, respectively. Thus, 
adopting compulsory voting for new democracies some years after of 
transition could be of help in consolidating the culture of participation.  
Spain is an amazing case, as it has consistently had high turnout 
without compulsory voting, despite that its CCSc would suggest the use 
of compulsory voting. Namibia is again an interesting, exceptional case. 
Turnouts in the Philippines, France and Portugal are only a bit higher 
than 60%, while their CCSc suggests the use of compulsory voting.  
Eight countries with a high CCSc – Guatemala, Georgia, Hungary, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela, Poland and Zambia – present 
electoral turnouts lower than 55%. Their CCSc suggests that using 
compulsory voting could be an institutional choice for enhancing 
224 | Towards the Cultural Compatibility Thesis of Democracy 
 
electoral participation. Interestingly, Venezuela used compulsory voting 
until recently. It is indicated that Venezuela experienced a drop of 30% in 
turnout once the requirement was removed in 1993 (Frankal, 2005).  
All in all, the cultural compatibility thesis also shows promising 
explanations and predictions about the institutional element of 
compulsory voting. 
9.2.5  Assessing the Cultural Compatibility Thesis 
in New and Fragile Democracies 
The cultural compatibility thesis suggests that in the initial phases of 
transition to democracy, taking into account the societal culture in 
designing a proper model of democracy is equally important as involving 
other socio-economic factors. The idea of using a power-sharing model in 
countries with a divided and heterogeneous society is very popular and 
widely recommended (Cho, 2010; Doorenspleet & Pellikaan, 2013), but 
the cultural compatibility thesis is hesitant about transplanting the 
institutional arrangements of a consociational model (Lijphart, 1969) in a 
country whose cultural and situational factors are less compatible with 
that model. Political accommodation of different groups in a 
fractionalized society is crucial; however, it should not occur at the 
expense of the stability of the country in a new, fragile democracy. 
Transplanting only integrative-oriented institutions in a country that is 
culturally more favorable to competition than to compromise might bring 
about a free-for-all instead of a consociational system. Thus, in such a 
society, a hybrid system of power sharing that integrates both inclusive 
and decisive elements might work better and receive more credibility. An 
example of this system is seen in Benin as a relatively successful and 
stable new democracy in West Africa.  
In her book Driving Democracy, Pippa Norris (2008) presents an 
interesting comparison between two African countries, Togo and Benin, 
and argues how the different institutional arrangements of the two 
countries led to survival of democracy in the latter and failure of 
democracy in the former. This thought-provoking analysis convincingly 
demonstrates the importance of institutional arrangement for the 
sustainability of the democratic system; however, in my estimation this 
analysis needs to be complemented with a cultural compatibility analysis. 
Using the majoritarian electoral system in Togo could be a reason for its 
electoral autocracy; however, its neighbor to the left, Ghana, has 
experienced a working electoral democracy while using the majoritarian 
electoral system similar to Togo’s. Furthermore, Benin’s experience of 
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having both a presidential regime and a PR electoral system disqualifies 
the orthodox interpretation of the power-sharing model, in which only the 
parliamentary regime is endorsed and the presidential system is 
discredited.   
To examine the explanatory power of the cultural compatibility thesis 
when it comes to the success or failure of democratic structures in new 
and fragile democracies, in the following, I provisionally study and 
compare some new and transitional electoral democracies, most of which 
are majority Muslim countries that have experienced internal or external 
conflicts. 
Although measures of societal culture are not available for many new 
democracies, cultural scores for Bosnia, Iraq, Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan 
and Senegal have been measured and reported in Hofstede et al. (2010) 
and in complementary databases of Schwartz (provided in a personal 
communication). After rescaling, I use countries’ scores of Hofstede’s 
masculinity and Schwartz’ mastery interchangeably in case of lacking 
scores for mastery (this is justifiable when referring to the clusters of 
dimensions introduced in Chapter 2). The same is done for Hofstede’s 
power distance and Schwartz’s hierarchy. Relevant GLOBE’s dimensions 
and Inglehart’s score of the secular-rational dimension are also used if 
available. Rescaling and averaging relevant cultural scores (according to 
Table 9.1), I calculated the culturally compatible scores for regime type 
and electoral system (i.e. CCSr and CCSe). Figure 9.5 shows the 
incompatibility bars of the regime type for these six countries.  
 
 
Figure 9.5. Cultural compatibility for regime type in six new/transitional 
democracies 
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The cultural compatibility thesis predicts that adoption of the 
parliamentary regime in Iraq and Pakistan is not compatible with the 
societal cultures of these societies. These societies show an inclination 
toward semi-presidentialism. On the other hand, Nigeria, with a 
presidential system, also has an inclination toward semi-presidentialism. 
Bosnia, Ghana and Senegal present a higher compatibility between their 
societal cultures and their regime types.  
 
 
Figure 9.6. Cultural compatibility for electoral system in six new/transitional 
democracies 
 
Figure 9.6 demonstrates the culturally compatible score for the 
electoral system in these countries. Iraq’s electoral system seems the most 
incompatible. Using a full PR system could be problematic in a country 
with a high power distance and strong mastery culture. The institutional 
setting in Iraq has been designed to make an inclusive political structure, 
but the large number of parties, weak consensual culture and strong 
monumentality lead to a very fragile and weak political system. In 2010, 
the government was formed nine months after the election (Aljazeera, 
2010). This can partly explain why just a while after the Iraqi 
parliamentary election in 2014, the militias of ISIS used the power 
vacuum and seized a large part of the country in a few weeks. The model 
of democracy in Iraq was designed very similarly to the Belgian model. It 
seems that it has many institutional elements of a consociational 
democracy; but the question is whether this democratic model is the most 
proper and most compatible with Iraq’s context. When it took 589 days 
until a government could be formed in Belgium (Greene, 2011), what can 
we expect from Iraq’s new and fragile democracy?   
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Furthermore, the cultural compatibility thesis proposes using a mixed 
system in Pakistan and Nigeria. Other countries have more or less 
compatible electoral systems. All in all, it seems that the institutional 
settings in Ghana, Senegal and Bosnia are compatible with the countries’ 
societal culture. On the contrary, Iraq, Pakistan and Nigeria show lower 
cultural compatibility.  
We employ some performance indicators to assess the functionality of 
democratic systems in these countries and examine how cultural 
compatibility and political stability are connected. We use the indicators 
of ‘political and social integration’1 and ‘democracy status’ from the 
well-known Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which provides 
evaluations with quantitative scores for the performance of 129 
developing and transition countries (BTI, 2014a). We also employ the 
index of political stability by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2012).  
As seen in Figure 9.7, a meaningful connection between cultural 
incompatibility and the performance indicators is observed: countries 
with a higher cultural compatibility, namely Ghana, Senegal and Bosnia, 
have a higher BTI’s democracy status as well as higher political and 
social integration. As the cultural compatibility thesis predicts, Iraq 
shows the lowest political and social integration.  
 
 
Figure 9.7. BTI indexes for six new/transitional democracies    
 
Figure 9.8 presents the political instability scores (reversed scores of 
World Bank’s political stability indicator for 2010) for seven countries. 
                                                      
1. This index measures whether “stable patterns of representation exist for mediating 
between society and the state” (BTI, 2014b). 
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Again, countries with higher cultural compatibility have a higher level of 
political stability. These findings again lend support to the cultural 
compatibility thesis. According to the thesis, developing institutional 
compatibility might be helpful for making a more stable democratic 
system in countries in transition. The robustness of the thesis could be 
examined if the suggested institutional reform were realized in countries 
like Iraq and Pakistan, and the consequences then evaluated.   
 
 
Figure 9.8. Word Bank index of political stability (reversed) for six 
new/transitional democracies 
9.3  Implications of the Cultural Compatibility 
Thesis 
Why do we have different models of democracy in different countries? 
This has been one of the key questions of this study. The discussions 
throughout the book have put forth a cultural explanation for this 
question. Based on what we found regarding the relation between 
dimensions of societal culture and elements of democratic institutions, 
one can assert that the emergence of various models of democracy and 
their survival and workability in different countries are not contingent. 
The cultural compatibility thesis developed in this chapter asserts that the 
compatibility of societal culture and institutional settings matters in 
designing democratic institutions in new democracies as well as in 
reforming institutions in established democracies. This study proposes 
that the ignorance of societal culture in the process of tailoring a 
democratic model for a new democracy can result in a much too tight or 
too loose democratic dress that would not fit the country.  
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The cultural compatibility thesis suggests that the transplantation of 
democratic institutions could be less problematic and more successful if 
the cultural difference between host and donor countries is low. That is, 
transplanting a democratic model from a country with a similar societal 
culture to a new democracy is more likely to be successful due to ‘the 
goodness of fit’ principle (De Jong et al., 2002). However, this does not 
mean that the cultural compatibility alone will guarantee the effectiveness 
of the adopted institutions. This would be, indeed, a sine qua non but not 
per se adequate. 
Needless to say that there are many factors that play a role in the 
formation and success of democratic political institutions in the country. 
Societal culture is one of the important, but less studied, contextual 
factors that affects the credibility and workability of a democratic model. 
This means that transplanting a so-called ‘best practice’ of democratic 
institutions into a country without considering the compatibility with the 
cultural orientations of that society might bring about a nonfunctional 
democracy. Thus, the mentality of adopting a best model should be 
replaced with the attitude of finding the most compatible model.  
The cultural compatibility thesis proposes that a constellation of 
cultural orientations predicts what arrangement of democratic institutions 
could better match to the societal characteristics of a country. The cultural 
compatibility thesis assumes that the cultural orientations (discussed in 
this study) are essentially neither good nor bad, but that they are different. 
The thesis presumes that the principle of democracy is consonant with 
different cultural orientations, but some cultural orientations might be 
mutually incompatible with a specific model of democracy. It should be 
emphasized that when we talk about cultural orientations in this study, we 
suppose that in principle none of the dimensions of societal culture 
should be interpreted in a way that justifies any violation of basic human 
rights and democratic principles. An unenlightened and authoritarian 
interpretation of cultural orientation has nothing to do with the cultural 
compatibility thesis. Interpreting a culture with high power distance, for 
instance, as a despotism-friendly culture is a grave misunderstanding of 
that cultural orientation. India and France have a very high and a 
relatively high power distant culture respectively, but both have old 
democratic systems as well.  
Gone is the time when some political scientists were convinced that 
democracy could only take root in countries with some specific cultural 
orientations. The classic argument by Weber (2001[1930]) about the 
connections between Protestantism and capitalism has been interpreted as 
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claiming that democracy could only be feasible in Protestant countries. 
Lipset (1994) emphasized the role of individualism as a core value, as 
well as the importance of the British colonization heritage, for 
establishing democracy. He argued that “almost all of the postwar new 
nations that have become enduring democracies are former British 
colonies, as are various others, such as Nigeria and Pakistan, which 
maintained competitive electoral institutions for briefer periods. Almost 
none of the former Belgian, Dutch, French, Portuguese, or Spanish 
colonies have comparable records” (Lipset, 1990). Huntington (1991) 
was very skeptical as to whether a democratic system could be feasible in 
any Islamic countries. All of these ideas have been challenged or even 
rejected over time. 
Nevertheless, the different cultural orientations have consequences for 
democratic practices. As presented and discussed previously, societies 
with higher future orientation, for instance, present higher political 
participation. Politicians in societies with high collaborativeness may 
cooperate and reach consensus easier and in a more sustainable manner. 
These cultural values do facilitate some practices of the democratic 
process, but a democratic system can still survive in countries with a 
lower level of these cultural attributes. Hence, the cultural compatibility 
thesis may help institutional designers learn of the vulnerabilities of a 
society regarding different aspects of democratic practices. As illustrated 
above, the specific constellation of four cultural orientations, for instance, 
could result in a weaker tendency toward electoral participation, which in 
turn endangers democratic consolidation. Therefore, a compensatory 
institution, i.e. compulsory voting, could be introduced to promote 
electoral turnout.  
The notion of compatibility does not mean that institutional 
arrangements should be adjusted to societal culture even if those cultural 
orientations are less favorable for a functional democracy. On the 
contrary, the thesis suggests that if a specific cultural orientation hampers 
the democratic consolidation, a proper institutional arrangement can still 
be effectively designed if the positive and negative impacts of that 
societal culture are understood and taken into account. For instance, Licht 
et al. (2007) argue that individualist nations respect the rule of law more 
and that this cultural orientation is more compatible with “good 
governance.” This proposition can be interpreted in various ways. Some 
scholars may conclude from this that no effective democracy can emerge 
in collectivist cultures. Others, including the author of this book, may 
conclude that we should consider social attitudes and behaviors attached 
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to collectivist culture when designing the institutional settings for such a 
society. That is, if there is a risk that in a collectivist culture preserving 
the relationship outvalues preserving the law, then institutions should be 
designed in a way that can protect the rule of law while also being 
considerate of relational ties. This is surely not an easy task; and often a 
trade-off between these two is inevitable. However, the cultural 
compatibility thesis suggests that in a collectivist culture, the 
transplantation of political institutions from an individualistic society 
could be problematic and nonfunctional. Moreover, the thesis suggests 
that more controlling measures and mechanisms are required for 
enforcing the rule of law in such societies.  
All in all, the cultural compatibility thesis provides some promising 
explanations for the diversity of democratic models and institutional 
settings. It may also be used to predict and propose a set of institutional 
choices that may be more compatible with the cultural context of a 
society. The cultural compatibility thesis posits that involving societal 
culture in the process of opting, adopting and adapting political 
institutions is necessary, though not sufficient.  
9.4  Plausible Challenges against the Cultural 
Compatibility Thesis 
The cultural compatibility thesis might receive many questions and 
challenges, just as any other theory in social science. In this section, I 
attempt to briefly address some of the plausible challenges as well as 
indicate how the thesis deals with these questions. 
9.4.1  The Challenge of Naivety 
Is it not naive to assume that cultural compatibility is a solution for 
institutional arrangement and can bring about a workable and legitimate 
democratic model?  
The cultural compatibility thesis does not at all claim that considering 
cultural compatibility when designing institutional arrangements would 
necessarily bring about a workable and sustainable democracy. Rather, it 
asserts that the compatibility between political institutions and societal 
culture can serve as a lubricant that decreases the stiction in the political 
mechanism. Without it, the system would work with more friction, which 
increases the danger of political collapse. However, as I emphasized 
before, the societal culture is one factor, along with many others, that 
should be taken into account. In new democracies and in the phase of 
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transition, this factor can play a crucial role in the acceptability and 
consolidation of democratic system.  
9.4.2  The Challenge of the Vicious Circle  
Is it wise to design a political system in accordance with some cultural 
orientations that are less beneficial for some aspects of the democratic 
process? How could a model of democracy that leaves more room for 
competition and less for cooperation help promote the culture of 
collaborativeness in a country lacking this cultural value? Can the 
adoption of competitive-oriented institutions, for instance, create a 
vicious circle of weakening the cultural value of collaborativeness? 
These are crucial questions. The answer of the cultural compatibility 
thesis is that the adopted institutional setting should be in affinity with the 
cultural orientation of a society in order to sustain the democratic process. 
Democracy is a learning-by-doing process. Teamwork and consensus 
making would be developed in a sustainable democratic practice. 
Imposing the integrative-oriented institutions could not per se enhance 
the process of consensus building. Adopting the full proportional system, 
for instance, might result in a multi-party system, but it does not 
necessarily bring about a successful coalition of parties in a country that 
has a low level of collaborativeness or a high level of mastery orientation.  
Adopting an incompatible institutional arrangement might lead to a 
vicious circle of dissatisfaction. This can destabilize democratic transition 
and encourage the authoritarian solutions or recurring revolution. A 
collaborative culture can be promoted if the compatible democratic 
system is established first in a new democracy; and then more integrative-
elements can be gradually introduced and developed in the political 
system of the country as well.      
The cultural compatibility thesis can help institutional designers and 
reformers assess which cultural orientations of a society can be employed 
to mediate the challenges that arise from other cultural values of society. 
For instance, a charismatic leader in a high monumentalist culture can be 
instrumental in encouraging people to take part in a collective behavior 
that might be less preferred in the society. This was the very mechanism 
that helped Nelson Mandela persuade angry South Africans to accept the 
power-sharing mechanism for their democratic system after the fall of the 
brutal apartheid regime.   
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9.4.3  The Challenge of Cultural Stability and 
Institutional Reform 
How can the cultural compatibility thesis suggest and justify 
institutional reform if the cultural orientation of a society is presumably 
stable?  
The cultural compatibility thesis has a descriptive and prescriptive 
application. In its descriptive mission, it explains how the model of 
democracy in a country is congruent with the national culture. Cultural 
compatibility can also partly explain why different models could be 
legitimate and functional in different contexts.  
In its prescriptive application, the thesis can provide some hints and 
guidelines for institutional design in new democracies and institutional 
reform in developing or established democracies. The thesis can warn 
institutional designers about the consequences of changes that are 
incompatible with the societal culture. The cultural compatibility thesis 
proposes that institutional reform be in accordance with the dynamism of 
cultural values. There is a constant and active interaction between 
political institutions and societal culture. Cultural values do change, 
though gradually and slowly. Accordingly, institutional reform might be 
required. Institutional reform is also needed to facilitate changes in 
political attitudes. This cultural dynamism is not only due to the change 
of cultural values per se, but can also be the result of the interaction 
between cultural orientations within a society, as briefly discussed in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.5).  
Some cultural orientations might be dormant and less motivating in 
one period and then be more influential and determinant at another 
moment or occasion. This makes for a cultural dynamism, which 
encourages institutional adaptation. For instance, during a transitional 
period after the fall of authoritarian regime, people might be very 
participative in initial democratic elections, despite the fact that the 
societal culture might be less participation-friendly (i.e. low future 
orientation and high uncertainty avoidance). But as time passes, dormant 
cultural orientations can become more active and might discourage 
political participation. Thus, institutional reform and the adoption of 
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9.4.4  The Challenge of the Viability of Institutional 
Arrangements 
Are all combinations of institutional elements viable? What if the 
cultural orientations of society encourage a nonviable model of 
democracy? 
The combination of different institutional elements will shape a 
variety of institutional arrangements and democratic patterns. Although 
there are many institutional elements, two major institutional choices 
determine the formal pattern of democratic institutions: parliamentary vs. 
presidential regime type and majoritarian vs. proportional electoral 
system. These two are bipolar dimensions that are neither fully dependent 
nor fully orthogonal. The combination of these two axes makes a 
diversity of institutional arrangements. This diversity is expected and 
accepted so long as there is a diversity of societal culture and socio-
economic factors. However, the viability of different democratic models 
is an interesting question to be investigated.  
The cultural compatibility thesis posits that different institutional 
settings might be viable in different societal context. Nevertheless, we 
can argue that some combinations of institutional elements are harmful 
for the sustainability of a democratic system. For instance, the 
combination of a majoritarian electoral system and full presidentialism 
with a weak parliament is prone to creating an excluding, paternalistic 
form of government. This political system may seem decisive, but it is 
less checked and balanced by the parliament and opposition parties. Some 
new African democracies, namely Mali, Zambia and Tanzania, have 
practiced this model of democracy. These countries have experienced 
fluctuations and counter-democratic times over the past years, whereas 
other countries with a similar electoral system and presidential regime, 
namely Ghana and Botswana, have experienced more stable democratic 
systems because the role and power of the parliament is more significant 
in these countries (see Fish & Kroenig (2009) for the parliamentary 
powers index of these countries). We can tentatively conclude that the 
combination of a full majoritarian electoral system with a strong president 
and a very weak parliament might be not a viable and sustainable model 
of democracy even if the societal culture of a country seems compatible 
with this institutional system. The viability of different institutional 
arrangements can be an independent subject for further research.  
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9.4.5  The Challenge of the Trade-off between 
Representation and Effectiveness  
How does the cultural compatibility thesis address the dichotomy 
between representation and performance in designing the institutional 
arrangement? Does the thesis make any contributions to the debate on the 
superiority of one over the other?  
One of the main debates in the comparative study of institutional 
design is concerns the famous dichotomy of representation vs. 
effectiveness (or accountability) (Carey & Hix, 2011; Lijphart, 1999; 
Powell, 2000). It is widely accepted that a more proportional electoral 
system, in particular in a parliamentary regime, causes ‘inclusiveness’ 
and consequently ‘consensus’, while adoption of a majoritarian electoral 
system and presidential regime would be better for ‘decisiveness,’ and 
consequently ‘effectiveness’. There is a subtle point here that 
inclusiveness per se does not lead to political consensus, and that 
decisiveness does not necessarily bring about effectiveness. We can argue 
that ‘inclusiveness’ without ‘consensus,’ and ‘decisiveness’ without 
‘effectiveness,’ are neither desired nor helpful. The cultural compatibility 
thesis asserts that the compatibility between institutional arrangement and 
societal culture is crucial for breeding consensus from inclusiveness and 
effectiveness from decisiveness. The thesis suggests that too much 
representation in a low collaborative and high competitive culture can 
lead to a mess rather than consensus. On the other hand, a majoritarian, 
decisive-oriented institution in a country with high expectations of 
inclusiveness would lead to tensions and dissatisfaction instead of 
accountability and performance.  
9.4.6  The Challenge of Divided Societies 
What solution does the cultural compatibility thesis suggest for the 
challenge of accommodation in those divided societies whose cultural 
orientations are less collaborative and consensual?  
The plausible answer to this challenge is that the institutional setting 
of a country should be a combination of institutional elements that can 
satisfy both social and cultural factors. That is, in divided societies with a 
weak collaborative and a strong mastery-oriented culture, a democratic 
model should be adopted that can satisfy both decisiveness and 
inclusiveness. For instance, we can think of a model in which the 
parliament accommodates the feature of inclusiveness and a directly 
elected president fulfills the attribute of decisiveness. That is, the 
electoral system of parliament should be designed to accommodate 
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different groups and ethnicities through giving them the power to 
influence the decisions of the government, whereas the presidential 
regime type could facilitate the formation of a strong and decisive 
government and maintain the unity of the country. The cultural 
compatibility thesis suggests that the adoption of a full proportional 
parliamentary system in a divided society with a weak culture of 
collaborativeness could make a free-for-all situation for different parties, 
leading to an indecisive, vulnerable political structure, even though it 
might also realize inclusiveness. 
 
These are six plausible challenges that may be raised and that I have 
tried to reflect upon. There is no doubt that more challenges and 
questions may turn up regarding the cultural compatibility thesis, as it is a 
new, developing theory. This study tries to problematize the interrelation 
between societal culture and democratic institutions and makes the first 
step in examining this interrelation in practice. And, like any other 
empirical study in the social sciences, this study has its limitations, which 
should be addressed and improved upon in further works.    
9.5  Limitations of the Study and Next Steps  
This study is the first step of a longer march. This work has its own 
limitations that need to be improved in a further research. The relation 
between patterns of culture and models of democracy should be 
elaborated with more theoretical and empirical developments. The two 
concepts of societal culture and democratic models have many underlying 
components that should be recognized, operationalized and studied. 
Understanding the interrelation between these two modes of institutions, 
i.e. formal and informal institutions, and the implications of the 
interaction between them can be considered a theme of research in cross-
cultural comparative politics. In the following, I list some limitations of 
this work and propose some complementary studies that should be 
conducted to consolidate the findings of this study and enhance the 
cultural compatibility thesis.  
 
1- A systematic measurement of societal culture for a wider range of 
countries is a must for improving the cross-cultural study of democracy. 
That is, the measurement of culture should be expanded; several cultural 
orientations should be (re)measured systematically using the most 
updated surveys; and this should be done for a greater number of 
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countries, and particularly for more developing countries. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the proposed nine clusters of cultural dimensions can be taken 
as a point of departure for a completely new framework, developing new 
question items for each cluster and measuring cultural dimensions for a 
broader range of countries. In this study, some cultural orientations that 
have been less studied and are usually embedded in other big dimensions, 
e.g. mastery orientation, out-group collectivism (or collaborativeness) and 
future orientation, are introduced as exclusive dimensions of culture. 
These dimensions demonstrate a strong potential to explain the variances 
in democratic models, political behaviors and institutional arrangements. 
Moreover, in further research, the conceptual definitions and empirical 
measurement of those cultural dimensions whose existing measures by 
different scholars are less convergent – like power distance – should be 
revised and redone. The measuring of these dimensions should be 
replicated and extended for more countries in further works. This will 
help researchers examine the robustness of the interrelations found in this 
study.  
 
2- The whole analysis in this study is at the national level. Cultural 
patterns and democratic models are operationalized and utilized at the 
national level, but we expect that these interrelations to be seen at the 
lower level as well. That is, the cultural differences between different 
regions and groups within countries might codetermine the diversity of 
institutional choices and political behaviors at the corresponding level. 
This should be studied in further research. Moreover, we need to have 
some multi-level analysis to examine to what extent there is an 
interaction between the different levels of analysis. There is a lasting, 
controversial discussion on the relation between individuals’ values and 
national cultural values. Many scholars in cross-cultural studies debate 
the validity of measuring national culture through aggregating individual 
responses (see Schwartz, 2014). They argue about whether the two levels 
of individuals and nations need to be connected or whether they are parts 
of two different worlds. Similar questions are asked about the relation 
between individuals’ political preferences and institutional choices at the 
national level. This study found a meaningful relation between 
dimensions of societal culture and dimensions/institutions of democracy 
at the national level. The questions of whether this interrelation is also 
seen at lower levels and how political behavior and the institutional 
preference of individuals would be affected by their cultural and 
individual values should be studied in further studies.  
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3- This study should be complemented with some elaborated case 
studies and a comparative analysis of a smaller set of countries. 
Examining the cultural compatibility thesis in countries that experienced 
institutional reforms and the consequences of the changes can help us to 
better understand what contextual factor may explain the success or 
failure of institutional reform. The impact of institutional reform on 
democratic performance and public satisfaction, and considering whether 
the direction of institutional reform is culturally compatible or not would 
be an interesting subject of research. This can be done for both 
established and new democracies. The electoral reform in New Zealand, 
for instance, or the several changes of the electoral system in Italy are 
examples of established democracies. Among new democracies, more 
countries have experienced institutional reform. Analyzing the 
institutional arrangement in Iraq and Pakistan, for instance, and the role 
of cultural incompatibility in the malfunction of their political system can 
evaluate the prescriptive application of the cultural compatibility thesis. 
Moreover, studying similarities and differences in political institutions as 
well as in cultural orientations in a specific cluster of countries, like new 
democracies in Muslim countries, could be a complementary comparative 
study to follow up this research.  
 
4- In the empirical analyses of this study, we tried to find meaningful 
patterns and significant associations between the different dimensions of 
culture and components/institutions of democracy; however, we saw 
some outliers and pattern-defying cases in several of the analyses. 
Studying these cases and the factors explaining their peculiar behavior is 
an important subject for further research. Outliers do not necessarily 
question the validity of a strong relation between two variables if they can 
be satisfactorily explained. For instance, in our analysis of the relation 
between the dimensions of culture and democracy (Chapter 5), the 
presence of some outlier countries (e.g. Brazil, India, Israel in Figure 5.2) 
may just show the incompatibility between societal culture and 
democratic models in those countries. This should be further examined in 
a follow-up research.  
 
5- In the empirical analyses of this book, the average scores of 
indicators for one or two decades are used to extract the dimensions of 
democracy. It is argued that using the average scores eliminates the 
variance of indicators across time. This might endanger the reliability of 
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the results. In a further research, the scores for the dimensions of 
democracy for each year should be extracted, and the analysis should be 
replicated with data of country-year scores. This set of data would also be 
useful for studying the changes in democratic models over time. 
Moreover, there are a limited number of countries that have scores for 
both dimensions of democracy and culture. Extracting the country-year 
scores, we can reanalyze our hypothesis with a larger number of cases, 
which lends more reliability to the findings.  
 
6- This study treats societal culture as a stable entity. As discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, cultural values change gradually and slowly. Measuring 
cultural changes necessitates public surveys over time, but these surveys 
have been less available until recently. In further research, changes of 
culture should be studied; and accordingly, the relation between cultural 
change and institutional variation should be examined. Moreover, 
distinguishing between situational attitudes, which have more 
fluctuations, and cultural values, which are more durable, would be 
crucial for the further development of the study of the dynamism of 
contextual factors. The dynamism of interaction between values, attitudes 
and institutions is a very interesting subject of further research, and one 
that is also relevant to this study.  
 
7- The consequences of the incompatibility between political 
institutions and contextual factors, and particularly societal culture, on the 
performance of a democratic system should be studied in future research. 
The effect of this incompatibility on the public’s perception of 
satisfaction with democracy has been studied in Chapter 6. The effect of 
the interaction between societal culture and political institutions on other 
performance indicators is crucial for examining the cultural compatibility 
thesis. To this purpose, the proper and reliable indicators of good 
governance, political stability, public trust, corruption, economic growth 
and equality should be employed. This should be done in large-N studies 
as well as in more comprehensive comparative studies with smaller cases.      
 
8- As emphasized previously, societal culture is one of the contextual 
factors that should be taken into account in institutional design. The 
interaction between societal culture and other social, economic and 
contextual factors and the effect of this interaction on the adoption and 
functionality of institutional arrangements in different countries should be 
studied in further research. It is crucial to understand, for instance, how 
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cultural orientations variously affect the institutional choices in 
heterogeneous and homogeneous societies. This would definitely help 
institutional designers recognize different types of ‘power-sharing’ 
models that work successfully in different contexts. The role of societal 
culture on institutional arrangement cannot be fully understood without 
studying its interaction with other contextual factors.  
 
This research was started concurrent with the fall of Libyan dictator 
and is ended at a time when Tunisia is holding its first democratic, free 
and fair elections. Between these two junctures, and four years after the 
Arab Spring, some democratic attempts in Muslim countries have failed 
and faced a political winter (e.g. Egypt, Libya); some fragile democracies 
have faced grave challenges and gotten stuck in destabilizing storms (e.g. 
Mali, Afghanistan, Iraq); and some new democracies have been enhanced 
and experienced a breeze of democratic change (e.g. Indonesia, Turkey 
and Tunisia).  
We all know that many factors have played a role in the success or 
failure of democratic experience in each of these countries and any other 
new democracies. Among many factors, this study has focused on the 
effect of societal culture and institutional arrangements, and the very 
important matter of their interactions. The recent ambivalent experience 
of democracy in Muslim countries has again questioned the conviction 
that some cultures are not compatible with democracy. This book hopes 
to have contributed to democratization studies by reformulating a 
controversial thesis: from an exclusive interpretation of ‘Culture Matters’ 
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Appendix A: Dimensions of National Culture 
Table A.1. Cultural dimensions of Hofstede and Minkov 
Cultural	  dimension	   Description	  
Hofstede	  
	   Individualism	  vs.	  
Collectivism	  
Individualism	  stands	  for	  a	  society	  in	  which	  the	  ties	  between	  
individuals	  are	  loose:	  A	  person	  is	  expected	  to	  look	  after	  
himself	  or	  herself	  and	  his	  or	  her	  immediate	  family	  only.	  
Collectivism	  stands	  for	  a	  society	  in	  which	  people	  from	  birth	  
onwards	  are	  integrated	  into	  strong,	  cohesive	  in-­‐groups,	  
which	  continue	  to	  protect	  them	  throughout	  their	  lifetime	  in	  
exchange	  for	  unquestioning	  loyalty.	  
	   Power	  distance	   The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  less-­‐powerful	  members	  of	  society	  
expect	  and	  accept	  that	  power	  is	  distributed	  unequally.	  
	   Uncertainty	  avoidance	   The	  extent	  to	  which	  members	  of	  society	  feel	  uncomfortable	  
with	  uncertain,	  unknown,	  ambiguous,	  or	  unstructured	  
situations.	  The	  fundamental	  issue	  here	  is	  how	  a	  society	  
deals	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  future	  can	  never	  be	  known.	  
	   Masculinity	  vs.	  
Femininity	  
Masculinity	  represents	  a	  preference	  in	  society	  for	  achievement,	  
competition,	  heroism,	  assertiveness,	  and	  material	  reward	  for	  
success.	  Its	  opposite,	  femininity,	  stands	  for	  a	  preference	  for	  
cooperation,	  consensus,	  modesty,	  caring	  for	  the	  weak,	  and	  
quality	  of	  life.	  This	  dimension	  is	  also	  related	  to	  the	  division	  of	  
emotional	  roles	  between	  women	  and	  men.	  
	   Long-­‐	  vs.	  Short-­‐term	  
orientation	  
Long-­‐term	  Orientation	  stands	  for	  a	  society	  that	  fosters	  virtues	  
and	  is	  oriented	  toward	  future	  rewards,	  in	  particular	  
perseverance	  and	  thrift.	  Short-­‐term	  orientation	  stands	  for	  a	  
society	  that	  fosters	  virtues	  related	  to	  the	  past	  and	  present,	  
in	  particular	  respect	  for	  tradition,	  preservation	  of	  “face,”	  
and	  fulfilling	  social	  obligations.	  
Minkov	  
	   Exclusionism	  vs.	  
Universalism	  
Exclusionism	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  cultural	  tendency	  to	  treat	  
people	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  group	  affiliation	  and	  reserve	  
favors,	  services,	  privileges	  for	  in-­‐groups	  while	  excluding	  
out-­‐groups	  from	  those	  who	  deserve	  such	  privileged	  
treatment.	  Universalism	  is	  the	  opposite	  cultural	  tendency;	  
treating	  people	  primarily	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  who	  they	  are	  as	  
individuals	  and	  disregarding	  their	  group	  affiliation.	  
	   Monumentalism	  vs.	  
Flexumility	  (Self-­‐
Effacement)	  
Monumentalism	  stands	  for	  pride	  and	  high	  self-­‐regard,	  
demonstration	  of	  status	  and	  generosity	  with	  money,	  
favors	  and	  services,	  consistency	  between	  feelings	  and	  
outward	  expression	  and	  avoidance	  of	  dialectical	  feelings	  
and	  thoughts,	  including	  greater	  religiousness.	  Flexumility	  
(Flexibility	  +	  Humility)	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  opposite	  
characteristics.	  
	   Indulgence	  vs.	  Restraint	   Indulgence	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  tendency	  to	  allow	  relatively	  free	  
gratification	  of	  some	  desire	  and	  feelings	  (leisure,	  casual	  
sex,	  spending,	  and	  consumption).	  Restraint	  stands	  for	  the	  
tendency	  to	  curb	  the	  gratification	  of	  desires	  and	  feelings	  
by	  strict	  social	  norms	  and	  prohibitions.	  
Source. Hofstede (2001), Minkov(2007). 
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Table A.2. Cultural dimensions of Inglehart 




In	  traditional	  cultures	  religion	  is	  very	  important	  and	  a	  main	  goal	  in	  
most	  people’s	  lives	  is	  to	  make	  their	  parents	  proud;	  they	  idealize	  
large	  families,	  and	  have	  large	  numbers	  of	  children.	  They	  also	  
have	  high	  levels	  of	  national	  pride,	  favor	  more	  respect	  for	  
authority	  and	  reject	  divorce,	  abortion,	  euthanasia	  and	  suicide.	  
Societies	  with	  secular-­‐rational	  values	  have	  the	  opposite	  
preferences	  on	  all	  these	  topics.	  
Survival	  vs.	  Self-­‐
Expression	  
Self-­‐expression	  dimension	  reflects	  a	  syndrome	  of	  tolerance,	  trust,	  
emphasis	  on	  subjective	  well-­‐being,	  civic	  activism,	  and	  self-­‐
expression	  that	  emerges	  in	  postindustrial	  societies	  with	  high	  
levels	  of	  existential	  security	  and	  individual	  autonomy.	  At	  the	  
opposite	  pole,	  people	  in	  societies	  shaped	  by	  existential	  insecurity	  
and	  rigid	  intellectual	  and	  social	  constraints	  on	  human	  autonomy	  
tend	  to	  emphasize	  economic	  and	  physical	  security	  above	  all.	  
Source. Inglehart et al. (2004), Inglehart & Welzel (2005). 
 
Table A.3. Cultural dimensions of Schwartz 
Cultural	  orientations	   Description	  
Embeddedness	  
(conservatism)	  
A	  cultural	  emphasis	  on	  maintenance	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  propriety,	  
and	  restraint	  of	  actions	  or	  inclinations	  that	  might	  disrupt	  the	  
solidarity	  group	  or	  the	  traditional	  order	  (embedded	  value	  items:	  
social	  order,	  respect	  for	  tradition,	  security,	  obedience,	  wisdom)	  
Intellectual	  
autonomy	  
A	  cultural	  emphasis	  on	  the	  desirability	  of	  individuals	  independently	  
pursuing	  their	  own	  ideas	  and	  intellectual	  directions	  (embedded	  
value	  items:	  curiosity,	  broadmindedness,	  creativity)	  
Affective	  autonomy	   A	  cultural	  emphasis	  on	  the	  desirability	  of	  individuals	  independently	  
pursuing	  affectively	  positive	  experience	  (embedded	  value	  items:	  
pleasure,	  exciting	  life,	  varied	  life)	  
Hierarchy	   A	  cultural	  emphasis	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  an	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  
power,	  roles	  and	  resources	  (embedded	  value	  items:	  social	  power,	  
authority,	  humility,	  wealth)	  
Egalitarianism	   A	  cultural	  emphasis	  on	  transcendence	  of	  selfish	  interests	  in	  favor	  
of	  voluntary	  commitment	  to	  promoting	  the	  welfare	  of	  others	  
(embedded	  value	  items:	  equality,	  social	  justice,	  freedom,	  
responsibility,	  honesty)	  
Mastery	   A	  cultural	  emphasis	  on	  getting	  ahead	  through	  active	  self-­‐assertion	  
(ambition,	  success,	  courage,	  competence)	  
Harmony	   A	  cultural	  emphasis	  on	  fitting	  harmoniously	  into	  the	  social	  and	  
natural	  environment	  (unity	  with	  nature,	  protecting	  the	  
environment,	  world	  of	  beauty)	  
Source. Schwartz (1999). 
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Table A.4. Cultural dimensions of GLOBE project 
Cultural	  dimension	   Description	  
Performance	  
orientation	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  organization	  or	  society	  encourages	  and	  
rewards	  group	  members	  for	  performance	  improvement	  and	  
excellence	  
Future	  orientation	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  in	  organizations	  or	  societies	  engage	  
in	  future-­‐oriented	  behavior	  such	  as	  planning,	  investing	  in	  the	  
future,	  and	  delaying	  gratification	  
Gender	  
egalitarianism	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  organization	  or	  a	  society	  minimizes	  gender	  
role	  differences	  and	  gender	  discrimination	  
Assertiveness	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  in	  organizations	  or	  societies	  are	  
assertive,	  confrontational,	  and	  aggressive	  in	  social	  relationships	  
Institutional	  
collectivism	  
the	  degree	  to	  which	  organizational	  and	  societal	  institutional	  
practices	  encourage	  and	  reward	  collective	  distribution	  of	  
resources	  and	  collective	  action	  
In-­‐group	  collectivism	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  express	  pride,	  loyalty,	  and	  
cohesiveness	  in	  their	  organizations	  or	  families	  
Power	  distance	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  members	  of	  an	  organization	  or	  society	  expect	  
and	  agree	  that	  power	  should	  be	  unequally	  shared	  
Humane	  orientation	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  individuals	  in	  organizations	  or	  societies	  
encourage	  and	  reward	  individuals	  for	  being	  fair,	  altruistic,	  
friendly,	  generous,	  caring,	  and	  kind	  to	  others	  
Uncertainty	  
avoidance	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  members	  of	  an	  organization	  or	  society	  strive	  to	  
avoid	  uncertainty	  by	  reliance	  on	  social	  norms,	  rituals,	  and	  
bureaucratic	  practices	  to	  alleviate	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  future	  
events	  
Source. House et al. (2002). 
 
 
Table A.5. Scores of dimensions of national culture 
	   Hofstede	   Minkov	   Schwartza	   Inglehart	   GLOBE	  (standardized	  practices)	  
	   H1	   H2	   H3	   H4	   H5	   M1	   M2	   M3	   S1	   S2	   S3	   S4	   S5	   S6	   S7	   I1	   I2	   G1	   G2	   G3	   G4	   G5	   G6	   G7	   G8	  
Albania	  
	   	   	   	  
61	   285	   15	   102	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
0.07	   -­‐1.14	   4.57	   3.69	   3.48	   4.57	   4.28	   5.51	   4.62	   4.40	  
Argentina	   46	   49	   86	   56	   20	   311	   62	   28	   3.63	   3.43	   4.55	   1.80	   5.10	   3.72	   4.27	   -­‐0.66	   0.38	   3.63	   3.10	   3.44	   4.18	   3.66	   5.51	   5.56	   3.94	  
Australia	   90	   36	   51	   61	   21	   174	   71	   35	   3.85	   3.39	   4.20	   2.16	   4.92	   3.75	   4.13	   0.21	   1.75	   4.37	   4.09	   3.41	   4.29	   4.31	   4.14	   4.81	   4.32	  
Austria	   55	   11	   70	   79	   60	   191	   63	   40	   3.19	   3.89	   4.97	   1.66	   5.06	   3.72	   4.62	   0.25	   1.43	   4.47	   4.47	   3.18	   4.59	   4.34	   4.89	   5.00	   3.77	  
Bangladesh	   20	   80	   55	   55	   47	   412	   20	   76	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.21	   -­‐0.93	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Belgium	   75	   65	   94	   54	   82	   159	   57	   -­‐46	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
0.50	   1.13	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Bolivia	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
4.21	   2.36	   4.83	   2.69	   4.83	   3.69	   4.26	  
	   	  
3.57	   3.55	   3.45	   3.78	   3.96	   5.44	   4.46	   3.99	  
Bosnia	  
	   	   	   	  
70	   320	   44	   -­‐74	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.34	   -­‐0.65	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Brazil	   38	   69	   76	   49	   44	   313	   59	   61	   4.03	   3.04	   4.27	   2.59	   4.25	   3.84	   4.25	   -­‐0.98	   0.61	   4.11	   3.90	   3.44	   4.25	   3.94	   5.16	   5.24	   3.76	  
Bulgaria	   30	   70	   85	   40	   69	   340	   16	   -­‐135	   3.80	   3.11	   4.26	   2.32	   5.04	   3.77	   4.04	   1.13	   -­‐1.01	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Canada	   80	   39	   48	   52	   36	   172	   68	   64	   3.52	   3.71	   4.57	   1.69	   4.99	   3.93	   4.20	   -­‐0.26	   1.91	   4.46	   4.40	   3.66	   4.09	   4.36	   4.22	   4.85	   4.51	  
Chile	   23	   63	   86	   28	   31	   256	   68	   24	   3.90	   2.47	   4.38	   2.10	   5.11	   3.54	   4.49	   -­‐0.87	   0.00	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  China	   20	   80	   30	   66	   87	   253	   24	   -­‐206	   3.74	   3.20	   4.31	   3.63	   4.31	  
	  
3.76	   0.80	   -­‐1.16	   4.37	   3.68	   3.03	   3.77	   4.67	   5.86	   5.02	   4.29	  
Colombia	   13	   67	   80	   64	   13	   320	   83	   38	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.87	   0.60	   3.93	   3.35	   3.64	   4.16	   3.84	   5.59	   5.37	   3.72	  
Costa	  Rica	   15	   35	   86	   21	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	  
4.10	   3.64	   3.56	   3.83	   3.95	   5.26	   4.70	   4.38	  
Croatia	   33	   73	   80	   40	   58	  
	  
33	   -­‐76	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
0.08	   0.31	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Cyprus	  
	   	   	   	  
	   70	   	   4.19	   2.66	   3.83	   1.98	   5.06	   3.66	   4.32	   -­‐0.56	   0.13	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Czech	  Rep.	   58	   57	   74	   57	   70	   238	   29	   -­‐116	   3.77	   3.07	   4.59	   2.07	   4.59	   3.45	   4.66	   1.23	   0.38	  




	   	   	   	  
13	   338	   54	   53	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.05	   0.33	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Ecuador	   8	   78	   67	   63	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
4.06	   3.66	   3.09	   3.98	   3.82	   5.55	   5.29	   4.45	  
Egypt	   38	   80	   68	   53	   7	   482	   4	   154	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.61	   -­‐0.46	   4.15	   3.80	   2.90	   3.91	   4.36	   5.49	   4.76	   4.60	  
El	  Salvador	   19	   66	   94	   40	   20	  
	  
89	   117	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐2.06	   0.53	   3.72	   3.73	   3.23	   4.49	   3.74	   5.22	   5.56	   3.69	  
Estonia	   60	   40	   60	   30	   82	   233	   16	   -­‐146	   4.08	   2.92	   4.11	   1.88	   4.75	   3.44	   4.66	   1.27	   -­‐1.19	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
 
	   Hofstede	   Minkov	   Schwartza	   Inglehart	   GLOBE	  (standardized	  practices)	  
	   H1	   H2	   H3	   H4	   H5	   M1	   M2	   M3	   S1	   S2	   S3	   S4	   S5	   S6	   S7	   I1	   I2	   G1	   G2	   G3	   G4	   G5	   G6	   G7	   G8	  
Finland	   63	   33	   59	   26	   38	   102	   57	   -­‐27	   3.53	   3.61	   4.84	   1.70	   5.03	   3.39	   4.59	   0.82	   1.12	   4.02	   4.39	   3.55	   4.05	   4.77	   4.23	   5.08	   4.19	  
France	   71	   68	   86	   43	   63	   196	   48	   -­‐42	   3.10	   4.31	   5.37	   1.98	   5.18	   3.57	   4.50	   0.63	   1.13	   4.43	   3.74	   3.81	   4.44	   4.20	   4.66	   5.68	   3.60	  
Georgia	  
	   	   	   	  
38	   367	   32	   -­‐27	   4.25	   3.26	   3.86	   2.46	   4.74	   3.62	   4.09	   -­‐0.04	   -­‐1.31	   3.85	   3.45	   3.52	   4.15	   4.03	   6.18	   5.15	   4.17	  
Germany	   67	   35	   65	   66	   83	   151	   40	   -­‐92	   3.18	   3.75	   4.92	   1.91	   5.14	   3.75	   4.71	   1.39	   0.50	   4.42	   4.41	   3.25	   4.66	   3.97	   4.16	   5.48	   3.30	  
Ghana	   20	   77	   54	   46	   4	   	   72	   	   4.30	   2.16	   3.94	   2.65	   4.85	   4.15	   3.43	   -­‐1.94	   -­‐0.29	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Greece	   35	   60	   112	   57	   45	   332	   50	   4	   3.47	   3.83	   4.43	   1.78	   4.98	   4.13	   4.68	   0.77	   0.55	   3.34	   3.53	   3.53	   4.55	   3.41	   5.28	   5.35	   3.44	  
Guatemala	   6	   95	   101	   37	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.70	   -­‐0.17	   3.85	   3.35	   3.14	   3.96	   3.78	   5.54	   5.47	   3.91	  




3.87	   2.97	   4.23	   2.82	   4.61	   3.94	   3.61	   1.20	   -­‐0.98	   4.69	   3.88	   3.26	   4.53	   4.03	   5.33	   4.94	   3.72	  
Hungary	   80	   46	   82	   88	   58	  
	  
31	   -­‐46	   3.73	   3.35	   4.46	   2.04	   4.51	   3.74	   4.38	   0.40	   -­‐1.22	   3.50	   3.31	   4.02	   4.71	   3.63	   5.31	   5.57	   3.39	  
India	   48	   77	   40	   56	   51	  
	  
26	   18	   3.91	   3.54	   4.02	   3.37	   4.49	   4.16	   3.98	   -­‐0.36	   -­‐0.21	   4.11	   4.04	   2.89	   3.70	   4.25	   5.81	   5.29	   4.45	  
Indonesia	   14	   78	   48	   46	   62	   364	   38	   21	   4.50	   3.12	   3.70	   2.65	   4.33	   3.62	   3.99	   -­‐0.47	   -­‐0.80	   4.14	   3.61	   3.04	   3.70	   4.27	   5.50	   4.93	   4.47	  
Iran	   41	   58	   59	   43	   14	   339	   40	   114	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.22	   -­‐0.45	   4.58	   3.70	   2.99	   4.04	   3.88	   6.03	   5.43	   4.23	  
Iraq	   38	   80	   68	   53	   25	  
	  
17	   123	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.40	   -­‐1.68	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Ireland	   70	   28	   35	   68	   24	   208	   65	   91	   3.60	   3.62	   4.38	   1.86	   4.99	   3.84	   3.90	   -­‐0.91	   1.18	   4.30	   3.93	   3.19	   3.93	   4.57	   5.12	   5.13	   4.96	  
Israel	   54	   13	   81	   47	   38	  
	   	   	  
3.82	   3.51	   4.42	   2.47	   4.86	   3.87	   3.35	   0.26	   0.36	   4.03	   3.82	   3.21	   4.19	   4.40	   4.63	   4.71	   4.07	  
Italy	   76	   50	   75	   70	   61	   248	   30	   5	   3.61	   2.84	   4.86	   1.47	   5.38	   3.60	   4.91	   0.13	   0.60	   3.66	   3.34	   3.30	   4.12	   3.75	   4.99	   5.45	   3.66	  
Jamaica	   39	   45	   13	   68	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Japan	   46	   54	   92	  
	  
88	   233	   42	   -­‐80	   3.55	   3.47	   4.73	   2.58	   4.47	   3.97	   4.30	   1.96	   -­‐0.05	   4.22	   4.29	   3.17	   3.69	   5.23	   4.72	   5.23	   4.34	  
Kuwait	   38	   80	   68	   53	   23	  
	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  
3.79	   3.18	   2.59	   3.56	   4.32	   5.70	   4.97	   4.44	  
Latvia	   70	   44	   63	   9	   69	   220	   13	   -­‐141	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
0.72	   -­‐1.27	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Lithuania	   60	   42	   65	   19	   82	   258	   16	   -­‐159	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
0.98	   -­‐1.00	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Luxemburg	   60	   40	   70	   50	   64	   142	   56	   	   	   	   	   	   0.42	   1.13	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Macedonia	  
	   	   	   	  
62	   299	   35	   -­‐6	   4.05	   2.68	   4.27	   2.95	   4.48	   3.88	   4.14	   0.12	   -­‐0.72	  




4.33	   2.99	   4.10	   2.35	   4.50	   3.83	   3.68	   -­‐0.73	   0.09	   4.16	   4.39	   3.31	   3.77	   4.45	   5.47	   5.09	   4.76	  
Mali	  





	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.25	   -­‐0.08	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Malta	   59	   56	   96	   47	   47	   328	   66	   115	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.53	   -­‐0.03	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Mexico	   30	   81	   82	   69	   24	   325	   97	   99	   3.79	   3.13	   4.48	   2.30	   4.77	   3.84	   4.58	   -­‐1.47	   1.03	   3.97	   3.75	   3.50	   4.31	   3.95	   5.62	   5.07	   3.84	  
 
 
	   Hofstede	   Minkov	   Schwartza	   Inglehart	   GLOBE	  (standardized	  practices)	  
	   H1	   H2	   H3	   H4	   H5	   M1	   M2	   M3	   S1	   S2	   S3	   S4	   S5	   S6	   S7	   I1	   I2	   G1	   G2	   G3	   G4	   G5	   G6	   G7	   G8	  
Moldova	  
	   	   	   	  
71	   262	   19	   -­‐129	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   0.47	   -­‐1.28	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Morocco	   46	   70	   68	   53	   14	   333	   25	   178	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.32	   -­‐1.04	   4.31	   3.50	   3.08	   4.72	   4.18	   6.37	   6.14	   4.52	  
Namibia	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
	   4.02	   3.29	   4.00	   2.49	   4.60	   4.06	   3.56	  
	   	  
3.52	   3.32	   3.69	   3.81	   4.02	   4.39	   5.29	   3.83	  
Netherlands	   80	   38	   53	   14	   67	  
	  
68	   -­‐55	   3.36	   3.65	   4.78	   2.00	   5.08	   3.80	   4.19	   0.71	   1.39	   4.46	   4.72	   3.62	   4.46	   4.62	   3.79	   4.32	   4.02	  
New	  Zealand	   79	   22	   49	   58	   33	   152	   75	   -­‐17	   3.47	   3.86	   4.47	   2.16	   5.03	   3.86	   4.19	   0.00	   1.86	   4.86	   3.46	   3.18	   3.53	   4.96	   3.58	   5.12	   4.43	  
Nigeria	   20	   77	   54	   46	   13	   495	   84	   120	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.53	   0.28	   3.79	   3.95	   3.04	   4.53	   4.00	   5.34	   5.53	   3.96	  
Norway	   69	   31	   50	   8	   35	  
	  
55	   34	   3.55	   3.29	   4.67	   1.41	   5.29	   3.62	   4.64	   1.39	   2.17	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Pakistan	   14	   55	   70	   50	   50	   341	   0	   97	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.42	   -­‐1.25	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Panama	   11	   95	   86	   44	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Peru	   16	   64	   87	   42	   25	   298	   46	   19	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.36	   0.03	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Philippines	   32	   94	   44	   64	   27	   387	   42	   115	   4.07	   2.90	   3.98	   2.57	   4.60	   3.73	   4.08	   -­‐1.21	   -­‐0.11	   4.21	   3.92	   3.42	   3.85	   4.37	   6.14	   5.15	   4.88	  
Poland	   60	   68	   93	   64	   38	   267	   29	   6	   4.05	   3.04	   4.24	   2.51	   4.55	   3.64	   4.24	   -­‐0.78	   -­‐0.14	   3.96	   3.23	   3.94	   4.11	   4.51	   5.55	   5.09	   3.67	  
Portugal	   27	   63	   104	   31	   28	   239	   33	   42	   3.51	   3.41	   4.51	   1.85	   5.39	   3.90	   4.57	   -­‐0.90	   0.49	   3.65	   3.77	   3.69	   3.75	   4.02	   5.64	   5.50	   3.96	  
Romania	   30	   90	   90	   42	   52	   352	   20	   10	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.39	   -­‐1.55	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Russia	   39	   93	   95	   36	   81	   258	   20	   -­‐149	   4.04	   2.95	   4.24	   2.50	   4.64	   3.66	   4.25	   0.49	   -­‐1.42	   3.53	   3.06	   4.07	   3.86	   4.57	   5.83	   5.61	   4.04	  
Singapore	   20	   74	   8	   48	   72	   287	   46	   11	   4.21	   2.95	   3.78	   2.73	   4.69	   3.62	   3.98	   -­‐0.54	   -­‐0.28	   4.81	   4.88	   3.52	   4.06	   4.77	   5.66	   4.92	   3.29	  
Slovakia	   52	   104	   51	  
	  
77	   286	   28	   -­‐96	   4.05	   2.61	   4.15	   2.11	   4.58	   3.71	   4.53	   0.67	   -­‐0.43	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Slovenia	   27	   71	   88	   19	   49	   236	   48	   -­‐46	   3.82	   3.42	   4.93	   1.44	   4.58	   3.47	   4.77	   0.73	   0.36	   3.62	   3.56	   3.84	   4.01	   4.09	   5.49	   5.32	   3.75	  
South	  Africa	   65	   49	   49	   63	   34	   	   63	   102	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐1.09	   -­‐0.10	   4.40	   4.37	   3.52	   4.46	   4.51	   4.80	   4.71	   3.96	  
South	  Korea	   18	   60	   85	   39	   100	   353	   29	   -­‐96	   	   	   	   	   0.61	   -­‐1.37	   4.53	   3.90	   2.45	   4.36	   5.20	   5.71	   5.69	   3.73	  
Spain	   51	   57	   86	   42	   48	   244	   44	   20	   3.36	   3.59	   4.98	   1.84	   5.20	   3.68	   4.64	   0.09	   0.54	   4.00	   3.52	   3.06	   4.39	   3.87	   5.53	   5.53	   3.29	  
Sweden	   71	   31	   29	   5	   53	  
	  
78	   -­‐51	   3.23	   3.97	   5.07	   1.73	   4.96	   3.61	   4.54	   1.86	   2.35	   3.67	   4.37	   3.72	   3.41	  
	  
3.46	   4.94	   4.09	  
Switzerland	   68	   34	   58	   70	   74	   194	   66	   -­‐35	   3.04	   4.13	   5.42	   2.09	   4.98	   3.74	   4.53	   0.74	   1.90	   5.04	   4.80	   3.12	   4.58	   4.20	   4.04	   5.05	   3.73	  
Taiwan	   17	   58	   69	   45	   93	  
	  
49	   -­‐128	   4.05	   2.96	   3.87	   2.62	   4.39	   3.87	   4.22	   1.16	   -­‐1.18	   4.27	   3.65	   2.92	   3.70	   4.30	   5.45	   5.00	   3.82	  
Tanzania	   27	   64	   52	   41	   34	   284	   38	   80	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.84	   -­‐0.15	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Thailand	   20	   64	   64	   34	   32	   	   45	  
	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.64	   0.01	   3.84	   3.27	   3.26	   3.58	   3.88	   5.72	   5.62	   4.87	  
Trinidad	   16	   47	   55	   58	   13	   	   80	   	   	   	   	   -­‐1.83	   -­‐0.26	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
 
	   Hofstede	   Minkov	   Schwartza	   Inglehart	   GLOBE	  (standardized	  practices)	  
	   H1	   H2	   H3	   H4	   H5	   M1	   M2	   M3	   S1	   S2	   S3	   S4	   S5	   S6	   S7	   I1	   I2	   G1	   G2	   G3	   G4	   G5	   G6	   G7	   G8	  
Turkey	   37	   66	   85	   45	   46	   379	   49	   65	   4.03	   3.08	   4.29	   3.05	   4.91	   3.78	   4.31	   -­‐0.89	   -­‐0.33	   3.82	   3.74	   3.02	   4.42	   4.02	   5.79	   5.43	   3.92	  
Ukraine	  
	   	   	   	  
86	   280	   14	   -­‐163	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
0.30	   -­‐0.83	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  UK	   89	   35	   35	   66	   51	   114	   69	   -­‐12	   3.55	   3.86	   4.42	   2.34	   5.00	   3.88	   3.81	   0.06	   1.68	   4.16	   4.31	   3.67	   4.23	   4.31	   4.08	   5.26	   3.74	  
USA	   91	   40	   46	   62	   26	   172	   68	   148	   3.77	   3.51	   4.21	   2.07	   4.80	   3.92	   3.69	   -­‐0.81	   1.76	   4.45	   4.13	   3.36	   4.50	   4.21	   4.22	   4.92	   4.18	  
Uruguay	   36	   61	   100	   38	   26	   	   53	   -­‐44	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.37	   0.99	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Venezuela	   12	   81	   76	   73	   16	   310	   100	   150	   3.94	   3.09	   4.36	   2.10	   4.73	   3.86	   4.03	   -­‐1.60	   0.43	   3.41	   3.43	   3.60	   4.26	   3.96	   5.41	   5.22	   4.19	  
Zambia	   27	   64	   52	   41	   30	   	   42	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.77	   -­‐0.62	   4.01	   3.55	   2.88	   4.00	   4.41	   5.72	   5.23	   5.12	  
Source. Hofstede et al. (2010), Inglehart (2007; most updated country scores from waves 1995 to 2006), Minkov (2008), Licht et al. (2007). House et al. 
(2004). 
Note. H1 = individualism vs. collectivism; H2 = power distance; H3 = uncertainty avoidance; H4 = masculinity vs. femininity; H5 = long vs. short-term 
orientation; M1 = exclusionism vs. universalism; M2 = indulgence/restraint; M3 = monumentalism/flexumility; S1 = embeddedness; S2 = affective 
autonomy; S3 = intelectual autonomy; S4 = hierarchy; S5 = egalitarianism; S6 = mastery; S7 = harmony; I1 = secular vs. traditional; I2 = self-expression vs. 
survival; G1 = performance orientation; G2 = future orientation; G3 = gender egalitarianism; G4 = assertiveness; G5 = institutional collectivism; G6 = in-
group collectivism; G7 = power distance; G8 = humane orientation. 
aSchwartz’s cultural scores are based on a sample of over 15,000 urban teachers in Grades 3-12, surveyed during 1988-1998 (Licht et al., 2007, p. 667). The 
scores for bipolar dimensions have been calculated based on Schwartz’s procedure to subtract the scores of two poles of each bipolar dimension. For 
embeddedness vs. autonomy, he recommended to subtract the embeddedness score from the mean of the affective and intellectual autonomy scores 
(Schwartz, 2004). 
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Appendix B: GLOBE Survey Items 
Definitions and survey items measuring cultural dimensions in the 
GLOBE project, which are to be answered by respondents using a 1- to 7-
point scale (House et al., 2004; The GLOBE Foundation, 2006): 
Institutional collectivism (the degree to which societal institutional 
practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and 
collective action): 
1. In this society, leaders encourage group loyalty even if individual 
goals suffer. 
2. The economic system in this society is designed to maximize, 1 = 
individual interests, to 7 = collective interests. 
3. In this society, being accepted by the other members of a group is very 
important. 
4. In this society, 1 = group cohesion is more valued than individualism, 
to 7 = individualism is more valued than group cohesion. 
In-group collectivism (the degree to which individuals express pride, 
loyalty, and cohesiveness in their families): 
1. In this society, children take pride in the individual accomplishments 
of their parents. 
2. In this society, parents take pride in the individual accomplishments of 
their children. 
3. In this society, aging parents generally live at home with their 
children. 
4. In this society, children generally live at home with their parents until 
they get married. 
Power distance (the degree to which members of society expect and agree 
that power should be unequally shared): 
1. In this society, a person’s influence is based primarily on 1 = one’s 
ability and contribution to the society, to 7 = the authority of one’s 
position. 
2. In this society, followers are expected to 1 = obey their leaders 
without question, to 7 = question their leaders when in disagreement. 
3. In this society, people in positions of power try to 1 = increase their 
social distance from less powerful individuals, to 7 = decrease their 
social distance from less powerful people. 
4. In this society, rank and position in the hierarchy have special 
privileges. 
5. In this society, power is 1 = concentrated at the top, to 7 = shared 
throughout the society. 
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Appendix C: Classification of Democratic 
Regime Types 
The classification of regime types by Cheibub (2007) is based on the 
formal constitutions and not necessarily on the real practice of 
democracy. Cheibub et al. (2010, p. 82) argued that “in almost every 
instance where the formal rules do not seem to match practice at a first 
glance, we find examples of behavior that conform to the constitutional 
prerogatives of the president and/or the assembly”. We believe, however, 
that finding exceptional instances cannot overshadow the real and regular 
practices in many countries. 
If not the constitution but the practice of democracy is the main focus 
of attention, as it is here, things will look somewhat differently. For 
instance, we are not convinced that the Austrian regime should be viewed 
as semi-presidential, rather than semi-parliamentary; it has a popularly-
elected president, but this president has a ceremonial role only. Given this 
argumentation and considering the different definitions and 
classifications of semi-presidentialism in the literature (Duverger, 1980; 
Elgie, 2005; Siaroff, 2003), we reformulated and rearranged the criteria 
by Cheibub (2007, p. 35) and identified four types of political regime, as 
illustrated in Figure C.1.  
 
 
Figure C.1. The criteria for classifying the democratic regimes in practice 
 
Countries in which the head of state is not popularly elected (‘No’ to 
the first question) are categorized under the ‘parliamentary’ regime here. 
Countries having an elected president with a ceremonial role in practice 
(No to the second question) are classified as ‘semi-parliamentary’ 
regimes. For answering the second question and assessing whether or not 
a president has ‘considerable power’, we use the ‘Presidential Power’ 
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score introduced by Siaroff (2003), which was extended for some more 
countries by Elgie & McMenamin (2008) and Qi (2010). If the score is 
lower than 5, then the system is semi-parliamentary (e.g. Lithuania, 
Portugal, Croatia after 2000); otherwise the regime is semi-presidential 
(e.g. France, Romania, Croatia before 2000) or presidential (e.g. USA, 
Latin America, South Korea) depending on the answer to the third 
question in Figure A1, regarding whether or not an executive branch 
responsible to the legislative (based on Siaroff (2003)). 
According to our classification, Switzerland which has no popular 
elected executive, and Austria which has a ceremonial elected president 
are respectively considered parliamentary and semi-parliamentary 
democracies, while according to Cheibub (2007) they are presidential and 
semi-presidential regimes respectively. In Table E.1 in Appendix E, the 
regime type of each country, based on our formulation, is specified. 
Except for Croatia, Finland, Moldova and Poland, all democratic 
countries had the same regime type for the whole range of 1990 to 2009.  
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Appendix D: Varieties of Referendums and the 
Weighting Rationale  
Two main categories of referendums can be distinguished: top-down 
and bottom-up.  
- Plebiscitary and mandatory (or compulsory) referendums are two 
types of top-down referendums. A plebiscite is defined here as a 
referendum called by the authorities, either the executive or legislative. A 
mandatory referendum is required “under circumstances defined in the 
constitution or in legislation” (IDEA, 2008, p. 213).  
- Optional (or abrogative or facultative or citizen-demanded) 
referendums and initiatives are two types of bottom-up referendums. The 
former is “initiated, or triggered, by a number of citizens referring to 
existing laws or political or legislative proposals” (IDEA, 2008, p. 61). 
Initiatives are political proposals (e.g. draft legislation) initiated by 
citizens. The proposal might be directly used for popular voting (direct 
initiative) or it could be revised by the legislative and then presented to 
the popular vote (indirect initiative which is also called counter proposal 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010)). 
There is considerable inconsistency in the terminology of different 
types of referendums in the literature. For instance, in IDEA’s 
terminology, the ‘optional referendum’ is used in the meaning of 
plebiscite while in the terminology of Center for Research on Direct 
Democracy (C2D, 2012) it resembles the citizen-demanded referendum. 
In the terminology of IRI (Kaufmann et al., 2010)), the term ‘optional 
referendum’ is not common and ‘citizen-initiated referendum’ is used 
instead. This could result in problematical operationalization 
Some scholars distinguish and weigh referendums based on the main 
categories only (i.e. top-down or bottom-up) (Peterlevitz, 2011). Some 
studies use only the number of referendums, no matter their types 
(Altman, 2011; Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Vanhanen, 2002). Another 
approach is to give a different weight to each type of referendum 
(Altman, 2012; Vatter, 2009). We follow this approach and weigh each 
type of referendum distinctively, based on its importance and contribution 
to direct democracy.  
It can be argued convincingly that bottom-up referendums with the 
citizens as initiators should have a higher weight than the top-down ones. 
Initiatives are seemed more participatory than optional (abrogative) 
referendums because in initiatives citizens themselves define, directly or 
indirectly, the issue and subject of the referendum. Plebiscites have more 
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‘governmental control’ than mandatory referendums (Setala, 2006; 
Vatter, 2009), which gives the latter higher participatory value than the 
former (see Table D.1 for weights).  
Normally only binding referendums are taken into account in the 
indices (Peterlevitz, 2011; Vatter, 2009). However, we believe that the 
non-binding referendum presents a form of participation that cannot be 
ignored. Setala (2006) asserted that in west European democracies 
parliament binds itself to the result of advisory (non-binding) plebiscites. 
Therefore, we assign a weight for these referendums as well, albeit half 
the weight of a binding one. According to C2D (2012) database, all non-
binding referendums have been plebiscites. However, we understood that 
there were also non-binding initiatives in some countries (e.g. the 
Netherlands) (van der Krieken, 2011). 
Venhanen (2002), in his revised index of participation, includes the 
number of referendums as a supplement to voter turnout, assuming 5 
points for each national referendum and 1 point for a local referendum. It 
seems an acceptable assumption, taking into account observation that in 
Switzerland – a country with a full-developed referendum culture – 
national referendums are five times as scarce as local ones. This ratio is 
reasonable if the practicalities (time, cost, facilities) in national and local 
referendums would also be taken into account. Moreover, the number of 
participants in a national referendum is also multifold than a local 
referendum. Thus a weighting factor of 0.20 for local referendums seems 
acceptable. Table D.1 summarizes the weighting coefficients for different 
type, level and effect of referendums.  
 
Table D.1. Weight of different types, levels and effect of referendums 





Binding	  	   KB	   1	  
Non-­‐Binding	  (advisory)	  	   KNB	   0.50	  
Level	  
National	  	   KN	   1	  
Local/regional/state	  	   KL	   0.20	  
Type	  
Plebiscite	  	   KP	   0.25	  
Mandatory	  	   KM	   0.50	  
Optional	  	   KO	   0.75	  
Initiative	  	   KI	   1	  
 
As an example, Switzerland in 2000 had 1 mandatory referendum, 2 
optional referendums and 13 initiatives at the national level, and 84 
mandatory, 12 optional and 16 initiatives at the local level, all bindings. 
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Thus the aggregated score of referendums for Switzerland in 2000 would 
be:  
aggregated score of referendums = Σ (K effect * K level * K type * N type ) = 
KB * KN * KM * 1 + KB * KN * KO * 2 + KB * KN * KI * 13 + KB * KL * 
KM * 84 + KB * KL * KO * 12 + KB * KL * KI * 16  
= 1 * 1 * 0.5 * 1 + 1 * 1 * 0.75 * 2 + 1 * 1 * 1 * 13 + 1 * 0.5 * 0.5 * 
84 + 1 * 0.5 * 0.75 * 12 + 1 * 0.5 * 1 * 16 = 28.4 
The aggregated score could be zero, when there is no referendum held 
in a country and it could be as high as in the above example for 
Switzerland. The REP score for Switzerland in 2000 is calculated as Log 
(28.4+1) =1.47, however, considering the highest score limit, its score 
would be 1. 
We collected all binding and non-binding, national and local, and 
different types of referendums for all countries whose data are available 
in the extensive database of C2D (2012) in addition to other sources 
(Direct Democracy Navigator, 2012; Statistics Norway, 2012; van der 
Krieken, 2011) for the range of 1990 to 2009. 
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Appendix E: Dimensions of Democracy and 
Other Indicators  
Table E.1. Countries’ scores of two dimensions of democracy, their sub-
components, and satisfaction with democracy for 80 electoral democracies, 
averaged for the range 1990-2009 




type*	   DBY	   LENP	   LNPG	   TEP	   IDD	   GEP	   REP	   NEP	   PDD	  
SWD	  	  
(%)	  
Albania	   ALB	   PR	   PARL	   1992	   0.361	   0.374	   0.862	   0.488	   0.707	   0.021	   0.260	   0.480	   42.6	  
Argentina	   ARG	   PR	   PRES	   1983	   0.540	   0.328	   0.682	   0.494	   0.653	   0.000	   0.258	   0.443	   36.1	  
Australia	   AUL	   Maj.	   PARL	   1946	   0.386	   0.349	   0.899	   0.494	   0.703	   0.022	   0.788	   0.584	   78.5	  
Austria	   AUS	   PR	   sPARL	   1946	   0.537	   0.456	   0.979	   0.621	   0.763	   0.011	   0.505	   0.561	   68.9	  
Bangladesh	   BNG	   Maj.	   PARL	   1991	   0.368	   0.345	   0.806	   0.468	   0.685	   0.005	   0.198	   0.452	  
	  Belgium	   BEL	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.908	   0.740	   0.964	   0.865	   0.720	   0.000	   0.599	   0.552	   55.5	  
Benin	   BEN	   PR	   PRES	   1991	   0.771	   0.645	   0.765	   0.725	   0.624	   0.016	   0.155	   0.408	   	  
Bolivia	   BOL	   Mix.	   PRES	   1982	   0.564	   0.453	   0.715	   0.568	   0.562	   0.061	   0.186	   0.386	   30.6	  
Bosnia	   BOS	   PR	   sPARL	   1996	   0.879	   0.668	   0.950	   0.823	   0.418	   0.000	   0.220	   0.295	   29.7	  
Botswana	   BOT	   Maj.	   PARL	   1973	   0.199	   0.301	   0.810	   0.365	   0.482	   0.106	   0.145	   0.339	   73.4	  
Brazil	   BRA	   PR	   PRES	   1979	   0.923	   0.688	   0.743	   0.778	   0.664	   0.061	   0.512	   0.513	   29.6	  
Bulgaria	   BUL	   PR	   sPARL	   1990	   0.480	   0.409	   0.931	   0.567	   0.702	   0.000	   0.149	   0.451	   22.5	  
Canada	   CAN	   Maj.	   PARL	   1946	   0.459	   0.301	   0.878	   0.495	   0.571	   0.010	   0.742	   0.493	   70.2	  
Chile	   CHL	   PR	   PRES	   1990	   0.737	   0.445	   0.711	   0.616	   0.584	   0.000	   0.209	   0.392	   38.1	  
Colombia	   COL	   PR	   PRES	   1958	   0.607	   0.490	   0.731	   0.601	   0.384	   0.084	   0.177	   0.282	   29.3	  
Costa	  Rica	   COS	   PR	   PRES	   1949	   0.446	   0.316	   0.702	   0.463	   0.603	   0.005	   0.231	   0.409	   56.3	  
Croatia	   CRO	   PR	   sPARL	   1991	   0.469	   0.411	   0.729	   0.520	   0.660	   0.016	   0.399	   0.479	   29.6	  
Cyprus	   CYP	   PR	   PRES	   1983	   0.561	   0.492	   0.711	   0.581	   0.671	   0.005	   0.299	   0.463	   69.6	  
Czech	  Rep.	   CZR	   PR	   PARL	   1990	   0.557	   0.411	   0.929	   0.597	   0.749	   0.011	   0.384	   0.529	   45.2	  
Denmark	   DEN	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.674	   0.442	   0.986	   0.665	   0.824	   0.046	   0.584	   0.620	   83.0	  
Dominican	  
Rep.	   DOM	   PR	   PRES	   1980	   0.415	   0.323	   0.710	   0.457	   0.549	   0.000	   0.192	   0.368	   48.1	  
Ecuador	   ECU	   PR	   PRES	   1979	   0.809	   0.430	   0.712	   0.628	   0.573	   0.150	   0.176	   0.409	   26.6	  
El	  Salvador	   SAL	   PR	   PRES	   1984	   0.520	   0.341	   0.741	   0.509	   0.501	   0.000	   0.136	   0.328	   39.4	  
Estonia	   EST	   PR	   PARL	   1991	   0.692	   0.503	   0.948	   0.691	   0.475	   0.026	   0.255	   0.341	   40.4	  
Finland	   FIN	   PR	   sPARL	   1946	   0.705	   0.586	   0.722	   0.668	   0.685	   0.003	   0.450	   0.501	   64.3	  
France	   FRN	   Maj.	   sPRES	   1946	   0.445	   0.404	   0.710	   0.504	   0.624	   0.022	   0.629	   0.505	   52.4	  
Georgia	   GRG	   Mix.	   sPRES	   1992	   0.399	   0.369	   0.809	   0.492	   0.563	   0.042	   0.207	   0.387	   41.2	  
Germany	   GMY	   Mix.	   PARL	   1949	   0.568	   0.434	   0.966	   0.620	   0.718	   0.097	   0.568	   0.564	   58.5	  
Ghana	   GHA	   Maj.	   PRES	   1993	   0.314	   0.309	   0.713	   0.411	   0.703	   0.005	   0.081	   0.439	   71.3	  
Greece	   GRC	   PR	   PARL	   1974	   0.373	   0.301	   0.929	   0.471	   0.648	   0.000	   0.362	   0.461	   45.1	  
Guatemala	   GUA	   PR	   PRES	   1986	   0.572	   0.431	   0.726	   0.563	   0.351	   0.051	   0.178	   0.256	   33.4	  
Hungary	   HUN	   Mix.	   PARL	   1990	   0.479	   0.400	   0.893	   0.555	   0.505	   0.134	   0.183	   0.366	   29.2	  
Iceland	   ICE	   PR	   sPARL	   1946	   0.578	   0.448	   0.977	   0.632	   0.859	   0.000	   0.516	   0.618	   66.4	  
India	   IND	   Maj.	   PARL	   1947	   0.729	   0.574	   0.926	   0.729	   0.577	   0.000	   0.275	   0.401	   61.8	  
Indonesia	   INS	   PR	   PRES	   1999	   0.775	   0.510	   0.760	   0.670	   0.796	   0.000	   0.127	   0.503	   46.2	  
Ireland	   IRE	   PR	   sPARL	   1946	   0.508	   0.382	   0.945	   0.568	   0.660	   0.161	   0.517	   0.532	   72.1	  
Israel	   ISR	   PR	   PARL	   1948	   0.818	   0.591	   0.979	   0.779	   0.705	   0.000	   0.390	   0.501	   41.3	  
Italy	   ITA	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.739	   0.335	   0.939	   0.614	   0.707	   0.459	   0.517	   0.619	   30.7	  
Jamaica	   JAM	   Maj.	   PARL	   1962	   0.216	   0.301	   0.844	   0.380	   0.485	   0.000	   0.077	   0.306	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type*	   DBY	   LENP	   LNPG	   TEP	   IDD	   GEP	   REP	   NEP	   PDD	  
SWD	  	  
(%)	  
Japan	   JPN	   Mix.	   PARL	   1947	   0.450	   0.393	   0.894	   0.541	   0.647	   0.000	   0.602	   0.509	   55.1	  
Latvia	   LAT	   PR	   PARL	   1991	   0.766	   0.592	   0.948	   0.755	   0.531	   0.108	   0.345	   0.409	   32.5	  
Lithuania	   LIT	   Mix.	   sPARL	   1991	   0.630	   0.477	   0.897	   0.646	   0.471	   0.226	   0.331	   0.394	   36.2	  
Luxembourg	   LUX	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.593	   0.466	   0.961	   0.643	   0.483	   0.003	   0.563	   0.403	   79.0	  
Macedonia	   MAC	   PR	   sPARL	   1991	   0.501	   0.487	   0.866	   0.596	   0.571	   0.021	   0.210	   0.389	   42.3	  
Malaysia	   MAL	   Maj.	   PARL	   1974	   0.358	   0.554	   0.848	   0.552	   0.564	   0.000	   0.064	   0.351	  
	  Mali	   MLI	   Maj.	   sPRES	   1992	   0.528	   0.377	   0.809	   0.544	   0.281	   0.005	   0.156	   0.201	  
Malta	   MLT	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.300	   0.301	   0.984	   0.446	   0.953	   0.003	   0.342	   0.641	   62.6	  
Mexico	   MEX	   Mix.	   PRES	   1994	   0.437	   0.313	   0.685	   0.454	   0.528	   0.036	   0.260	   0.376	   27.1	  
Moldova	   MLD	   PR	   PARL	   1990	   0.432	   0.338	   0.903	   0.509	   0.560	   0.014	   0.156	   0.397	   20.5	  
Namibia	   NAM	   PR	   PRES	   1990	   0.229	   0.301	   0.870	   0.391	   0.683	   0.000	   0.175	   0.445	   72.7	  
Netherlands	   NTH	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.721	   0.547	   0.989	   0.731	   0.754	   0.086	   0.516	   0.573	   71.5	  
New	  Zealand	  NEW	   Mix.	   PARL	   1946	   0.470	   0.354	   0.930	   0.537	   0.781	   0.000	   0.888	   0.646	   68.5	  
Norway	   NOR	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.651	   0.444	   0.967	   0.654	   0.752	   0.110	   0.651	   0.603	   79.4	  
Panama	   PAN	   Mix.	   PRES	   1989	   0.549	   0.361	   0.703	   0.518	   0.621	   0.031	   0.160	   0.411	   37.8	  
Paraguay	   PAR	   PR	   PRES	   1990	   0.440	   0.305	   0.696	   0.454	   0.413	   0.000	   0.181	   0.284	   15.9	  
Peru	   PER	   PR	   sPRES	   1980	   0.579	   0.394	   0.751	   0.555	   0.617	   0.005	   0.226	   0.416	   19.1	  
Philippines	   PHI	   Mix.	   PRES	   1986	   0.558	   0.460	   0.661	   0.553	   0.620	   0.000	   0.107	   0.394	   51.1	  
Poland	   POL	   PR	   sPARL	   1989	   0.675	   0.464	   0.683	   0.598	   0.507	   0.036	   0.220	   0.355	   42.7	  
Portugal	   POR	   PR	   sPARL	   1976	   0.415	   0.310	   0.947	   0.496	   0.637	   0.016	   0.243	   0.434	   49.8	  
Romania	   ROM	   PR	   sPRES	   1990	   0.560	   0.414	   0.765	   0.562	   0.643	   0.029	   0.137	   0.419	   34.4	  
Senegal	   SEN	   Mix.	   sPRES	   2000	   0.186	   0.314	   0.691	   0.343	   0.399	   0.050	   0.137	   0.277	   55.2	  
Slovakia	   SLO	   PR	   sPARL	   1993	   0.673	   0.558	   0.940	   0.707	   0.760	   0.118	   0.387	   0.557	   28.1	  
Slovenia	   SLV	   PR	   sPARL	   1991	   0.758	   0.548	   0.963	   0.737	   0.727	   0.183	   0.274	   0.528	   44.7	  
South	  Africa	   SAF	   PR	   PARL	   1994	   0.325	   0.372	   0.997	   0.494	   0.657	   0.003	   0.185	   0.432	   52.5	  
South	  Korea	   KOR	   Mix.	   PRES	   1988	   0.430	   0.352	   0.670	   0.466	   0.648	   0.000	   0.420	   0.473	   43.4	  
Spain	   SPN	   PR	   PARL	   1977	   0.407	   0.319	   0.945	   0.497	   0.751	   0.007	   0.273	   0.507	   58.0	  
Sri	  Lanka	   SRI	   PR	   PRES	   1989	   0.421	   0.321	   0.727	   0.461	   0.729	   0.000	   0.167	   0.471	  
	  Sweden	   SWD	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.610	   0.476	   0.981	   0.658	   0.803	   0.005	   0.772	   0.637	   70.2	  
Switzerland	   SWZ	   PR	   PARL	   1946	   0.739	   0.663	   0.970	   0.780	   0.375	   1.000	   0.706	   0.566	   78.9	  
Taiwan	   TAW	   Mix.	   sPRES	   1989	   0.420	   0.312	   0.705	   0.452	   0.692	   0.088	   0.106	   0.454	   58.9	  
Tanzania	   TAZ	   Maj.	   PRES	   1995	   0.143	   0.364	   0.775	   0.343	   0.547	   0.011	   0.198	   0.370	   	  
Thailand	   THI	   Mix.	   PARL	   1983	   0.635	   0.508	   0.934	   0.670	   0.664	   0.011	   0.032	   0.407	  
	  Trinidad	   TRI	   Maj.	   PARL	   1962	   0.310	   0.315	   0.919	   0.447	   0.655	   0.000	   0.228	   0.438	  
	  Turkey	   TUR	   PR	   PARL	   1983	   0.530	   0.429	   0.857	   0.580	   0.662	   0.000	   0.133	   0.424	  
	  UK	   UKG	   Maj.	   PARL	   1946	   0.353	   0.301	   0.839	   0.447	   0.652	   0.008	   0.701	   0.533	   61.6	  
Ukraine	   UKR	   PR	   sPRES	   1991	   0.613	   0.610	   0.702	   0.640	   0.698	   0.088	   0.178	   0.472	   16.8	  
Uruguay	   URU	   PR	   PRES	   1985	   0.455	   0.473	   0.715	   0.536	   0.769	   0.051	   0.327	   0.537	   62.9	  
USA	   USA	   Maj.	   PRES	   1946	   0.296	   0.301	   0.700	   0.397	   0.458	   1.000	   0.740	   0.623	   76.3	  
Venezuela	   VEN	   Mix.	   PRES	   1959	   0.568	   0.368	   0.726	   0.533	   0.483	   0.054	   0.188	   0.338	   46.1	  
Zambia	   ZAM	   Maj.	   PRES	   1991	   0.383	   0.301	   0.707	   0.434	   0.399	   0.000	   0.151	   0.269	   49.1	  
Note: DBY: Democracy Birth Year (Source: Cheibub, 2007; Marshall et al., 2011); 
PR=Proportional Representation, Maj. = Majority/Plurality, Mix. =Mixed; PARL 
=Parliamentary, sPARL =semi-Parliamentary, PRES =Presidential, sPRES =semi-
Presidential; LENP = Log (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties); LNPG = Log 
(Number of Parties in Government +1); TEP = Total Electoral Proportionality; IDD = 
Integrative Dimension of Democracy = (LENP*LNPG*TEP) 1/3; GEP = General-Electoral 
Participation; REP = Referendum-Electoral Participation; NEP = Non-Electoral 
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Participation; PDD = Participative Dimension of Democracy = 0.60*GEP + 0.20*REP + 
0.20*NEP; SWD = Satisfaction With Democracy. 
# Electoral system in some countries changed as follows (Bormann & Golder 2012; 
Doorenspleet, 2005; IDEA, 2012; Norris, 2011):  
PR to Mixed: Bolivia (1997), Italy (1994), Romania (2008) and Venezuela (1993);   
Mixed to PR: Albania (2009), Croatia (2000), Ecuador (1998), Italy (2006), Turkey 
(1995) and Ukraine (2006);  
Majority to Mixed: Japan (1996), New Zealand (1996), Philippines (1998), Thailand 
(2001) and Ukraine (1998); 
Majority to PR: Macedonia (1998); 
* After 2000, regime type in Croatia, Finland and Poland changed from semi-presidential 
to semi-parliamentary and in Moldova from semi-presidential to parliamentary. 
Sources of data to calculate IDD and PDD: African Eelections Database, 2012; 
Afrobarometer, 2012; Alcantara, 2012; Araúz et al., 2010; Armingeon & Careja, 2007; 
Armingeon et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2001; Benito Sánchez, 2010; Bormann & Golder, 
2012; Bunker, 2007; C2D, 2012; Carey & Hix, 2010; Carr, 2012; Coppedge, 2007; 
Croissant & Martin, 2006; Democracy Barometer, 2010; Direct Democracy Navigator, 
2012; EVS, 2012; Foweraker, 1999; Gallagher, 2012; Globalbarometer, 2012; Golder, 
2005; IDEA, 2012; IPU, 2012; Keesing, 1998; Kriesi & Bochsler, 2012; Latinobarometro, 
2012; Nohlen & Stöver, 2010; Norris, 2009; Qi, 2010; Reilly, 2007; Statistics Norway, 
2012; Stockton, 2012; Van der Krieken, 2011; Van Eerd, 2009; WVS, 2012.  
Sources of data on SWD: Afrobarometer, 2013; ANU Poll, 2013; Central Archive for 
Empirical Social Research, 1997; East Asia Barometer, 2013; EVS/WVS, 2006;; 
European Commission, 2013; European Values Study, 2011; Globalbarometer, 2009; 
ISSP Research Group , 1999; LAPOP, 2013; Latinobarometer, 2013; Mattes & Davids, 
2000; Nadeau, 2002; Schmitt et al., 2008; Social Weather Stations, 2013; The 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 2013; WVS, 2009; Zhu et al., 2001. 
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Table E.2. Correlations between two dimensions of democracy and 
cultural/socio-economic indicators (including outliers) 
  
1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	  
1	   IDD	  (1990-­‐2009)	   1	  
(80)	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